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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  
1.1. Background 
“The sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a 
possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we 
consider it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries.”(Grotius, 1609).  
Although, even today, the surface of the moon is better known and mapped 
than the ocean floor, the oceans are no longer considered as limitless as in the 
days of Grotius. Human activities such as fisheries and pollution are now 
clearly taking their toll in ocean space. According to the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (2009) many fish stocks are fully exploited or in decline, and we 
are dealing with increasing pollution both in air and water (ICES, 2003), while 
economic activities in ocean space are rapidly expanding. 
 One of the main reasons why we are so rapidly depleting the ocean’s 
resources and polluting ocean space, has already been pointed out by Aristotle 
in 350 BC: “For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care 
bestowed upon it.” (Aristotle, 350 BC). This argument was popularized some 
2000 years later as “the Tragedy of the Commons” by Hardin (1968). A more 
formal economic analysis was introduced by Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955); 
they argue that open access to a resource leads to depletion, but under private 
property a resource will be well managed.  
In 1960, the UN recognized that measures had to be taken to manage ocean 
space and its resources. A series of conferences lead, in 1982, to the new Law of 
the Sea as codified in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea III, 
also known as UNCLOS III. It came into force on 16 November 1994, and has 
currently been signed by 161 countries (UN, 2010). 
By UNCLOS III, at least the following zones occur in the marine part of 
states: The territorial zone (12 nautical miles, nm) which fully falls under 
national jurisdiction. Then comes the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Its 
border is determined as a 200 miles zone from the coastline or by the edge of 
the continental shelf. In this zone states have the exclusive right to exploit the 
resources in a sustainable way. Beyond the national EEZs lie the High Seas, 
comprising 38% of ocean space (VLIZ, 2011). Here the notion of the Common 
Heritage of Mankind is applicable (Borgese, 1998; Stel and Loorbach, 2003). In 
practice however, the open access approach as pleaded for by Grotius still 
persists for the High Seas of ocean space.  
It would be naïve, however, to think that with the assignment of property 
rights or rights to exploit resources in a sustainable way, as in the EEZs, all 
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 problems would simply be solved. After all, ecosystems are not governed by 
human boundaries, they are open and highly dynamic systems. This results in 
two main problems: The first problem is that we are often dealing with 
transboundary common goods as in the case of shared fish stocks, and public 
goods issues as in the case of mitigation of transboundary pollution. The 
shared characteristic of these issues is that in both cases other countries cannot 
be excluded from enjoying the benefits. In addition for public goods such as 
mitigation of transboundary pollution, the benefit is non-rivalrous. Both 
characteristics lead to free-riding and under-provision of these goods from a 
global point of view. 
The second problem is the coordination and planning of economic activities 
within the EEZ of a single country. An increasing number of economic 
activities takes place, or are being planned in EEZs. Some of these activities 
may be incompatible with each other, whereas others may be perfectly 
compatible. Policy making for the separate activities, however, often takes 
place on a sectoral basis, with little regard for other activities, resulting in 
inefficient and suboptimal policy outcomes. Fishing, for example, is still 
unrestricted in Natura 2000 areas in the Dutch North Sea,  although quota exist 
on the total catch.  
 
1.2. Objective and research questions 
Ocean space is used for a large number of economic activities, and new human 
activities are being proposed. To use the marine environment in a sustainable 
way, we have to manage these human activities. In this way we can continue to 
enjoy the goods and services provided by the ocean system sustainably, 
without damaging the system irreversibly. 
Several instruments can be applied for the management of human activities 
in ocean space, but of course each instrument has its strengths and weaknesses. 
These depend on both the activity we wish to manage and on the state of the 
ocean system. Moreover, the advantages and disadvantages are related to the 
scale of the analysis and the problem at hand. A good instrument at country 
level may perform similar, better or worse at inter-country level. The analysis 
of these two broad problems forms the basis of this thesis. The aim of the thesis 
is therefore: 
To contribute to the optimal management of marine resources, by developing  
models for optimal spatial planning of offshore wind farms and by developing models to 
investigate the economic incentives associated with the planning of Marine Protected 
Areas both in EEZs and the High Seas . 
In the thesis I have chosen to study three activities in the ocean space, one 
new and two traditional ones, being: offshore wind farms, fisheries and nature 
conservation. As instruments I consider marine spatial planning and a specific 
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 tool within marine spatial planning: Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). Effort 
restrictions are also used in some of the chapters. More specifically the 
following questions are addressed in this thesis: 
 
1. How can spatial planning of new uses of ocean space improve the 
ecosystem management in the marine environment? 
2. How does the multiple use nature of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) 
affect the incentives of countries to assign such areas? 
3. How does the perceived uniqueness of species and their distribution over 
ecosystems owned by different countries affect the MPA assignment of 
countries? 
4. How does the assignment of MPAs in the High Seas influence the 
formation of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations? 
 
1.3. Methodology  
To address the questions above I use both constrained optimization techniques 
and game theory. While considering these questions we move through 
different scale levels. Question 1 is a problem at the local scale, i.e. the EEZ of a 
single country. Questions 2 and 3 involve the EEZs of several countries. 
Question 4 is defined at the scale of the High Sea. As a consequence, it concerns 
all countries of the world, through the international negotiations in the context 
of the UN.  
In Chapter 2 I address research question one. Spatial planning is interpreted 
as a constrained optimization problem. Consequently we formulate a 
constrained optimization model where a central planner’s perspective is 
applied to plan economic activities. The objective of the planner is to maximize 
society’s welfare, by generating an optimal spatial plan of economic activities. 
Planning economic activities, however, is constrained by both spatial economic 
and ecological restrictions. Restrictions in space are incompatible other 
economic activities and differing costs and benefits of locations. Ecological 
restrictions are restrictions to protect habitats or species. A number of scenarios 
and associated plans are generated by applying different restrictions, e.g. a 
minimum number of birds protected, or disallowing wind farms in 
ecologically sensitive areas. These plans are then evaluated on their merits. 
For studying research questions two to four I use game theory. Game theory 
is a mathematical method to analyze strategic interactions among agents. 
Agents choose a strategy from their possible set of strategies, such that they 
maximize their payoffs given the behavior of other agents. Because MPAs 
constitute, at least partly, public goods and fish stocks constitute a common 
pool resource, strategic interaction between countries is likely to occur. 
Therefore game theory is an appropriate method to analyze such situations. 
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 Chapter 3 deals with research question two. The chapter investigates the 
incentives of countries to assign an MPA, when they account for the fisheries 
benefits only, for the biodiversity conservation benefits only or for both. I 
devise a game theoretic model in which countries can cooperate or free-ride on 
each other’s contribution, and derive the optimal MPA size under the fisheries 
only, conservation only or the combined scenario.  
Chapter 4 addresses research question three. I devise a two player game in 
which countries decide to allocate MPAs in ecosystems that are available to 
them. Species are distributed over the ecosystems, but a number of species 
occur in multiple ecosystems, creating overlap between ecosystems. I 
investigate the MPA size chosen in each ecosystem, if countries cooperate, 
behave strategically, or ignore the contributions in biodiversity protection by 
the other country.  
Chapter 5 deals with the fourth research question. I investigate how the 
assignment of an MPA influences the stability of Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations (RFMOs) through adapting an existing RFMO 
formation game such that MPAs can be accommodated. I then study how the 
introduction of such an MPA influences the potential stability of the formed 
coalitions.  
1.4. Institutional setting and scale 
1.4.1. Background 
When looking at the management of ocean space, one inevitably runs into 
issues of scale. The reason is that at different scales different problems occur, 
because different rules and regulations apply. In this thesis I look at various 
scale levels and move from local problems, involving one country, to regional 
problems involving a few countries, to international problems involving a large 
number of countries. The increase in complexity due to larger numbers of 
countries involved necessitates an increased abstraction of reality to keep the 
models and results traceable and meaningful. 
The laws and policy at the various levels are framed by the Law of the Sea 
Legislation (UNCLOS III). UNCLOS III constitutes international law in the 
marine domain. It defines among others, the territorial sea, EEZ and High Seas. 
In this thesis I will ignore the difference between the EEZ and the territorial 
sea, because the studied problems that apply at the EEZ level apply equally at 
the territorial level1. 
In the next section I describe the institutional setting at the different scale 
1The last version of the Law of the Sea and its amendments, as well as the current signatories 
can be found at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm. For a more thorough review of 
UNCLOS III see e.g. Churchill and Lowe  (1999) 
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 levels. I define the local scale as the EEZ of a single country. The problems 
addressed at this scale comprise coordination and optimization problems 
within one country’s EEZ. Issues such as: “How can we arrive at an optimal 
spatial configuration for multiple users?” are addressed at this level. As an 
example we will describe the institutional setting in which the Netherlands 
operates in the North Sea, as it clearly illustrates the setting in which a typical 
Western state operates. 
I define the regional scale at the level of what is called a ‘regional sea’, i.e. a 
sea that is fully claimed by EEZs, such as the Baltic and North Sea. Problems 
addressed at this level comprise coordination problems among countries such 
as: “How can we manage shared fish stocks best?” “What is the influence of 
multiple uses on the optimal allocation of fishing effort and nature 
conservation if countries cooperate, free-ride or ignore each other?” Here we 
will scale up the Dutch example to the EU level. 
Finally, I define the international level as the High Seas. These areas are 
governed by international law, through the International Seabed Authority and 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations. In the High Seas the notion of 
Common Heritage of Mankind is applied. Their management is complicated by 
the fact that international law is hard to enforce, and governance at this level is 
carried out by means of voluntary international agreements. The problems 
addressed at this level comprise typical international environmental agreement 
problems, such as:  “How to build a coalition of countries that manage the fish 
stocks of the sea in a sustainable way?” 
1.4.2. Local level 
The local scale is defined here as the EEZ of a single country; in our case the 
Dutch EEZ in the North Sea. At the local scale the Dutch have access to a part 
of the North Sea (including a part of the Wadden Sea). This part can be divided 
into the territorial waters where the Netherlands has full jurisdiction, and the 
EEZ where it has the rights to exploit the resources sustainably. From an 
economic perspective, however, both are the same, because with regard to the 
economic exploitation the same set of rules and regulations apply2. 
The Dutch North Sea is governed by a plethora of rules and regulations, 
depending upon the administrative sector. Fisheries, nature, oil and gas 
extraction and energy generation at the North Sea are the responsibility of the 
2The administrative situation described here is the one that exists since 2010. Before 2010 a 
number of ministries existed that have now merged, making the situation before 2010 even 
more complicated. Most notably for the North Sea: the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and 
Food Quality and the Ministry of Economic Affairs merged into the new ‘Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation’. The Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment merged into 
the ‘Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment’. 
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 Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation. In addition both 
fisheries and nature conservation are subject to European policies, most 
notably the Bird and Habitats Directive for nature and the European Common 
Fisheries Policy for fisheries. Furthermore the Netherlands is a signatory to a 
number of international environmental agreements obliging it to reduce 
pollution. These agreements include the OSPAR convention to reduce 
pollution from dumping, land-based pollution and non-polluting activities that 
adversely affect the seas. 
Extraction of oil, gas and minerals as well as energy generation are also the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation. 
The ministry grants licenses for the extraction of these resources in specific 
areas. Companies can apply for these licenses. If approved, they can, subject to 
further regulations, extract resources or build offshore wind parks. The 
extraction of aggregates, such as sand and gravel, is the responsibility of 
another ministry: the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. The 
procedure for aggregates is similar to that of other non-renewable resources, 
i.e. companies apply for licenses with which they are granted to extract 
aggregates at certain locations, subject to further regulations.  
Navigation at the North sea is also governed by the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment, but is further subject to international 
regulations through UNCLOS III which defines the freedom of navigation, the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, which lies out 
navigational rules and ships routing, and the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships and the Bonn agreement which try to 
reduce pollution from shipping. 
Concerning the further (spatial) planning of the North Sea, the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment is also responsible for the law on spatial 
planning. In practice it states that the government should come up with a 
spatial vision for the North Sea. This has been realized with the Integral 
Management Plan North Sea 2015, which was formulated by an inter-
ministerial committee, IDON. It contains an integral plan concerning the 
health, economics and spatial planning of the North Sea (IDON, 2005). 
Furthermore the European Union has formulated the Marine Strategy 
Directive, obliging each country to formulate a Marine Strategy for its EEZ. 
This strategy should be an integrated spatial plan that follows a holistic 
ecosystem-based approach (European Commission, 2008). This view was        
re-affirmed in the Maritime Policy of the EU where the Marine Strategy 
Directive is seen as its environmental pillar (European Commission, 2006; van 
Hoof and van Tatenhove, 2009). Both the policy and the directive are the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. 
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 1.4.3. Regional level 
The Dutch EEZ in the North Sea borders with the EEZs of the United 
Kingdom, Belgium and Germany. With these countries, the Netherlands 
consequently has to deal when it comes to transboundary issues. At this level 
most activities are governed by European Directives and policy as well as 
international law. The relevant European legislation is the Marine Strategy 
Directive, the Bird and Habitats Directive, and the Water Framework Directive. 
The main policies are the Common Fisheries Policy and the Maritime Policy. 
The Marine Strategy Directive obliges all countries of the EU to formulate a 
marine strategy. Such a strategy should be an integrated strategy that should 
“culminate in the execution of programmes of measures designed to achieve or 
maintain good environmental status” and “while being specific to its own 
waters, reflects the overall perspective of the marine region or subregion 
concerned” (European Commission, 2008, preamble). Although the Directive 
specifies that countries should cooperate, both with EU members and non-EU 
members it leaves the details to the countries involved in the formulation of 
the strategies. The Bird and Habitats Directive and Water Framework Directive 
suffers from similar problems. Both, in principle, oblige countries to designate 
a network of protected areas (including Marine Protected Areas) and define 
river basin management plans, but both do not explicitly specify the details 
(European Commission, 1992, 2000). In practice the transformation of these 
directives into legislation by individual countries leaves room for different 
interpretations (van Hoof and van Tatenhove, 2009) which consequently can 
evolve into transboundary issues in e.g. spatial planning and the planning of 
Marine Protected Areas in particular.  
As mentioned in the previous section, countries like the Netherlands have 
the rights to exploit the resources in its EEZ, but in a sustainable way. 
However, some fish stocks are shared with the aforementioned countries and 
consequently the exploitation of fish stock has been regulated with the 
Common Fisheries Policy of the EU. The ministers responsible for the fisheries 
at a national level agree annually upon quota for most stocks. As such the total 
allowable catch is regulated among EU countries. The EU also bargains with 
non-EU-members such as Norway, Russia and the Faro Islands over 
transboundary stocks (EU, 2010). Because the setting of quota is the outcome of 
a bargaining process and because the EU as a whole has to bargain with non-
members, some of the transboundary shared stock problems remain.  
The Integrated Maritime Policy is not yet in force. It aims to be an 
encompassing policy that reaches across sectors, integrating the CFP and using 
the Marine Strategy Directive as its environmental pillar. It recognizes the need 
for ecosystem based planning at the regional scale, but also acknowledges that 
the marine economic sectors should be strengthened and that planning should 
be across sectors, incorporating the views of all stakeholders (European 
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 Commission, 2006). As pointed out by van Hoof and van Tatenhove (2009), the 
main challenge of the Maritime Policy will be to realize this integration of 
stakeholders across sectors and countries. 
In order to gather the required data necessary for these kind of policies the 
EU has started to install the Global Monitoring for the Environment and 
Security system (GMES), a system that uses local and European data and 
information systems to collect long term environmental data on the oceans 
(Ryder and Stel, 2003). 
1.4.4. High Sea level 
In Europe, the Dutch North Sea does not border with any High Seas, but the 
Netherlands is partner to the several international treaties governing this part 
of ocean space. As such it is bound to rules and regulations that have been put 
into international law.  
The main piece of legislation governing economic activities in the High Seas 
is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) (UN, 
1982) and its amendments: the Agreement relating to the implementation of 
Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 (UN, 1994) and The United Nations Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN, 
1995). These conventions together provide the framework in which resources 
can be extracted from the High Seas. 
Concerning fisheries these agreements state that fishing in the High Seas 
should be regulated by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 
(RFMOs). Note that “Regional” in Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations does not refer to ‘regional seas’ but to regions in the world 
oceans. Thus RFMOs govern e.g. the North‑East Atlantic region or Western 
and Central Pacific region. The membership of RFMOs is open and 
consequently any country in the world can join.  
These RFMOs set quota for fisheries in their area. Moreover, fishing by 
nations should be sustainable and based upon the precautionary principle. 
Fishing nations should have due regard for the measures taken by coastal 
states to protect their fish stocks, and all nations should try to reach 
cooperative agreements in case of disputes (UN, 1982, 1995).   
Concerning the extraction of other resources such as minerals or oil and gas, 
these have been stated to be the Common Heritage of Mankind. The returns of 
extracting these resources should benefit mankind as a whole. For this purpose 
and for further regulations the UN have installed the Seabed Authority, that 
grants licenses, takes care of the division of benefits and should promote 
transfer of technology (UN, 1982, 1994). These rules of course only apply to 
 9 
 
 countries that have signed up to the conventions. UNCLOS has been signed by 
161 countries of the world, but the two other conventions were signed by 
considerably fewer countries. Interestingly, the USA, which has one of the 
largest EEZs in the world, has not ratified UNCLOS III, but has ratified the 
Agreement on Migratory Fish Stocks (UN, 2010). 
Another important treaty, that nearly all countries have signed is the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and more specifically the CBD of 
2006. In this convention the parties to the Convention have agreed to conserve 
at least 10% of the seas, generally interpreted as MPAs. This decision was 
reaffirmed in the conference in 2010 (CBD, 2010). Obviously, this does not 
mean that 10% of the High Seas should be protected, but given that the High 
Seas constitute 38% of the world seas (VLIZ, 2011) a one on one translation 
would mean that at least 26% of the High Seas should be protected. Currently, 
however, the total area covered by MPAs is only 1.17% of ocean space 
(Spalding et al., 2010), so the targets are far from being reached. 
Pollution is mainly regulated through the MARPOL conventions, but the 
older annexes hardly apply to the High Seas as they are based on a distance to 
land approach, that does allow for dumping in the High Seas (Ardron et al., 
2008). The newer annexes in contrast have not been ratified by all countries 
and thus cannot completely mitigate the pollution they are intended for (IMO, 
2010). 
 
1.5. Emergence of new sea users and new management instruments 
1.5.1. Offshore wind farms and marine spatial planning 
One of the oldest use of the ocean space is fisheries. Man has been fishing since 
prehistoric times, first by picking up shells and small creatures from the 
beaches and gradually moving into other ways of fishing, such as angling, and 
fishing from boats. Navigation is a use of ocean space that may be even older. 
Man reached Australia approximately 40.000 years ago by boat. Navigation is 
intimately linked with trade. Traders have been exploring the world seas in 
search of new wares and markets since ancient history. Extraction of non-
renewable resources in contrast has a long tradition for some resources and 
less for others. Salt extraction goes back to ancient times, but aggregate 
extraction (sand and gravel) and oil and gas extraction have only begun in the 
second half of the last century. Oil exploration in the North Sea for example 
started in the 1960s (Olsgard and Gray, 1995). Similarly, most aggregates were 
originally mined on land but since the 1940’s aggregate extraction has also 
been carried out at sea (Smith, 2000).  
Thus ocean space has become a lot busier over the ages and is becoming 
busier still. One of the most recently emerged activities on the seas is the 
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 extraction of wave and wind energy as renewable energy supply. Our 
increasing demand for energy, and renewable energy in particular, has led us 
to look at the seas as a potential source of energy. The steady and strong winds 
on the seas offer a large energy potential for offshore wind parks. Wind power 
has been used for centuries, but was never very interesting for the generation 
of electricity. Nowadays the increase in turbine size combined with 
technological progress makes onshore wind electricity a feasible economic 
option. Offshore wind farms are generally not economically feasible yet, but 
may become feasible if positive social and ecological effects of offshore wind 
farms and negative social and ecological effects of fossil fuels are accounted for 
(Snyder and Kaiser, 2009; OECD, 2010). 
Within the ecological effects the main negative effect comprises mortality of 
animals, particularly birds (Exo et al., 2003; Drewitt and Langston 2006). Other 
effects include habitat alteration and disturbance by noise and electromagnetic 
fields (Elliott, 2002; Petersen and Malm, 2006). Positive effects may occur as 
well. Offshore wind farms are functioning as artificial reefs attracting fish and 
offering new habitat types. They can also act as de facto marine reserves if 
fishing is prohibited (Wilhelmsson et al., 2006; Fayram and de Risi, 2007). 
Socially some gains are expected from removing the wind farms from the 
direct view, mitigating the “Not In My Back Yard” effect but whether this 
really applies is questionable (Firestone and Kempton, 2007; Haggett, 2008).  
From the economic perspective the offshore environment offers a few other 
advantages and disadvantages: on the one hand strong, steady winds increase 
the potential energy generation and less turbulent winds and a reduction in 
wind shear reduce equipment costs. On the other hand the harsh environment, 
the foundations and the cabling increase the costs of offshore wind farms 
(Henderson et al., 2002; Mathew, 2006). 
Most, if not all, of these effects have a spatial component. Obviously local 
wind speeds, depth and distance from the shore are important revenue and 
cost considerations when planning offshore wind farms. Similarly both 
positive and negative ecological effects differ with location as some 
environments are more vulnerable than others or are more susceptible to 
improvement by offshore wind farms. It is therefore hardly surprising that the 
emergence of offshore wind farms as a new activity was one of the main 
drivers behind the start of the Marine Spatial Planning processes in several 
European countries (Douvere et al., 2007). 
Marine Spatial Planning is a holistic approach that applies ecosystem-based 
sea use management to allocate parts of ocean space to specific uses in order to 
achieve optimal economic, ecological and social objectives. Because it is cross-
sector it can be used to identify synergies and conflicts between different uses 
(Douvere et al., 2007; Douvere, 2008). Further advantages of Marine Spatial 
Planning include a more rational site selection for development and 
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 conservation, more efficient use of marine resources, and a more strategic and 
proactive framework for decision making (Gilliland and Laffoley, 2008). 
The need for spatial considerations in offshore wind farms has been 
recognized sector-wise and several models exist taking spatial economic 
differences into consideration (e.g. Kooijman et al., 2001). Spatial ecological 
aspects have also been researched (e.g. Garthe and Hüppop, 2004, van der Wal 
et al., 2006) but for Marine Spatial Planning a more integrated model is 
necessary. Such a model would take other economic activities into account as 
well as the spatial ecological effect. The main social effects can be addressed by 
generating several scenarios with such a model by, and together with, 
stakeholders. The scenarios generated by the different stakeholders can then 
form the basis for discussion among stakeholders and policymakers. In 
Chapter 2 such a model is designed and applied to the Dutch North Sea. 
 
1.5.2. Multiple use Marine Protected Areas at the regional level 
As mentioned in the previous section the designation of offshore wind farms 
was one of the main drivers behind the start of MSP in Europe. Another main 
driver was nature conservation, especially the habitat and birds directives 
(Douvere et al., 2007; Douvere, 2008). These directives require the designation 
of protected areas, including Marine Protected Areas (European Commission, 
1992). As a result Marine Protected Areas became an important instrument 
within MSP in Europe, and as such they are included in the Marine Strategy 
Directive (European Commission, 2008) and mentioned in the Maritime Policy 
(European Commission, 2006). 
An essential tool within MSP are therefore Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). 
The interpretation of the term “protected” basically defines what the goal of 
such areas is e.g. fisheries management, nature conservation, tourism, or 
something else. The use of MPAs as a fisheries management tool has been 
criticized as inefficient, especially under open access (Hannesson, 1998; 
Anderson, 2002) and overly optimistic if fishermen behavior is ignored (Smith 
and Wilen, 2004), but also promoted as hedge against uncertainty (Lauck et al., 
1998; Sumaila, 2002; Sumaila et al., 2007) and useful if a habitat-effect occurs 
(Schnier, 2005a,b; Armstrong, 2007; Armstrong and Falk-Petersen, 2008). For 
conservation, its effects have generally been shown to be positive (Halpern and 
Warner, 2002; Lubchenco et al., 2003; Halpern et al., 2010) although they 
obviously cannot protect species from more mobile threats such as pollution 
and oil spills. 
One of the reasons that MPAs are gaining momentum in MSP and marine 
conservation is exactly because they can serve different goals at the same time 
and a number of authors have investigated possible synergies such as between 
nature conservation and tourism (Brown et al., 2000; Boncoeur et al., 2002; de 
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 Groot and Bush, 2010; Thur, 2010), nature conservation and fisheries 
management (Tundi Agardy, 1994; Gell and Roberts, 2003; Meester et al., 2004) 
and nature conservation and scientific research (Lindeboom, 1995). All of these 
studies, however, focus on the local scale, whereas some of these benefits e.g. 
nature conservation and fisheries benefits, are public goods, i.e. their benefits 
are non-excludible at the regional level whereas the costs are borne by single 
countries.  
The non-excludability of benefits of MPAs at the regional scale has also been 
recognized, but always for single uses, usually fisheries. Ruijs and Janmaat 
(2007) investigate the location of an MPA in a transboundary fishery and how 
it is affected by fish migration and non-cooperative behavior. Sumaila (2002) 
studies how MPAs can serve as a hedge against shocks in fish growth in a 
transboundary fisheries. The public good aspect of MPAs with regard to 
nature conservation has received little attention, but Busch (2008) has derived 
a number of general conditions for transboundary parks to be superior over 
isolated parks, such that countries will assign transboundary parks instead of 
isolated ones. 
The fact that MPAs serve multiple goals may at the regional scale affect 
incentives of countries to assign MPAs, depending on which uses of the MPA 
they account for. In Chapter 3 I investigate how the incentives of countries 
change depending whether they account for the fisheries benefits, the nature 
conservation benefits or both. 
1.5.3. Marine Protected Areas configurations at the regional level 
As argued in the previous section MPAs are an important instrument for 
marine conservation and MSP, but at the regional scale they suffer from free-
riding problems. Even if all uses are accounted for as investigated in Chapter 
3, free-riding problems persist. In that Chapter, however, I only investigate the 
size of MPAs and ignore the spatial aspect of MPAs.  
The importance of the spatial configuration of MPAs has been emphasized 
by several authors, both with regards to the fisheries and nature conservation. 
In fisheries for example, Costello and Kaffine (2010) show that MPAs are 
created endogenously when spatial territorial user rights are used in the 
fisheries. Sanchirico (2004) studies the importance of connectivity and how it 
affects which patches in a meta-population are to be designated as MPA. 
Sanchirico and Wilen (2001) identify ecological structures necessary for MPAs 
to increase both harvest and stock. Smith and Wilen (2003, 2004) show the 
importance of taking the spatial effort redistribution of fishermen into account 
when designing MPAs. 
Spatial configuration has attracted similar attention in marine nature 
conservation. The literature on these subjects comprises mainly reserve site 
selection problems. Meester et al. (2004) identify MPA configurations for a 
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 given number of MPA sites that meet multiple targets concerning species 
representation, fisheries effort and reserve shape. Ball and Possingham 
(2000) designed MARXAN, a program that calculates MPA configurations 
given specific minimum representation targets of species, while minimizing 
the costs of the full reserve, or the boundary length of the full reserve. Game 
et al. (2008) investigate spatial configurations to minimize the probability of 
losing biodiversity in reserves through a catastrophe. 
In contrast to fishermen, the influence of spatial configuration on the 
economic incentives of countries has received relatively little attention. In the 
fisheries literature Ruijs and Janmaat (2007) address the issue, although they 
only consider a single MPA. In marine conservation the problem has hardly 
been studied so far, but some work has been done in the terrestrial domain 
(e.g. Rodrigues and Gaston, 2002 and Jantke and Schneider, 2010). These 
papers, however, only consider cost-effectiveness in a single country versus 
cost-effectiveness under full cooperation and ignore strategic incentives. 
In Chapter 4 I explore the incentives and how the MPA configuration is 
influenced by the distribution of species over ecosystems. I also point out the 
important differences in configuration between the situation where countries 
ignore the contribution to protection by other countries and the situation 
where free-riding on these contributions occurs. The former situation is 
similar to the approach by Rodrigues and Gaston (2002) and Jantke and 
Schneider (2010), the latter is the approach usually taken by economists 
when studying public goods. 
1.5.4. Marine Protected Areas at the High Sea level 
In the previous sections I have outlined the importance of MPAs and the 
incentives associated with these MPAs at the regional sea level. MPAs, 
however, are also increasingly called for as an instrument for management of 
the High Seas. MPAs are seen as the way forward in the High Seas, 
especially to protect vulnerable habitats, such as sea mounts and as a 
management tool for High Sea fisheries (Sumaila et al., 2007; North-East 
Atlantic Fisheries Commission, 2009; IUCN, 2010). Several proposals have 
been made to designate at least 10% of the High Seas as MPA (Sumaila et al., 
2007). 
The High Sea is governed by other mechanisms and institutions then 
regional seas and as a consequence the incentives, and ways to assign MPAs, 
are also very different from the regional seas. Because no property rights 
exist in the High Seas, MPAs cannot be assigned by a country; they have to 
be assigned through an international agreement. Some partial MPAs have 
been designated on the High Seas, e.g. by the North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission that outlawed trawling in certain areas (North-East Atlantic 
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 Fisheries Commission, 2009). 
The only way to ensure that an MPA is indeed a protected area, i.e. an area 
where certain activities such as fishing are outlawed, is by unanimous 
agreement, because if a country does not agree and permits these activities the 
MPA is no longer a protected area. Therefore an MPA agreement must be 
acceptable and beneficial to all potential users of the area where the MPA is to 
be installed. 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) regulate the High 
Sea fisheries in certain parts of the High Seas. Although countries are obliged 
by UNCLOS III to join the appropriate RFMO if they wish to fish in the area 
managed by the RFMO, they cannot be excluded if they fish there without 
joining the RFMO. Another way to fish outside the RFMO membership would 
be to choose to resign from UNCLOS. When fishing without joining the 
appropriate RFMO countries are said to be involved in Unregulated Fishing. It 
can be beneficial to a country not to join an RFMO and engage in unregulated 
fishing, because in this way the country is not bound to Total Allowable 
Catches, and it can profit from the effort reductions by the RFMO members. 
The problem then, to get countries to join an RFMO can be thought of as an 
international environmental agreement where a coalition of countries forms an 
RFMO, whereas the other countries free-ride on the effort reductions by this 
RFMO. In recent literature (e.g. Pintassilgo et al., 2010) this has been analyzed 
as a coalition formation game, that studied the stability of coalitions to reduce 
fishing effort. 
If MPAs would be assigned in the High Seas, they would change effort 
decisions. Since effort decisions are in part dictated by RFMO membership the 
MPAs may also change RFMO membership. In Chapter 5 I use the fisheries 
model of Chapter 3 to check the influence of MPAs on this coalition formation. 
1.6. Reading guide 
The remaining chapters of this thesis answer the research questions phrased in 
section 1.2 and the last chapter draws some overall conclusions. The scale level 
of analysis of the research questions moves in the same direction as the 
description of the institutional setting in section 1.4. Moreover the research 
questions run parallel to the description of new users and management 
instruments in section 1.5.  
Chapter 2 analyzes the local scale and the new sea user offshore wind farms 
as well as Marine Spatial Planning of this activity in the ocean space. A spatial 
optimization model is formulated and applied to the Dutch North Sea. A 
number of scenarios with different spatial ecological restrictions are explored.  
Chapter 3 analyzes the strategic incentives associated with the assignment 
of MPAs when they have multiple uses. With the help of a game theoretic 
model I study the incentives for cooperation and free-riding when accounting 
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 for fisheries, conservation or both.  
In Chapter 4 I study how the distribution of species over ecosystems and 
how different ways of accounting for the contributions of others affects the 
MPA assignment in ecosystems. I develop a game theoretic model that 
incorporates the distribution of species over ecosystems into the decisions on 
MPA size in different ecosystems. Three different regimes are considered: full 
cooperation, free-riding and conservation autarky, i.e. ignoring the 
contribution by others. 
In Chapter 5 I study the effect of MPAs in the High Seas on the formation of 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations. I adapt the fisheries model 
from Chapter 3 to a High Sea setting and combine it with a game theoretic 
model to analyze the stability of coalitions.  
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Chapter 2*: Spatial planning of offshore wind farms: a 
windfall to marine environmental protection? 
2.1. Introduction 
Wind energy is one of the current major candidates for renewable energy 
generation. Compared to fossil fuels it has the advantage that it is CO2 neutral 
when generating energy. In fact greenhouse gas emissions only take place 
during the construction, maintenance and decommissioning phases (Lenzen 
and Munksgaard, 2002). Moreover, if one accounts for the subsidies to other 
energy sources, and takes current carbon credit prices as a proxy for the 
damage costs of carbon emissions, wind energy is competitive with regular 
power sources (The Economist, 2008).  
Total wind power installed in the EU by the end of 2007 was 56,535 MW, or 
3.7 % of its total energy demand (European Wind Energy Association, 2008). 
This amount is significantly higher then the target set for 2010 by the EU, 
which was 40,000 MW (European Commission, 1997). 
This success story has a flip side: wind farms often meet local resistance. 
Considerations such as equity, fairness and landscape intrusion lay at the basis 
of such resistance (Christensen and Lund, 1998; Wolsink, 2000; Ek, 2005; 
Wolsink, 2007). Moreover, turbines cause noise, shadow flickering, 
electromagnetic fields and disturbance of animals and habitat, by causing 
collisions with birds and bats, and acting as barriers against migration and 
foraging (Burton et al., 2001; Mathew, 2006; van der Wal et al., 2006). Because 
these effects vary strongly with location the spatial dimension is pivotal in 
tradeoffs between wind energy and its environmental effects. 
Wind parks are located offshore to avoid landscape intrusion and noise. The 
offshore environment has other advantages as well, such as stronger and 
steadier winds and large continuous areas, enabling the establishment of large 
wind farms. Offshore winds are less turbulent, thus decreasing the fatigue load 
and increasing the lifetime of the project. Finally the reduced occurrence of 
wind shear allows shorter towers (Henderson et al., 2002; Mathew, 2006). 
Disadvantages of offshore wind farms are higher investment costs for 
foundation, the distance to the main electrical grid, and improved equipment 
needed because of the harsh environment, which causes quick corrosion and 
makes maintenance difficult (Henderson et al., 2002; Mathew, 2006).  
Ecological effects of locating wind farms offshore can be both detrimental 
and beneficial. Wind farms negatively affect the marine environment through 
*This chapter is based on the paper: Maarten J. Punt, Rolf. A. Groeneveld, Ekko C. van Ierland, 
Jan H. Stel, 2009. Spatial planning of offshore wind farms: a windfall to marine environmental 
protection? Ecological Economics 69(1): 93-103.  
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 avian collisions (Exo et al., 2003; Drewitt and Langston, 2006), underwater 
noise (Koschinski et al., 2003; Wahlberg and Westerberg, 2005; Thomsen et al., 
2006) and electromagnetic fields (Gill, 2005; Petersen and Malm, 2006; Öhman 
et al., 2007). There are positive effects too on local biodiversity as the turbines 
can act as artificial reefs and no-take zones, and there is evidence of spill-over 
effects (Petersen and Malm, 2006; Wilhelmsson et al., 2006; Fayram and de Risi, 
2007). The impacts on biodiversity and ecosystem functions should therefore 
be considered in location choice. 
Wind farms yield the highest net revenues if located in areas with high 
wind speeds (which increases energy generation) and areas with low average 
seafloor depths at closest proximity to the shore (both of which diminish 
costs). 
In this chapter we analyze the problem of finding the optimal location for 
offshore wind farms, by considering both economic and ecological aspects. We 
develop and use a spatially explicit model that includes energy generation as 
well as the effects on bird and fish species. The model maximizes the revenues 
from wind farms under constraints for ecological impacts related to bird 
collisions and impacts on fish stocks.  
Few of the large number of economic and ecological models of spatial 
planning of offshore wind parks have integrated economic and ecological 
considerations in one framework. The model of Kooijman et al. (2001) 
calculates costs based on an engineering model and a GIS module that covers 
the North Sea. Elkinton et al. (2005) focus on the layout of the offshore wind 
parks. Planning systems for businesses have been developed by Resoft (2008), 
Garrad Hassan (2008), EMD (2008) and BMT renewables (2008). All of these 
models calculate costs, but none of them consider the effects on species or 
ecosystems explicitly, although the models of Garrad Hassan, Resoft and EMD 
include modules for landscape intrusion. Ecological models focus mainly on 
the effects of wind farms on birds. These include sensitivity maps by Garthe 
and Hüppop (2004), a turbine specific collision risk model (Tucker, 1996) and a 
spatial planning model (van der Wal et al., 2006). Eliott (2002) has formulated a 
conceptual model but does not quantify relationships. Moreover, none of these 
models consider economic choices explicitly. 
The contribution of this chapter is that it considers both spatial economic 
choices and local ecological effects. We present a modeling framework that 
spatially allocates offshore wind farms, taking into consideration spatial 
variations in wind speed, distance to the shore and sea floor depth, and 
presence and dispersal of bird and fish populations. We demonstrate how the 
model can be applied to the Dutch EEZ, where concerns of renewable energy, 
biodiversity and fisheries rank high on the political agenda. The aim of the 
chapter is to illustrate some of the choices faced in spatial planning of offshore 
wind parks as well as the potential of the model in analyzing this problem.  
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 The chapter is organised as follows: the next section presents a more 
detailed analysis of offshore wind farms and their effects. It continues with the 
formulation of the model and the illustration of how it can be applied to the 
Dutch EEZ. Finally, discussion and conclusions are presented. 
2.2. Integrated assessment of offshore wind farms 
Earlier conceptual integrated assessment models of offshore wind energy (e.g. 
Elliott, 2002) were based on the Drivers-Pressures-States-Impacts-Responses 
(DPSIR) framework. Another conceptual model, the Scene model, has been 
suggested by Rotmans (1998), and constitutes the inventory of social, economic 
and natural stocks and their relations.  
 We use the framework of Hein (2005) to describe the ecosystem and 
economic system and their relationships in a more explicit way then the DPSIR 
framework (Figure 2.1). It constitutes on the one hand the economic system, 
and its underlying processes: consumption and production and on the other 
hand the ecosystem that is driven by ecological processes. Several flows 
between both systems exist: the economic system pollutes and intervenes in the 
ecosystem whereas the ecosystem delivers ecosystem goods and services to the 
economic system. Interactions between systems influence the state of both, and 
systems may change over time as indicated by the time direction in Figure 2.1. 
New states will show different relationships within and between the economic 
system and the ecosystem. 
To build a conceptual model of the economic and ecological aspects of wind 
farms we first identify the drivers in both systems. Next we analyze the 
Figure 2.1: The interactions between the economic system and the ecosystem (cf. Hein, 2005) 
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 feedbacks between both systems, first the affected ecosystem services, then the 
pollution effects and finally the interventions in the ecosystem.  
The driving factor in the economic system that underlies the planning and 
implementation of offshore wind farms is the consumption of energy. Some of 
the energy consumption may be supplied by wind farms, depending on the 
costs. OECD and IEA (2005) estimate that the generation costs of electricity 
with conventional plants (coal, gas, nuclear) range between 15.7 and 60.4 
US$(2003)/MWh., whereas wind power ranges between 31.1 and 94.3 
US$(2003)/MWh. Note that these prices exclude technology specific subsidies 
and corporate taxes. 
When building a wind park the net economic benefits are dependent upon 
the amount of electricity that can be sold and the costs, which mainly consist of 
the investment costs such as the costs of the turbines and infrastructure, and 
the variable costs that mainly constitute operation and maintenance costs 
(O&M costs). These costs differ between locations depending upon turbine 
types, wind speed, sea floor depth at the site and distance from the shore 
(Kooijman et al., 2001; Noord et al., 2004; Mathew, 2006). 
The marine ecosystem is mostly driven by ecological processes such as 
photosynthesis, recruitment, mortality, predation and decomposition. The 
ecosystem services provided depend on these processes and the resulting 
species stocks. The goods and services provided by marine ecosystems have 
been inventoried by Beaumont et al. (2007). The goods and services affected by 
wind farms are raw materials, food provision, cultural services, option use 
services and biologically mediated habitat. 
Pollution by offshore wind parks consists of emissions during construction, 
maintenance and decommissioning, sediment plumes and drill cuttings due to 
foundation works and cabling, and underwater noise (Elliott, 2002; Gill, 2005; 
Petersen and Malm, 2006). Total CO2 emission ranges from 8.1 to 123.7 g CO2/
kWh over the lifetime of a project (Lenzen and Munksgaard, 2002). The newest 
fossil fuel energy plants by comparison emit between 344 and 846 g CO2/kWh 
(Metz et al., 2005). To our knowledge no studies yet exist that investigate the 
effects of sediment plumes and drill cuttings caused by wind farms but de 
Groot (1996) and Breuer (2004) have studied the effects for sand extraction and 
oil exploration on the local environment. Both smother habitats and the drill 
cuttings can cause chemical poisoning, depending on which materials are used 
with the drilling. Most of these effects are local and the benthos recovers 
reasonably quickly. 
More permanent than the above mentioned forms of pollution are 
underwater noise and the electromagnetic fields that are caused by the cables. 
Although the cables are well isolated, the formation of electromagnetic fields 
cannot be prevented completely (Gill, 2005; Öhman et al., 2007). The evidence 
on the impacts of cables is inconclusive but the impacts seem to be minimal 
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 (Petersen and Malm, 2006; Öhman et al., 2007). The same applies for 
underwater sound; it leads to avoidance of wind farms areas, masking of 
communication signals and hearing loss for various marine species. Wahlberg 
and Westerberg (2005) find that cod and Atlantic salmon detect wind farm 
noise from distances of 7-13 km and 0.4-0.5 km respectively, and may change 
their migration routes accordingly. These figures, however, are highly 
uncertain due to complicating factors such as reflection, transmission speed, 
wind speed and water density. For porpoises and seals the detection distances 
are 40 and 360 meters, respectively. Porpoises experience the noise, but are not 
disturbed whereas seals avoid the noise (Koschinski et al., 2003).  
The interventions in the ecosystem consist of physical barriers that are 
formed by the wind parks for migration and foraging routes of birds, and 
possibly fish species and marine mammals. The direct effects on birds have 
been researched extensively, both on and offshore (see e.g. Hiscock et al., 2002, 
Exo et al., 2003, Garthe and Hüppop, 2004, Drewitt and Langston, 2006 and 
Madders and Whitfield, 2006). The most important effects are collision, 
avoidance and changed migration routes. The number of collisions of birds 
with turbines depends on location, bird species and weather (Exo et al., 2003; 
Garthe and Hüppop, 2004; Drewitt and Langston, 2006). Drewitt and Langston 
(2006) reviewed collision literature and found a large range: 0.01 to 23 birds 
killed per turbine per year. 
Furthermore the presence of turbines may also influence the local 
hydrography of a place through the concrete foundations and the cabling. 
Previously available habitat is destroyed by the foundations and cabling, and 
the local habitat is changed to hard substrate. Recolonization may occur 
depending on the neighborhood (Elliott, 2002; Hiscock et al., 2002; Gill, 2005; 
Petersen and Malm, 2006; van der Wal et al., 2006). 
A more positive intervention in the ecosystem is the creation of an artificial 
reef, and if fishing is prohibited in the area, a no-take zone. Wind farms have 
been shown to act as artificial reefs that increase numbers of fish and other 
benthos species (Petersen and Malm, 2006; Wilhelmsson et al., 2006; Fayram 
and de Risi, 2007). 
2.3. Model setup 
2.3.1. Introduction 
We focus our modeling efforts on the most important economic and 
environmental effects of wind farms. We use a supply side model that assumes 
that all energy generated can be sold at a fixed price. Costs and revenues are 
calculated on a one-year basis. We include fish and birds as indicator species. 
The effects of wind farms on species are modeled based on the impacts on 
 22 
 
 habitat quality and dispersal options. In the proposed model, for simplicity, 
we do not consider the sound and electromagnetic field disturbances of fish.  
The model consists of both an economic and an ecological system. In both 
systems variables and parameters vary with the location under consideration. 
The model maximizes the revenues from the sale of wind generated electricity, 
considering ecological and planning restrictions, such as minimum numbers of 
species and sites reserved for shipping or marine conservation. This section 
explains the mathematical structure of the model. 
2.3.2. The economic system 
The model maximizes the revenues of generating wind energy in a particular 
area, under a set of ecological and policy constraints. Formally1: 
 
where Ri(Ti) represents the revenues (in thousand of 2007 Euro) of wind 
energy generation in cell i as a function of the number of turbines in cell i (Ti). 
Timax is the maximum number of turbines in a cell determined by the spatial, 
design and ecological constraints, such as available area, space requirements 
for the separate turbines and policy measures. The revenues in each cell i are 
calculated as the energy produced (in Megawatt hour) in cell i multiplied with 
the price of energy p (in thousand of 2007 Euro per MWh) minus the total costs 
of energy production (in thousand of 2007 Euro) in that cell. 
Energy production, Ei, is a function of the potential energy production per 
turbine and the number of turbines in that cell: 
 
where ei is the energy potential of a turbine in cell i. The energy production Ei 
is generated at a cost Ci. The cost function has the following form: 
 
where ci represents the total cost per wind turbine. Total costs (ci) are equal to 
the amortized investment costs (fi) and operation & maintenance costs (vi). The 
costs vary with the power of the turbine, the average seafloor depth in the cell 
and the distance to the nearest grid connection. Total revenues are thus 
determined by the energy potential and the local costs in each cell. In the 
absence of further constraints the model would fill each cell where placing 
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1To distinguish between parameters and variables we use capitals for variables and lower case 
for parameters. Indices are noted as subscripts. 
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 turbines is profitable, with the maximum number of turbines. This concludes 
the economic part. 
2.3.3. The ecosystem 
Ecological effects of offshore wind farms are described by a spatially explicit 
model that includes spatial variation in abundance of birds and fish, as well as 
dispersal of individuals. 
Many spatial ecological models are based upon the theory of island 
biogeography of MacArthur and Wilson (1967) or the metapopulation theory of 
Levins (1969) or reserve selection models as the one first derived by Kirkpatrick 
(1983). These models have been extended to model both terrestrial reserves and 
species (e.g. Pulliam et al., 1992, Day and Possingham, 1995, and Moilanen and 
Cabeza, 2002) and marine reserves and species (e.g. Ball and Possingham, 2000, 
Beattie et al., 2002, and Sanchirico, 2004). 
Reserve selection models use algorithms such as simulated annealing and 
branch-and-bound, and are specifically concerned with the selection of reserves 
such that either a given numbers of species (typically 50-500) is preserved 
under minimal costs, or that as many species as possible are conserved under a 
given budget. Their focus on species richness makes this approach unsuitable 
for our model. Metapopulation models use relatively few patches with 
subpopulations and directed movement. As the modeled environment is 
considered to be very open and the population evenly spread out, a model of 
random dispersal movement combined with local habitat quality, such as the 
one by Hof and Bevers (1998) may describe the environment better. In this 
chapter we use the version as modified by Groeneveld (2004). The model is a 
steady state model that shows the final distribution of a population as an end 
result of processes such as birth, death and migration. Such models are often 
used in ecology and to a lesser extent in economics (Hanski, 1994; Hof and 
Bevers, 1998, 2000; Moilanen and Hanski, 1998; Groeneveld et al., 2005; Polasky 
et al., 2005, 2008; Groeneveld and Weikard, 2006). The temporal dimension is 
contracted in such models as the main interest is the final spatial distribution 
and survival and not so much the path towards the equilibrium.  
The original model assumes random dispersal, implying that the probability 
that a species occurs in a cell is a function of the connectivity to adjacent 
suitable cells. The original non-linear formula to calculate this probability as 
given by Hof and Bevers (1998) is: 
 
with rij the probability that cell i is connected to cell j, and Hj ∈{0,1} the habitat 
suitability of cell j. Hof and Bevers approach (2.4) with a set of linear equations: 
 
( )1 1i ij jP r H i = − − ∀ ∏ (2.4) 
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where s denotes either birds or fish and in which parameter ds is chosen to 
approach equation (2.3) as closely as possible (for details see: Hof and Bevers, 
1998). We follow the modification of Groeneveld (2004) and make the domain 
of Hi continuous over the interval: [0,1]. Pi,s represents the probability that an 
individual of a species reaches that cell and survives. Since the model is a 
linear maximization problem at least one of equations (2.5) and (2.6) is 
satisfied as an equality. Hence Pi,s is equal to the minimum of the two RHSs of 
equations (2.5) and (2.6), i.e. either the habitat suitability of cell i, which may 
have increased or decreased after the introduction of the turbines, or to a 
weighted sum of the habitat suitability of its neighboring cells, depending on 
which of the two is less. 
 The habitat suitability of a cell is measured on scale of 0-1, with 1 being 
ideal and 0 being unsuitable. The original habitat suitability of cell i (before the 
introduction of the turbines) lies somewhere between zero and one and is 
modified by the number of turbines. The final H(Ti)i,s is a function of the 
number of turbines in that cell (Ti) but the relationship between H(Ti)i,s and Ti 
differs between species. Birds are bothered by the turbines, so that each 
additional turbine makes that cell less attractive to birds. For fish we assume 
that the positive artificial reef working and the absence of fisheries more than 
offset possible negative effects of electromagnetic fields and noise. Examples of 
suitability functions are shown in Figure 2.2.  
As Pi,s is the probability of an individual reaching cell i, multiplying the 
potential maximum number of individuals with this probability gives the 
number of survivors. The total number of individuals of a species s in cell i, 
Ni,s, is therefore calculated as: 
 
with ni,s the potential maximum number of birds and fish in that cell. 
2.3.4. The integrated system 
Both systems are integrated into one model, with the number of turbines Ti as 
a link between both systems. Ti is the basic decision variable of the model as it 
determines costs and revenues in the economic side of the model and habitat 
suitability in the ecological part of the model (see Figure 2.2). In turn, habitat 
suitability affects Pi through (2.5) and (2.6) and hence the number of birds and 
fish in a cell. In this way the model integrates the economic and ecological side 
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of the problem. The model maximizes profits under the restriction that 
minimum numbers of birds and fish are maintained: 
 
Apart from the ecological restrictions, no further feedbacks from the ecosystem 
to the economic system exist, and the model is a constrained optimization 
problem. 
2.4. Demonstration for the Dutch Exclusive Economic Zone in the 
North Sea 
2.4.1. Introduction 
We now demonstrate the model for the Dutch Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
in the North Sea, in order to show its potentials. The results are meant to be 
indicative of the capabilities of the model, rather than providing an actual 
policy advice.  
The North Sea is a shallow sea (90 m. on average) that is surrounded by 
several industrialized countries. It is very rich in biodiversity with 1500 species 
of nematodes, 700 taxa of macrofauna in the benthos, 224 species of fish, 28 
 
min
,( )s i i s s
i
N N T N s= ≥ ∀∑ (2.8) 
Figure 2.2: Hypothetical habitat suitability for a bird and fish species as a function of tur-
bines in cell i (Ti) (Intercept values without turbines: 1 and 0.5, slopes -2.86*10-4 and 1.43*10-
4 for bird and fish species respectively) 
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 species of birds, 2 seal species, harbour porpoises, 2 dolphin species and a 
whale species (Ducrotoy et al., 2000). It is also one of the most intensively used 
seas, surrounded by countries with strongly developed maritime sectors (see 
Table 2.1). 
Offshore wind farms are a relatively new activity in the North Sea. So far 
Denmark has seven offshore wind farms in operation and two under 
construction, the UK has seven in operation and seven under construction, and 
the Netherlands have two wind parks (European Wind Energy Association, 
2008). 
Parameter values of the Dutch North Sea used in the model are shown in 
Table 2.2. The North Sea atlas (www.noordzeeatlas.nl) provides spatial 
information on the average seafloor depth and densities of several bird and 
fish species in the EEZ. Although these densities are not the maximum 
densities of birds and fish that could occur in the North Sea, they can be taken 
as a general measure of the number of individuals present before the 
implementations of wind farms.  
We use the ICES squares divided by four as cell unit for the grid in the 
model. This means that each cell is 33 x 28 km. This is a compromise between 
the spatial scale of the fish data (ICES squares) and bird data (5 x 5 km). The 
cells are shown in Figure 2.3. To mitigate edge effects on the population 
models we assume that the edge cells in the Dutch EEZ are connected to their 
neighbors in other EEZs and that these have ideal habitat. 
The bird density in number/m2 was converted in absolute numbers by 
averaging the density in one cell and multiplying with its area. The fish catch 
per unit of effort (CPUE) was taken as relative biomass measure and converted 
to absolute numbers by assuming that total spawning stock biomass (as 
estimated by ICES) of the species in the Dutch EEZ was directly proportional 
to the area of the Dutch EEZ in the total North Sea. The CPUE was then 
normalized to one and multiplied with the total spawning stock biomass in the 
Table 2.1: Economic impact of maritime sectors in selected North Sea countries 
 
Source: Marine Institute (2006) 
Countries 
Economic 
impact 
(% of GDP) 
Turnover 
(€bln) 
Direct  
employment 
Indirect  
employment 
Denmark 11.5 12.4 70,100 - 
Netherlands 3.7 14.7 137,000 56,0000 
Norway 20.0 21.4 192,000 - 
UK 3.5-4.9 23.7 250,000 173,000 
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Dutch EEZ. Biomass was converted to numbers assuming an average plaice 
(Pleuronectes platessa) weighs 1 kg.  
For bird species we chose for illustrative purposes the combined summer 
dataset of the razorbill (Alca torda) and guillemot (Uria aalge). The dataset is 
combined as the two species cannot be separated when surveyed although 
most of the counts comprise guillemots (Noordzee atlas, 2008). For simplicity 
Table 2.2: Basic parameter values in the model for the Dutch EEZ. 
 
1The parameter ei is calculated on the basis of the Rough Capacity Factor (RCF) of a cell. The 
calculation of the RCF was taken from Mathew (2006). It is determined by wind speed and 
turbine performance characteristics. The RCF is multiplied with the generator power (2 
MW) and number of hours in a year to get ei.  
2The investment costs of a turbine consist of turbine purchase (variable with depth and 
distance), and are multiplied by a percentage to account for infrastructure. The investment 
costs are multiplied by an annuity factor to calculate the costs on a yearly basis. This is 
parameter fi. Yearly O&M costs (vi) are calculated as a percentage of the purchase costs of 
the turbine.  
Parameter Value Source 
Price of energy (p) 0.0825 thousand €/MWh Eurostat 
Energy potential per turbine 
(ei)1 
8.8 - 12.7 GWh/annum Windspeeds: ECN (2004). 
Turbine technical specifi-
cations: Mathew (2006). 
Amortized investment costs 
(fi)2 
300 - 500 thousand €/
annum 
Turbine prices: Kooijman 
(2002) as cited in Noord et 
al. (2004) and compen-
sated for inflation. Modi-
fying percentages for in-
frastructure: Mathew 
(2006) 
Operation & Maintenance 
costs (vi)2 
100 - 200 thousand €/
annum 
Kooijman (2002) as cited 
in Noord et al. (2004) 
Modifying percentages for 
O&M: Mathew (2006) 
Total costs (ci=fi+vi) 400 - 700 thousand €/
annum 
  
Connectivity between cells (d) 0.3 (corresponding rij = 0.5) Hof and Bevers (1998) 
Original number of fish in cell 
i (si) 
40*103 - 900*103 Noordzee atlas 
(www.noordzeeatlas.nl) 
Original number of birds in 
cell i (bi) 
50 – 12000 Noordzee atlas 
(www.noordzeeatlas.nl) 
Maximum number of turbines 3500 Mathew (2006) 
Intercept value of fish 0.5   
Slope value of fish 1/7000   
Intercept value of birds 1   
Slope value of birds -1/3500   
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 the flocks are referred to as razorbills. Both species have relatively high 
sensitivity to wind farms (Garthe and Hüppop, 2004) therefore the negative 
impacts on this species is among the highest in the ecosystem. The negative 
impacts on other bird species is probably lower or of a similar level. The slope 
used for the linear function that describes habitat suitability as a function of 
number of turbines (cf. Figure 2.2) equals a maximum of 3 birds killed per 
year per turbine, which is within the range found by Drewitt and Langston 
(2006). The number was chosen such that, when a cell is filled with the 
maximum number of turbines as defined by turbine characteristics, the 
habitat suitability for birds of that cell is worst case2. The fish species we chose 
is plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) of age class 4 years and older, as it is a 
widespread demersal fish and offshore wind farms have been shown to have 
a positive effect on demersal fish (Wilhelmsson et al., 2006). Furthermore 
juvenile plaice is not a target species of the fisheries and are concentrated in 
the Wadden Sea area. In our illustration we assume that filling a cell 
completely with wind turbines doubles the habitat suitability for fish in that 
2The range found by Drewitt and Langston (2006) was between 0.01 and 23 birds per turbine 
per year. A number higher than three would give similar results, however, as it would still 
reduce the bird population to zero for the cells that are completely filled with turbines. A small 
difference may occur for cells that are not completely filled. 
Figure 2.3: The Dutch EEZ and the numbered cells used in the model. From left to right UK: 
United Kingdom, NL: The Netherlands, D: Germany, DK: Denmark. 
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 cell (i.e. the original habitat suitability of a cell before the turbine introduction 
is not ideal due to e.g. fishing pressure). Since the probability of species 
occurrence is mostly determined by local habitat suitability this causes the 
original fish population in that cell to double and reach its potential maximum. 
Although both assumptions of worst case habitat suitability for birds and best 
case suitability for fish when the maximum number of turbines is placed are 
both arbitrary, they serve to illustrate extreme cases. They can be relaxed in a 
sensitivity analysis and real data can be inserted when results of empirical 
ecological studies become available. 
In addition to the usual restriction on the total numbers of birds and fish, one 
further restriction is applied in the model to make it more realistic. For each 
cell the maximum available area was calculated by excluding land, islands, the 
Wadden sea area, shipping lanes, anchorages and terrain reserved for military 
exercises, and the maximum number of turbines in each cell was modified 
accordingly. 
2.4.2. The scenarios 
One baseline simulation and four scenarios were run with the model. In the 
baseline simulation no turbines are built, and the model is calibrated such that 
the potential maximum number of species ni,s, and the species probability Pi,s 
replicate the original ecological data. The four scenarios have different 
restrictions imposed for ecological targets, and all scenarios are restricted to a 
total maximum installed capacity of 22,000 MW. This equals the current 
installed capacity of all power plants in the Netherlands (Eurostat, http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). This target can be thought of as a scenario in which 
the Netherlands would want to take most of its electricity from wind power to 
drastically reduce CO2 emissions. Even an installed capacity of 22,000 MW, 
however, cannot completely replace current energy plants due to constraints in 
wind availability and demand peaks (Mathew, 2006). In the current model the 
22,000 MW target can, in absence of further restrictions, in principle be met by 
four cells with turbines. 
The first scenario is the pure economic scenario. The only restriction to 
location choice is the available marine area, i.e. areas not claimed by other uses. 
In the second scenario we account for razorbills in the area. Placement of 
turbines is still free but there is a restriction that 99% of the total razorbill 
population modeled under the baseline simulation should survive. This 
scenario implies a strong conservation effort on razorbills, which mimics a 
strong emphasis on species specific conservation. In the third scenario this 
restriction is changed to a minimum survival of 90% of the baseline simulation-
modeled razorbill populations in cells with special ecological values. Cells 
were deemed to have special ecological value if they were either part of the 
Plaice Box, or designated as possible marine reserves under the integrated 
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 management plan for the Dutch North Sea (IDON, 2005). This scenario mimics 
a more spatially orientated conservation strategy that is more focused on 
habitat preservation. The fourth scenario has the restriction that 70% of the 
modeled baseline simulation razorbill population should survive and 
furthermore an index which is made up of fish and birds weighing 1 vs. 100, 
respectively, should be at least 105% of the value in the baseline simulation. It 
is possible to reach a higher value of the multi-objective index since there is a 
trade-off between birds and fish in this case. This scenario can be thought of as 
implementing multi-objective targets, where society weighs fish against birds, 
and then imposes a target. The scenarios and their restrictions are shown in 
Table 2.3. 
2.4.3. Results 
The main results of the different scenario runs are shown in Table 2.4. Figure 
2.4 shows the distribution of razorbills and plaice as modeled by the baseline 
simulation and Figure 2.5 shows the location of the turbines in the four 
different scenarios as well as the corresponding changes in species 
populations, indexed on the baseline simulation.  
To accentuate the trade-off we have also formulated gained and forgone 
existence values for fish and birds. This value was calculated as the difference 
between the baseline simulation multiplied with the price. Beattie et al. (2002) 
use market prices as indicators of existence value and we follow that approach. 
The price in (€/kg) was applied by assuming that the average plaice weighs 1 
kg. For the razorbills we used the value of Brown (1992) which is a 
Table 2.3: The baseline simulation, the modeled scenarios and their restrictions 
 
Scenarios Restrictions 
Baseline simulation No turbines 
Scenario 1: Economic Turbine numbers only restricted by cell space and 
maximum installed capacity. 
Scenario 2: Bird protection 99% of the total modeled baseline simulation bird 
population should survive. Restrictions on cell space and 
maximum installed capacity. 
Scenario 3: Habitat 
protection 
90% of the modeled baseline simulation bird population 
in cells with special ecological value should survive. 
Restrictions on cell space and maximum installed 
capacity. 
Scenario 4: Multi-objective 
target 
The multi-objective index should be at 105% of its 
maximum. 
70% of the total modeled baseline simulation population 
should survive. Restrictions on cell space and maximum 
installed capacity. 
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 replacement cost. Both values were converted to Euro and adjusted to current 
price level.  
From Table 2.4 and Figure 2.5 we can see that the different policies have 
quite different effects. In scenario 1 where no ecological restrictions are in 
place the most profitable locations are those with high wind speeds, which are 
the three cells in the top of the EEZ and one a bit more to the right. Since these 
cells do not contain any shipping lanes they can be filled with the absolute 
maximum number of turbines. Under the current parameter values wind 
speed is clearly more important than the costs of the location (related to depth 
and distance) as the cells with the highest wind speed are also the most 
expensive ones, and they are still chosen. The birds in these locations of course 
suffer maximum damage, i.e. they cannot live in these areas anymore, whereas 
the fish population enjoys the full benefits of protection and doubles. Total 
bird stocks are not too strongly affected due to the medium low original 
number of birds in this area and the fact that so few cells are needed. 
The restriction that 99% of the razorbill population should survive in 
scenario 2 changes the allocation of turbines as well as the main results. The 
cells selected now are less profitable but a greater bird population survives, as 
the original bird populations in these cells is low. The revenues of wind energy 
generation fall by 7%, but the razorbill population increases by 4% and the 
plaice stock increases by 12%, compared to the economic scenario. Whether 
this justifies the fall in revenues is a matter of preferences.  
In scenario 3 some of the cells used originally in the economic scenario are 
part of the areas with special ecological value. The restriction of protecting 
90% of the modeled baseline simulation razorbill population in those cells is 
Table 2.4: Modeled revenues, numbers of razorbills and plaice and the existence value 
associated with the gains and losses in razorbill and plaice populations. 
 
1For an explanation of monetary values used and calculations see section 2.4.3. 
  Baseline 
simulation 
S 1: 
Economic 
S 2: 
Razorbill 
protection 
S 3: 
Habitat 
protection 
S 4: 
Multi-
Objective 
Revenues  
(million 2007 €) - 4330 4028 4180 4104 
Total number of 
razorbills (thousands) 119.13 113.09 117.94 113.21 114.59 
Total number of plaice 
(millions) 21.54 19.84 22.31 22.78 23.66 
Forgone existence 
value razorbills 
(million 2007 €)1 
- 3.24 0.64 3.17 2.43 
Gained existence value 
plaice (million 2007 €)1 - 0.12 0.30 0.49 0.84 
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Figure 2.4: Modeled baseline simulation distribution of razorbills and plaice in the Dutch 
EEZ. 
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now the main restriction that drives the model results. This restriction does not 
allow building more than a small number of turbines in the cells that are part 
of an area with special ecological value. Hence the turbines can still be built in 
the most profitable area but have to be more spread out. This also affects 
revenues, razorbill and plaice numbers, but the changes are relatively small: 
revenues fall by 3% whereas razorbills and plaice populations increase by 0.1% 
and 4% respectively, compared to the economic scenario. If we look at the 
change in existence value lost and gained we see the same pattern. At current 
prices, the change in existence value would hardly affect the total social 
 
Figure 2.5: Number of turbines, and indices of razorbill and plaice in different scenarios 
with a total installed capacity of 22000 MW in the Dutch EEZ 
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 revenues as the revenues of wind energy are much larger than gained and 
forgone existence values. 
Under the multi-objective scenario the turbines are again placed in the 
Northern area of the Dutch EEZ. The reduction in razorbill numbers under the 
multi-objective scenario is so small that it hardly affects the index. Moreover 
the increase in number of plaice makes up for the decrease in bird numbers. 
The spatial configuration as well as the revenues, razorbill and plaice numbers 
are similar to those under the economic scenario. The multi-objective is 
reflected in the configuration: turbines are now placed in cells with a 
reasonable profitability, a higher general plaice population and a medium low 
bird population. The revenues are in between the habitat protection scenario 
and bird protection scenario, for the razorbill population it is better than the 
habitat protection scenario, but worse than the bird protection scenario, and it 
is better for the plaice population in both cases.  
2.4.4. Sensitivity analysis 
We applied a sensitivity analysis on several parameters to check the robustness 
of the model results, mainly focusing on the economic scenario. Connectivity, 
however, was checked against the minimum birds scenario as this spatial 
component is most likely to affect the bird populations in the neighborhood, 
possibly making it more difficult to sustain the required number of birds. 
We examined the effect of turbine capacity, investment costs, marginal 
distance costs and connectivity. Turbine capacity determines the rough 
capacity factor in each cell (together with wind speed), the maximum number 
of turbines in a cell, and the slope of the bird and fish habitat parameters. 
Alternative specifications of turbine characteristics (for 1.5, 3.5 and 5 MW 
turbines) influenced total revenues, the maximum number of turbines installed 
in a cell. The results for the different turbines are shown in Table 2.5. 
Smaller turbines give smaller total revenues because maximum power 
output is lower, hence they produce less power. Larger turbines are better as 
they are higher and intercept stronger winds, so power output and revenues 
Table 2.5: Main model results for revenues razorbill and plaice numbers in scenario 1, when 
using different turbine specifications. 
 
1Turbines used in the original model 
Turbine type Total revenues 
(billion 2007 Euro) 
Total number of 
razorbills 
(thousands) 
Total number of 
plaice (million) 
1.5 MW 4.29 112.93 22.21 
2 MW1 4.33 113.09 21.87 
3.5 MW 5.66 113.70 21.76 
5 MW 6.37 113.50 21.76 
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 are better. From the environmental protection perspective larger turbines may 
be a more promising strategy, as less turbines are needed so there are fewer 
razorbills that are disturbed (see also Figure 2.2). Due to the inherent structure 
of the model, which causes the habitat suitability for birds to be at its minimum 
when the maximum number of turbines is placed in a cell, more birds are killed 
per turbine. This may cause differences if cells are not completely filled with 
turbines. This explains the small difference in bird numbers between the 5 MW 
and 3.5 MW turbines.  
Another important point is the investment costs. In the current model setting 
the turbine price increases with depth and distance from the shore, and 
infrastructure costs are calculated as an additional 30% of the turbine price. We 
analyzed the changes under a range of multipliers from 1.1 to 2.0 in steps of 0.1. 
The allocation of turbines is relatively robust against these changes. The 
allocation is the same for the range 1.1-1.3, one cell is changed for the range 1.4-
1.7. For the range 1.8-2.0 the allocation is gradually shifted to the south (Figure 
2.6c). A high RCF cannot compensate any more for high costs at this point. 
These cells have relatively low costs whereas their RCF is higher than in other 
cells with similar costs. In the current model settings increasing the discount 
rate or decreasing the project life time have similar effects. 
In a similar analysis we increased the marginal distance costs over a range of 
10-90%. The results were a bit stronger than in the previous analysis, i.e. the 
turbine allocation switched to cells close to the shore (See Figure 2.6d). 
We checked the connectivity effects with a range of rij over [0.1-0.8] in steps 
of 0.1. We approached each value of rij with a d and ran the model. For the 
smallest rij = 0.1 the model becomes unfeasible, because the ecological model is 
unable to replicate the baseline for such low values of connectivity. Clearly 
connectivity should be assumed to be higher. For rij = [0.4-0.8] the model 
 
Figure 2.6: Turbine distributions in the Dutch EEZ under: a) the original economic scenario, 
b) the economic scenario with turbines of 3.5 MW, c) the economic scenario with an 80% 
increase in investment costs, d) the economic scenario with an 80% increase in marginal 
distance costs 
 a) b) c) d) 
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 results do not change. There is a small change in the allocation of turbines and 
total number of birds for rij=0.2. Cell 5 is cleared and instead cells 2 and 11 are 
used, this is done to save nearby local populations such as the one in cell 7. The 
total number of birds compared to higher values of connectivity is reduced by 
1.7%. For a connectivity of 0.3 this reduction is 0.09%, and allocation of 
turbines does not change. 
The population equations used in the model are highly stylized. The spatial 
component mainly consists of the state of adjacent cells. Therefore the effect of 
the turbines is mainly local, especially for higher degrees of connectivity, 
which assures that turbine-free neighboring cells supply the necessary 
immigration. This high degree of connectivity is justified as marine ecosystems 
are often regarded as being more open than terrestrial systems (Carr et al., 
2003).  
2.5. Discussion & conclusions 
In this chapter we presented a modeling framework to spatially allocate 
offshore wind farms in order to maximize revenues while accounting for other 
economic activities, and protecting birds and fish populations (i.e. razorbill 
and plaice in our example). Four different scenarios were analyzed for the 
Dutch EEZ, and we conducted a sensitivity analysis. 
The analyses show that the allocation of turbines in the Dutch EEZ is quite 
robust against changes in parameters. Basically two regions are preferred from 
an economic perspective. The first region comprises the top cells of the EEZ, 
the second region lies just south of the middle of the EEZ. The two regions 
reflect a difference in emphasis on the RCF and costs. The cells of the second 
region overlap with selected locations in a similar economic study to build 
turbines in the Dutch North Sea (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2004). 
Some of the cells that are attractive from a cost perspective are quite full 
already due to shipping lanes and other uses. Although the model adjusts the 
number of turbines for those uses, the actual number of turbines that can be 
realized in those cells may be lower. 
Neither region is very important to bird conservation, as both have low 
original bird populations. However, different bird species have different 
requirements and the underlying distribution of individuals influences the 
number of birds in a cell, thus the results do not necessarily hold for other bird 
species.  
The model shows that careful spatial planning of turbines may prevent the 
turbines from causing major harm to bird populations, while increasing local 
fish stocks. This finding is similar to that of Petersen and Malm (2006), who 
argued after a review that with proper siting and careful construction reef 
effects would outweigh possible negative effects.  
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 Whether these increases in fish stocks have a spill-over effect remains to be 
seen. The current model allows for negative spill-overs but not for positive 
ones. So far, however, the evidence regarding spill-over effects of MPAs differs 
between species (Murawski et al., 2005). 
The scenario where MPAs are partially closed for wind farms clearly differs 
from the other three scenarios, because the conservation policy is more 
spatially orientated. One could argue that wind farms should not be placed in 
special ecological areas at all. However the small number of turbines in those 
cells could be interpreted as being placed on the edge of the reserve. They 
increase fish stocks by basically extending the reserves. Whether or not such 
arrangements would be beneficial for marine environmental protection would 
also depend on the other species present in the reserve such as birds, mammals 
and the local benthos. The bird species we chose to model does not generally 
have large subpopulations in the special areas and is therefore less influenced 
by the wind farms in the reserves.  
This chapter has shown the necessity of considering both economic and 
ecological spatial effects of planning offshore wind farms. The choice of 
location includes trade-offs between revenues, costs and species that are only 
apparent with a spatial model. Even though the model is highly stylized, the 
current version provides an indication of how the spatial trade-offs interact, in 
addition to the absolute minimum effects that need to be considered when 
making location choices. These factors and trade-offs should now be further 
explored in order to reap the windfall effects from the spatial planning of 
offshore wind farms. 
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 Chapter 3*: Planning Marine Protected Areas: a multiple 
use game 
3.1. Introduction 
The marine environment supplies several goods and ecosystem services to 
society. Yet it is also under increasing pressure from a variety of human 
activities, such as fisheries, oil & gas exploration and shipping. To extract 
goods and services sustainably and to protect vulnerable ecosystems we need 
to manage human activities in the marine domain. 
The European Commission is at the forefront in safeguarding and exploiting 
its Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). This is reflected in its policies and new 
initiatives such as the Common Fisheries Policy (EU, 2009a), the Water 
Framework Directive (EU, 2009b), the Maritime Policy (European Commission, 
2007) and the Marine Strategy Directive (MSD) (European Commission, 2008). 
All of these call for ecosystem management at a regional sea level, i.e. between 
countries sharing a common sea, such as the North Sea. The EU MSD explicitly 
calls for the formulation of integrated marine strategies by its member states, 
which should “apply an ecosystem-based approach to the management of 
human activities while enabling the sustainable use of marine goods and 
services” (European Commission, 2008 article 1.1 and 1.2). Consequently we 
need to consider regional seas as entities surpassing boundaries of individual 
countries.  
The necessary integration of management plans both within countries as 
well as between countries, is far from being reached. The management plans of 
individual member states’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) are not always in 
concordance with each other (Stel, 2003; Douvere et al., 2007) and planning and 
policy making at national level is often fragmented since responsibilities for 
different activities are divided between different organizations, institutions 
and ministries (Stel, 2002). The fragmentation favors an attitude in which 
effects of human activities are considered in isolation, whereas the effects are 
actually interdependent and cumulative (Elliott, 2002; ICES, 2003; de la Mare, 
2005).  
To manage our seas sustainably we need to develop tools and policy 
instruments that are capable of achieving goals that have been set at EU level, 
and mitigate fragmentation at lower levels. Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) 
may be such a tool. They have been proposed for fisheries management for a 
long time (Guénette et al., 1998) and more recently also as a tool to tackle 
*This chapter is based on the paper: Maarten J. Punt, Hans-Peter Weikard, Rolf A. Groeneveld, 
Ekko C. van Ierland and Jan H. Stel, 2010. Planning Marine Protected Areas: a multiple use 
game. Natural Resource Modeling 23(4): 610-646. 
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 biodiversity conservation, ecosystem restoration, regulation of tourist activities 
and as an example of integrated coastal management if all of these are included 
(Jones, 2002).  
Over the last two decades several studies have advocated MPAs as a 
fisheries management tool, claiming that MPAs increase yields through 
spillover, especially in heavily fished areas (e.g. Polacheck, 1990, Bohnsack, 
1993 and Holland and Brazee, 1996). The initial optimism of these studies was 
later dimmed by several modeling studies that showed that earlier papers 
largely ignored the effects on effort displacement (Hannesson, 1998; Anderson, 
2002), spatial heterogeneity in fishermen behavior (Smith, 2004; Smith and 
Wilen, 2004) and (spatial) heterogeneity in fish behavior (Holland, 2000). All 
effects were shown to be able to reduce or negate the positive spillover effects 
of MPAs. The main reasons for still advocating MPAs for fisheries 
management that remained were uncertainties and shocks (Lauck et al., 1998; 
Charles, 2001, Sumaila, 2002; Sumaila et al., 2007; Kvamsdal and Sandal, 2008).  
However this spatial heterogeneity was also shown to be able to make MPAs 
worthwhile in certain cases especially if MPAs increase growth rates (e.g. 
Sanchirico and Wilen, 2001 and Sanchirico, 2004). Fishing may have a 
destructive effect on habitats (Jennings and Kaiser, 1998; Jennings et al., 2001; 
Armstrong and Falk-Petersen, 2008) and hence areas that are protected and 
where no fishing occurs may have a positive effect on the growth rate of the 
fish stock outside the MPA through habitat enhancement and the preservation 
of the nursery function of the MPA (Rodwell et al., 2002; Schnier, 2005a; 
Armstrong, 2007; Armstrong and Falk-Petersen, 2008). Moreover studying 
MPAs only as a fisheries management tool ignores other important aspects of 
MPAs such as species conservation and other uses (but see: Brown et al., 2000, 
Boncoeur et al., 2002, Villa et al., 2002, Dalton, 2004 and Ngoc, 2010). 
The multiple uses of MPAs and their impacts on the marine ecosystem 
require full cooperation among all countries that share a regional sea such as 
the North Sea. On the one hand, strategic interaction and sub-optimal policy 
outcomes may occur, because in general no central authority exists that can 
enforce cooperation on these issues. On the other hand, if various functions of 
MPAs (e.g. in terms of fisheries and nature conservation) are linked, the 
advantages of cooperation may increase in such a way that self-enforcing 
agreements can be formed. 
In this chapter we will analyze the problem of multiple use MPAs by 
multiple countries using game theory. This provides insights into the 
functioning of MPAs as a policy instrument for the MSD and the Maritime 
Policy Directive. More specifically, we will examine the size of MPAs that 
countries adopt, when they account for effects of MPAs on fisheries and 
species conservation separately or jointly and investigate the effect of playing 
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 cooperatively versus playing non-cooperatively on a single issue when 
multiple issues are at stake. 
In game theory strategic interaction between countries has been investigated 
in a general fisheries context (Munro, 1979; Levhari and Mirman, 1980; 
Hämäläinen et al., 1985; Vislie, 1987; Hannesson, 1997; Arnason et al., 2000; 
Bjørndal and Lindroos, 2004; Kronbak and Lindroos, 2007). The related 
problems of public good provision, international environmental agreements 
and enforcement have also been considered both in terms of transboundary 
pollution abatement and coalitions (Mäler, 1989; Mäler and de Zeeuw, 1998; 
Finus, 2003; Finus et al., 2006; Weikard et al., 2006a; Nagashima et al., 2009) 
and in terms of possible coalitions for fisheries management (Pintassilgo, 2003; 
Pintassilgo and Lindroos, 2008; Pintassilgo et al., 2010). Game theoretic 
treatments of (marine) protected areas have received less attention so far. 
Sanchirico and Wilen (2001) and Beattie et al. (2002) study strategic interaction, 
both among fishermen and between fishermen and policymakers. Sumaila 
(2002) devises a computational model of assigning an MPA as a differential 
game between two agents. Ruijs and Janmaat (2007) have studied strategic 
positioning of MPAs. They consider two countries, the location of MPAs and 
the effect of different migratory regimes in a differential game. Busch (2008) 
derives some general conditions from game theory for terrestrial 
transboundary reserves to be superior over isolated reserves.  
Our chapter contributes to the literature as it considers the combination of 
multiple uses of MPAs with multiple agents: we examine cooperation and 
defector incentives when multiple agents operate in a multiple use setting, i.e. 
by considering impacts on fisheries and nature conservation. Furthermore the 
fisheries MPA model is improved to accommodate the habitat enhancement 
effects of MPAs, and a conservation game is introduced, that uses standard 
ecological functions to model species richness and consequent conservation 
benefits. 
In section 3.2. we present a game theoretic model that investigates the issue 
of multiple use MPAs in a multiple country setting by developing two 
separate models of MPAs in a multiple country setting: one model for the 
fisheries case and one model for the species conservation case. Next we 
combine the models and investigate the impacts of combining fisheries and 
nature conservation goals on MPA size. In section 3.3. we provide a numerical 
example to illustrate our results and in section 3.4. we discuss the limitations 
of the model, draw conclusions and discuss their implications. 
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 3.2. Model description 
 
3.2.1. Model background 
In our model we consider a regional sea, such as the North Sea, that is 
completely claimed by a number of countries. These countries have divided 
the sea into Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of equal size. The sea contains 
only one fish species that is of commercial interest for fisheries, and this fish 
species consists of a single stock. The other fish species, as well as mammals 
and benthos are assumed to have no commercial value, only existence value. 
We ignore effects of time and space, to focus exclusively on basic mechanisms. 
Furthermore we confine our interest to the steady state and neglect transition 
paths. 
Our fisheries model describes optimal harvesting of fish by a number of 
countries in a common sea with a single stock. We analyze the impact of 
establishing an MPA in a context where each country has a fixed share in the 
fishing area. In the fisheries model the cost of protection is a reduction in 
catchability proportional to MPA size1. We assume that from a fisheries’ 
perspective, assigning an MPA does not cause any costs other than 
opportunity costs of forgone harvest and additional effort costs. For simplicity 
monitoring and enforcement costs are neglected. The gains of a country consist 
of an increase in growth rate of the shared stock owing to an increase in habitat 
quality in the protected area. Such an increase cannot be reached by 
conventional harvest restrictions because it would only reduce overall fishing 
pressure but not release one area completely from fishing pressure, to recover 
habitat. This habitat effect of MPAs is a public good since a single country 
bears the cost while all countries benefit. 
Our nature conservation model describes conservation efforts by a number 
of countries in the same common sea. We analyze the impact of the total size of 
an MPA on the number of species protected and resulting costs and benefits. 
Each country’s MPA is a contribution to the total protected area, but benefits 
derived from the extra species protected by this MPA accrue to all countries, 
making this another public goods issue. 
3.2.2. Marine Protected Areas as fisheries management tool 
Our fisheries model assumes that there is only one fish stock that is worth 
harvesting from a commercial point of view. We consider a set N of n 
symmetric countries that harvest from a single stock, ignoring other stocks and 
1In the current model setting we assume a direct proportionality between reduction in harvest 
and MPA size. In further research other specifications such as concave or convex reductions 
can be explored. However, such specifications would not alter the basic line of reasoning. 
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 species. If countries cooperate, they maximize the sum of their profits. If they 
defect, they optimize their own profits. Country i’s profits Πi depend on 
harvest and incurred costs. We use a supply side model that assumes that the 
full harvest can be sold at a fixed unit price p: 
 
where Hi is total harvest of country i and Ci are total costs of country i.  
We assume that the stock is uniformly distributed over the fishing grounds 
and we model the growth of the stock with a modified Schaefer production 
function. We assume that the sea is completely claimed by EEZs and that all 
EEZs are of equal size. The total size of the sea is normalized to one, and 
consequently each country has an EEZ of size In absence of MPAs each 
country’s fishing ground is its EEZ.  
We assume that in equilibrium harvest equals the growth of the fish stock. 
The size of the MPA affects both the harvest and the growth rate of the fish 
stock but for simplicity we assume that location of the reserve does not matter. 
The total growth of the fish stock is modeled with a modified logistic growth 
function scaled such that the carrying capacity, i.e. the maximum stock size, 
equals one. This growth function is: 
 
with R(M) the internal growth rate of the stock  and  the 
total MPA. 
Setting aside a share of fishing ground as an MPA is assumed to have a 
positive effect on the growth rate R through enhancing the growth rate in the 
MPA. We model this enhancement as a coupled production function: the 
internal growth rate is rb in the unprotected area and (rb + rM) in the protected 
area. This assumption is based on increased recruitment that is achieved by 
increasing spawning biomass through the absence of fishing in sensitive areas. 
Similar functional forms for Marine Protected Area modeling have been used 
by e.g. Schnier (2005a,b), who also modifies the growth rate and Armstrong 
(2007) who modifies the carrying capacity as an effect of MPAs. If we further 
assume that both stock and carrying capacity are proportional to protected 
area we get: 
 i i i
pH C i NΠ = − ∀ ∈ (3.1) 
1 .n
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), 1G X M R M X X= − (3.2) 
0 1,X≤ ≤ 0 1M≤ ≤
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with  is the size of the MPA of an individual country i. The sum of 
individual MPAs equals total MPA.  
To model harvest we use a modified Schaefer harvest function: 
 
with Q total catchability, Qi catchability in the EEZ of country i, E total effort 
level and Ei effort level of country i. In a standard Schaefer function 
catchability is a parameter. In our model we go beyond this, and assume 
catchability is a combination of a technical coefficient and the fishable area. 
Therefore catchability Q is a decreasing function of M. We use the following 
functions for Q(M) and Qi(Mi): 
 
where qo is original catchability and qM is marginal catchability reduction due 
to area that cannot be fished because it is owned by other players ( ), or 
protected (Mi). 
Costs are assumed to be constant per unit of effort: 
 
Full cooperation on MPAs for fisheries 
When players fully cooperate they maximize the sum of total profits: 
 
with Π denoting total profits.  
To obtain the steady state of the model we set total growth equal to harvest 
and solve for effort level2: 
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2The model can also be solved for stock. We chose to use effort here because the solutions are 
more straightforward. 
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Using harvest function (3.4) and substituting the equilibrium stock given in 
(3.8) we get the objective function: 
 
Taking the First Order Condition with respect to effort we obtain3: 
 
If we substitute the equilibrium stock given in (3.8) into equation (3.10), we get: 
 
Equation (3.11) displays standard components of a FOC in a static fisheries 
model. The left hand side is the marginal benefit: an increase in effort increases 
catch if , and this additional catch is valued at p. The right hand side is 
the marginal cost of effort.  
Similarly, the first order condition with respect to M is given by: 
 
If we substitute the equilibrium stock given in (3.8) into equation (3.12) we get: 
This clearly illustrates the effect of MPAs. The left hand side of (3.13) is the 
marginal benefit of an MPA: an extra unit of protected area increases growth 
and consequently harvest by which is valued at p. The right hand 
side shows the marginal cost of such an area as forgone harvest in an extra unit 
of protected area, also valued at p. 
Solving equation (3.10) and (3.12) simultaneously gives a cubic equation 
which can be factorized into quadratic and linear parts and solved. Given the 
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3We present the interior solution of the model, although these solutions, too, may be corner 
solutions. Corner solutions arise if the bounded variables such as stock, effort and Marine 
Protected Area size exceed their bounds under the solution. Solutions that are corner solutions 
under our parameter assumptions are not analyzed. 
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assumption that all parameters are strictly positive, we find two corner 
solutions where effort is zero and one interior solution: 
 
To evaluate the influence of individual parameters on equilibrium MPA we 
use the implicit function theorem and first order conditions (3.10) and (3.12) to 
determine the signs of their derivatives. The derivatives are shown in 
Appendix 3.A., the signs in Table 3.1.  
Most signs of derivatives can be determined with exception of the 
derivatives with respect to rM and qo. The signs that can be determined have the 
expected sign. An increase in price of fish (p) would make harvesting more 
worthwhile, and thus the protected area is increased to increase harvest. An 
increase in cost of effort (cE) makes a protected area more expensive because 
the protected area decreases the effectiveness of effort through the catchability. 
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Table 3.1: Signs of derivatives of equilibrium MPA under full cooperation and Nash 
equilibrium with respect to parameters in the fisheries game 
 
 
 
Und. = Undetermined. All relations are derived from the implicit function theorem. 
Assumptions used for signs above: All parameters >0, 0≤M≤1, 0 ≤ Mi ≤1/n, 0≤Q(M)≤1, qo ≥ 
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 Consequently with a smaller MPA, less effort is required, thus as effort 
becomes more expensive MPA size is reduced. 
Similarly an increase in rb or qM decreases protected area as they make the 
MPA more costly by increasing forgone harvest necessary to protect an area to 
obtain the same growth bonus. The signs of  and are mainly      
 determined by the difference between price of fish and cost of effort and the 
parameters qM and qo. If p>>cE and Q(M) is not too small, both signs of the 
derivatives are positive. This is in line with expectations: if the price of fish is 
large relative to effort costs, an MPA pays off: the added growth bonus and 
thus extra fish to catch is more valuable than the relatively minor costs of extra 
effort needed to catch that fish. A larger growth bonus (rM) makes the MPA 
more valuable, because it increases extra available catch.  
Similarly a larger original catchability (qo) makes the MPA even cheaper 
because the reducing effect on harvest of the MPA is smaller. 
The Nash equilibrium for MPAs for fisheries 
In Nash equilibrium each individual player wishes to maximize his own 
fisheries profits, given that other players maximize their profits. We assume 
that the sum of harvest of all players is equal to the growth of the stock. The 
harvest depends on choices of effort and MPA size: 
 
 
where  
 
An individual player’s optimization problem is: 
 
Maximizing individual profit functions in (3.16) is not the same as in an open 
access regime. Even though countries optimize their own effort, no new 
entrants are allowed, thus rent is not driven to zero. The first order condition 
with respect to Ei is: 
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If we substitute the equilibrium stock given in (3.15) into equation (3.17), we 
get: 
 
which displays standard components of a FOC in a static fisheries model. The 
left hand side is the marginal benefit: an increase in effort increases catch if X is 
larger than ½ minus the catch of other players, and this additional catch is 
valued at p. The right hand side is marginal effort cost. From a comparison 
between (3.11) and (3.18) it is clear that in Nash equilibrium the stock is 
smaller, through the catch by other players. 
The FOC with respect to MPA is: 
 
If we substitute the equilibrium stock given in (3.15) into equation (3.19) we 
get: 
 
This is similar to the full cooperation case but it now includes terms for 
other players. The left hand side is the marginal benefit of an MPA: an extra 
unit of protected area increases growth and consequently harvest by: 
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where the last term accounts for catch of other players. The extra harvest is 
valued at p. The right hand side shows the marginal cost of such an area in the 
form of forgone harvest (again with a modifier for other players) in that extra 
unit of protected area, also valued at p. A player cannot reap all extra harvest 
from an MPA, because some of it is harvested by others, and therefore the 
incentive to assign an MPA is lower. This can also be seen from the comparison 
between (3.13) and (3.20). 
Solving equations (3.17) and (3.19) simultaneously for n symmetric players we 
get another cubic equation which can be factorized into quadratic and linear 
parts and solved4. Similar to the case of full cooperation we find three solution 
pairs, with two corner solutions, given that all parameters are strictly positive 
and qo ≥ qM. The interior solution for each individual MPA is: 
 
We apply the same procedure as under full cooperation, using the implicit 
function theorem and equations (3.17) and (3.19) to establish the effect of 
individual parameters on equilibrium MPA. The results are the same as for full 
cooperation (Table 3.1, and Appendix 3.A.). 
If we take the solutions from full cooperation and the Nash equilibrium we 
can obtain the difference between the respective protected areas and evaluate 
the effect of parameters on this difference. 
where MFC is total area set aside under full cooperation and MN is total area set 
aside in Nash equilibrium. Given our previous assumptions (all parameters 
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4 The equilibrium effort is a complex and long expression and adds little. It is available from 
the author upon request.  
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 strictly positive, and n ≥ 2), it can be shown that parameter rb increases the 
difference in MPA between full cooperation and Nash equilibrium. 
Unfortunately, the effects of other parameters are ambiguous, and hence we 
have to resort to simulations. The same holds for the difference in payoffs 
between full cooperation and Nash equilibrium5. 
3.2.3. Marine Protected Areas for conservation 
Conservation is a main goal of Marine Protected Areas. In this game we 
measure conservation success as species richness attained in a Marine 
Protected Area. We do not model populations of all species independently but 
instead use the species-area relationship to determine the number of species 
that a reserve contains. The species-area relationship (SPAR) has first been put 
forward by Arrhenius (1921) and is a curve of the general form  with S 
number of species, A area and k and z two positive parameters. It is explained 
by either the passive-sampling effect (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967) or the 
habitat diversity hypothesis (Williams, 1943). 
 The use of this relationship has been criticized for its scale-independent 
application and extrapolation (Leitner and Rosenzweig, 1997; Rosenzweig, 
2005), and its ambiguous role in conservation decisions in the Single Large or 
Several Small (SLOSS) debate (Simberloff and Abele, 1976). Despite these 
criticisms SPARs can still be used as a predictor of local species richness, if one 
accounts for scale (Neigel, 2003; Rosenzweig, 2005). Furthermore even though 
SPARs may support either several small reserves or a single large reserve, 
depending on parameters, in our case we assume a uniform sea, implying that 
the same species would be protected in several small reserves, and therefore 
we apply a SPAR on a single large reserve6.  
For mathematical convenience we transform the species-area relationship 
into a log-log relationship, i.e.  We further assume that costs 
rise linear with area set aside and that countries benefit from the (log) number 
of species in the total area set aside. Each country has an incentive to set some 
area aside, but given that others will also set aside some area, each will set 
aside less in Nash equilibrium. Assuming that all areas are interlinked and 
hence form one protected area, total benefits of species conservation are: 
 
zS kA=
= +ln ln ln .S k z A
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )ln ln ln .P P P PD M b S c M b k z M c M= − = + − (3.23) 
5 The difference in payoff is a complex and long expression, shedding no light on the effect of 
parameters, therefore we do not show it here. It is available from the author upon request. 
6 In a more elaborate analysis a more complex specification on the relation between area, 
species richness and the benefits of nature conservation can be used. However, this would not 
change the fundamentals of the current analysis. 
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 Here bP represents marginal global benefits of protection of the log number 
of species, ln S, and k and z are positive parameters of the SPAR and cP is the 
cost of protecting an area, such as monitoring and enforcement costs or 
opportunity costs for other uses. 
Full cooperation on MPAs for conservation 
Under full cooperation global welfare is maximized, accounting for benefit 
generation in all countries. The countries maximize: 
with M again total protected area. This results in the following first order 
condition: 
 
The full cooperation optimal MPA size is independent of the number of 
players, as they consider the protection of the full sea, and only one optimum 
exists, although the solution is silent on how this should be reached. Given 
symmetric costs and benefits a fair solution would be that each country’s MPA 
is M*. 
The Nash equilibrium for MPAs for conservation 
In Nash equilibrium, each country maximizes its individual welfare, assuming 
all other countries maximize theirs. We assume each country gets benefits 
proportional to their EEZ size, 1/n. Hence global marginal benefits of 
protection accrue to players in equal shares. Each country hence maximizes: 
 
For an interior solution, the first order condition becomes: 
 
Again we see the strategic setting of the game from the first order condition. 
The additional benefit of an extra unit of area is in the numerator, but it is 
scaled by total area already protected as shown in the denominator. The costs 
of protecting one unit extra are cP.  
We obtain for a symmetric solution: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )ln lnP PD M b k z M c M= + − (3.24) 
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which approaches zero for n→∞ clearly illustrating the sub-optimality of this 
Nash equilibrium. 
The difference in MPA size assigned between full cooperation and Nash 
equilibrium is: 
 
The difference in MPA size between full cooperation case and Nash 
equilibrium is increasing in number of players, in relative gains (bp/cp) of the 
MPA and slope of the SPAR (z). The difference in payoff between full 
cooperation and Nash equilibrium is: 
 
For gains of an MPA we see a similar pattern: the difference increases with 
gains of a protected area and with increasing numbers of players. 
Consequently, if we assume that cooperation is easier if differences in payoff 
are smaller, then in the nature conservation case chances of cooperation 
decrease with an increase in bp, z or n. 
3.2.4. Combining the games 
Marine Protected Areas affect fisheries as well as nature conservation. In order 
to see how equilibria change if we take both into account, we now combine the 
games. Payoffs now reflect both gains from fisheries and conservation. The 
optimal MPA size, for full cooperation and Nash equilibrium may change as 
well. Formally, this is different from issue linkage as in e.g. Folmer et al. (1993), 
Barrett (1997) or Buchner et al. (2005), because we are not dealing with two 
separate problems that are addressed with two different strategic instruments. 
In our game two separate problems are addressed with one instrument: the 
size of the MPA. 
When countries combine both problems, the objective function under full 
cooperation becomes: 
 
Whereas the objective function of an individual country is: 
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The first order conditions of both problems are respectively: 
 
 
In these two FOC we recognize the first order conditions of the separate 
problems. The first order conditions with respect to effort are, of course, the 
same as under (3.10) and (3.18). Solving (3.10) and (3.18) for effort and 
substituting the results into (3.33) and (3.34) yields two fourth order 
polynomials that cannot be solved analytically. The derivatives with respect to 
parameters that can be determined with the implicit function theorem are also 
inconclusive on effects of parameters, unless we assume specific values. 
Therefore we resort to simulations for further analysis.  
The effect of the combination of the games is an MPA that is intermediate to 
the equilibrium MPAs of the separated games. As the two separate games are 
both public goods games the combined game is also a public goods game. We 
now show the effect of these combined functions in a numerical example. 
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 3.3. Numerical example  
We now present a numerical example with two countries, as an illustration of 
the more general case. Suppose we have a sea that is fully claimed as EEZs and 
shared equally between two countries. Initial parameter settings are shown in 
Table 3.2. The current parameter values are arbitrary values, selected to 
illustrate the functioning of the model. In a sensitivity analysis we study 
impacts of changing these parameter values. 
3.3.1. Fisheries: Full cooperation versus Nash 
Solving the countries’ maximization problem for M, for given parameters 
using (3.10) and (3.12) gives a value of 38.6% of the full sea. How this is 
distributed between countries is not relevant from the perspective of full 
cooperation. In our setting with symmetric countries a natural choice would be 
to share the burden of conservation equally and set aside 19.3% of the full sea. 
In the non-cooperative game countries optimize their private income. As can 
be seen from Table 3.3 MPA size in each country is much smaller under Nash 
equilibrium than under full cooperation. Each country designates about 5.6% 
of the full sea as MPA, and hence 11.2% of the total area is protected. 
As can be seen from Table 3.3, outcomes of full cooperation are much more 
favorable in terms of payoff for both countries than playing Nash. Full 
cooperation cannot be reached however, unless some bargaining solution is 
enforced. 
Table 3.2: Arbitrary parameter values for the numerical example 
 
Parameter  Value Unit 
p Price 25 Euro per unit of harvest 
cE Cost per unit of effort 5  Euro per unit of effort 
rb Basic growth rate 0.2  - 
rM Growth bonus MPAs 0.8  - 
bp Benefits of protection 1  
Euro per log of species 
number 
k Species-area curve constant 2 - 
z 
Species-area curve 
exponent 
0.2 - 
cP Costs of protection 0.25 Euro per unit of MPA 
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 3.3.2. Conservation: Full cooperation versus Nash  
The conservation game for a two player game is similar to the fisheries game. 
However, since the response functions have a slope of -1 in the symmetric case, 
the reaction curves overlap completely implying an infinite number of Nash 
equilibria. If we require symmetry in outcomes, we are left with one Nash 
equilibrium. Applying formulas (3.25) and (3.28) and parameter values from 
Table 3.2, we get individual MPA sizes of 20% and 40% of the full sea for Nash 
equilibrium and full cooperation, respectively, implying total MPA sizes of 
40% and 80%. The corresponding payoffs of full cooperation and Nash 
equilibrium are shown in Table 3.3.  
From Table 3.3, it can also be seen that from a fisheries perspective the Nash 
equilibrium of the conservation game is preferred: under full cooperation 
fishing is not profitable but under the Nash equilibrium it is. This shows the 
advantage of considering the combined problem. 
3.3.3. Combining both games 
If we combine the games we get the objective functions as shown in section 
3.2.3. In Table 3.3 the main results are shown to compare the full cooperation 
outcome with the Nash equilibrium. The results are intermediate to the values 
we find for the separate games except for effort. Because M* of the combined 
game is slightly larger than in the fisheries game, more effort is needed due to 
lower catchability in the combined game. 
In Figure 3.1 we show payoff of player as a function of MPA size, and we 
marked respective Nash and Full cooperation solutions for the separate 
fisheries and conservation games. Figure 3.1 also illustrates the sub-optimality 
of considering each issue in isolation. In this particular case the MPA that is 
optimal for the combined game is too large from a pure fisheries perspective 
and too small from a conservation perspective. It is therefore imperative to 
combine the two. Only in special cases, when optimal fisheries and 
conservation MPA sizes happen to coincide will the combined optimum be the 
same as in the separate games.  
Another interesting finding demonstrated in Figure 3.1, is that, from 
society’s point of view, cooperation on a single issue can be worse than playing 
Nash on that single issue (see also Table 3.3). Consider the payoff in the 
equilibrium where countries cooperate only on species conservation. We can 
see from Figure 3.1 that it is lower than the payoff of the Nash equilibrium of 
conservation. If the cooperative solution of the conservation game is applied, 
losses of fisheries are so large that they exceed all gains from conservation.  
Whether this happens depends, of course, on parameter values, but the 
possibility is underlines the need of considering multiple uses in marine policy.  
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As stated before, because externalities run in the same directions in both 
games, combining the games does not remove defection incentives. However, 
the combined Nash equilibrium gives a better total payoff than the total payoff 
in the separated games (compare Table 3.3). 
3.3.4. Comparative statics 
To illustrate the model further and to provide some more insights into 
incentives for cooperation we have carried out a sensitivity analysis on all 
parameters in the combined model. For each parameter we calculated the 
values of MPA sizes and the corresponding payoff for the change of a single 
parameter in steps of 10%, over a range of minus 50% to plus 50%, keeping 
other parameters fixed. We used the same procedure for the fisheries model to 
calculate the effect of parameters on the size of the difference between full 
cooperation and the Nash equilibrium because these differences could not be 
analyzed analytically. 
Differences between full cooperation and Nash equilibrium in the fisheries 
game 
In Figure 3.2 we show how payoff (ΠFC and ΠN ) and MPA share (MFC and MN) 
change, with price of fish (p), keeping all other parameters fixed. From this 
 
Figure 3.1: The total payoff of one country and respective equilibria of the isolated 
games, as a function of a) MPA size chosen by both countries (as a share of the full sea) 
under full cooperation, b) MPA size chosen by one country (as a share of the full sea) 
assuming that the other player plays Nash. For parameter values see Table 3.2. 
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graph the differences can also be seen, and whether these differences are 
increasing or decreasing. How differences in payoff (ΠFC—ΠN) and MPA  
(MFC—MN) react upon changes of other parameters is shown in Table 3.4.  
If the price of fish (p) increases, value of harvest increases and this drives up 
the payoff under full cooperation more than it drives up the payoff under Nash 
equilibrium, because harvests are larger under full cooperation. The incentive 
to set aside more area as an MPA, however, increases a bit more under Nash
 
 
Figure 3.2: The difference between full cooperation and Nash equilibrium in payoff and 
MPA share in the fisheries game, as a function of changing the price of fish (pf) 
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Table 3.4: The relation between parameters and the difference between full cooperation 
and Nash equilibrium for payoff and MPA share in the separate fisheries game and the 
combined game  
 
Und. = Undetermined, 0 = no effect. A ‘+’ indicates that the parameter and difference move 
in the same direction, a ‘-’ indicates that the parameter and difference move in opposite 
directions. All results were derived from simulations. 
 Difference p cE rb rM qo qM bP z cP 
Fisheries 
game  
 
FC NM M− - + + - - + 0 0 0 
 
FC NΠ − Π + - + + - + 0 0 0 
 
FC NM M− Und. Und. - Und. Und. Und. - - + 
 
FC NW W− + - + + - + + + - 
Combined 
game  
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  equilibrium because all countries have a stronger incentive to set aside a larger 
MPA and thus the difference in total area set aside decreases. 
 The profitability of fisheries declines faster under Nash equilibrium than 
under full cooperation. At a price of 17.5 or less fishing is no longer profitable 
in Nash equilibrium whereas fishing still occurs under full cooperation. This is 
a consequence of reduced harvests in Nash equilibrium. 
The effect of other parameters on the difference between full cooperation 
and Nash equilibrium differs. Parameter rM has similar effects on the size of the 
differences as price of fish (p), and this effect is caused by the same 
mechanisms. A larger growth bonus (rM) increases the incentive to set aside 
MPA, but larger benefits are reaped under full cooperation. As expected the 
cost side (cE) has the exact opposite effect of the price of fish; the same 
mechanisms apply in opposite direction.  
Assuming that cooperation becomes more likely when this difference is 
smaller, Table 3.4 shows that increasing parameter qo has an unequivocal 
diminishing effect on the size of the differences. Similarly a decrease in rb or qM 
also decreases differences in payoff and equilibrium MPA size. 
All these parameter changes make an MPA more attractive by reducing MPA 
costs in terms of forgone harvest. 
Comparative statics of the combined game 
The relation between parameters and payoffs and MPA sizes are shown in 
Table 3.5. As expected the effect of parameters on equilibrium payoff and 
equilibrium MPA is the same for full cooperation and Nash equilibrium, albeit 
sometimes larger or smaller. In Table 3.5 it is shown that increasing the benefits 
of an MPA (by increasing p, rM, or bP) or decreasing its costs (by increasing qo or 
decreasing cE or cP) generally has the effect of increasing both equilibrium MPA 
and payoff. Two exceptions are basic growth rate (rb) and curvature of the 
SPAR (z). 
Increasing basic growth rate (rb) decreases the incentive to set aside MPA, 
because the harvest forgone to acquire the same level of growth bonus (rM) is 
 Table 3.5: The relation between parameters, payoffs and MPA share in the combined 
game both for full cooperation and Nash equilibrium 
A ‘+’ indicates that the parameter and variable move in the same direction, a ‘-’ indicates 
that the parameter and variable move in opposite directions. All results were derived from 
simulations. 
 p cE rb rM qo qM bP z cP 
M* + - - + + - + + - 
W* + - + + + - + - - 
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 larger, thus relatively less harvest is gained by setting aside MPA. The payoff 
however, does increase because overall harvest is larger.  
Increasing the curvature of the species-area curve (z), on the one hand, 
causes MPA size to increase because the return in terms of species numbers 
gets higher. Payoffs on the other hand fall, because fisheries profits fall and 
because the log of species numbers increases less than (linear) cost increase.  
In Table 3.4 we show the effect of parameters on the size of the difference in 
equilibrium payoff and MPA under full cooperation and Nash equilibrium. It 
is interesting to see that many of the fisheries parameters have an 
undetermined effect on the size of the difference between MPAs. What we 
often see here is a decreasing trend that eventually becomes negative, or the 
opposite: an increasing trend that starts negative but becomes positive. The 
difference in payoff however, has unambiguous signs: the direction of effects is 
the same as in the separate games. 
In Figure 3.3 we show how payoff and MPA share change as a result of 
changing the reduction in catchability (qM) given that all other parameters 
remain fixed. Increasing qM causes both MPA and payoff to decrease, and this 
decrease is larger for the Nash equilibrium than for full cooperation (Figure 
3.3), because a Nash player is punished double under an increase in qM: it 
decreases his harvest because he can only harvest in his own EEZ and the MPA 
reduces harvests even further. If we once again assume that cooperation is 
easier when differences between payoffs are smaller, then cooperation becomes
 
Figure 3.3: MPA and payoff under full cooperation (FC) and Nash equilibrium (Nash) in 
the combined game as a function of parameter qM keeping other parameters fixed. 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Catchability reduction (qM)
M
PA
 
si
ze
 (M
*
), P
ay
of
f (W
*
)
FC Payoff
FC MPA
Nash Payoff
Nash MPA
 61 
 
 
 more likely with decreasing qM. This can also be seen in Figure 3.3: if qM 
becomes very small, payoff and MPA differences between full cooperation and 
Nash equilibrium decrease and, for MPA size, the difference eventually 
vanishes. 
Figure 3.4 provides intuition on the mechanisms in the model: increasing 
original catchability reduces the costs of MPA from a fisheries perspective. 
Moreover it increases harvest and consequently payoff of fisheries. Therefore 
the optimum MPA size in the fisheries game goes up. The optimum of the 
separate conservation game is unaffected by changes in qo. As a consequence 
the combined optimum goes up and approaches the conservation optimum as 
the fisheries optimum approaches the conservation optimum. Consequently 
increasing the original catchability has the expected effect of moving towards 
the conservation optimum.  
3.4. Discussion & conclusions 
3.4.1. Main findings 
Here we summarize our main findings and then discuss some limitations of 
the study and offer suggestions for further research. In this chapter we 
consider effects of MPAs on fisheries and species conservation in a multi-
country setting. We analyze resulting externalities and possible shifts in 
 
Figure 3.4: MPA size in the combined and from the separate games as a function of qo, 
keeping other parameters fixed. 
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 equilibria if two separate games of MPA assignment are combined. We focus 
on main issues and develop a model that contains some of the important 
aspects that arise in the multiple country, multiple use setting that MPA 
planners, and marine policy makers, in general, face. 
The separate games provide novel ways to model impacts of MPAs both for 
conservation as well as for fisheries. Furthermore, the combination of the 
games provides a counterintuitive result: cooperation on a single issue may be 
worse than not cooperating if we take all aspects into account. 
The setting of the fisheries model is such that if MPAs increase growth rates 
by more than the reduced harvest, it pays to set aside some area. Obviously 
cooperation is better than non-cooperation, because gains can be shared. 
Furthermore results show that the difference in MPA size assigned between 
cooperation and Nash equilibrium declines when either the growth bonus of 
the MPA increases, or when the price of fish increases. However, the payoff 
difference between full cooperation and Nash equilibrium also increases with 
these parameters which leads to stronger free-rider incentives. If the 
catchability reduction of the MPA increases, the difference in both assigned 
MPA and payoff decline. Essentially if MPAs become worth less, differences 
between full cooperation and Nash equilibrium decrease.  
The conservation game offers a new approach to the conservation problem. 
Although game theory has been used to analyze transboundary parks in 
general (Busch, 2008), to our knowledge species-area curves were never used 
in a game. The results of the game are straightforward: for species conservation 
cooperation is better than Nash equilibrium, and due to defector incentives we 
have a social dilemma. In contrast with the fisheries game, the difference in 
MPA assigned as well as the difference in payoff between full cooperation and 
Nash equilibrium are increasing in both gains of the MPA and number of 
players. Therefore it seems that achieving cooperation will be even harder.  
A core result of the chapter is that the combined game offers a new and 
counterintuitive perspective on these standard results of the separate games: if 
we take a combined view, cooperation on a single issue may be worse than non
-cooperation. By ignoring multiple use of the MPA the damage done in one 
domain of use is so large that it destroys all gains from cooperation on the 
other issue. Therefore we conclude that accounting for multiple uses is a 
necessity when planning MPAs.  
Furthermore the combined game has better possibilities from society’s 
perspective than the single games do. In our numerical example the combined 
game increases MPA assigned compared to the fisheries case. Also it decreases 
the difference in MPA between full cooperation and Nash equilibrium 
compared to the conservation case. Still, combining both games gives a public 
goods game and free-rider incentives remain. 
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 Summarizing, MPAs are a valuable tool for conservation and fisheries 
management in EEZs. Optimal use of this tool, however, requires 
consideration of its multiple use effects. Failing to consider multiple uses 
could, from society’s point of view, be worse than not cooperating at all.  
Although not a perfect solution, the MSD (and other European marine 
policies) encourages countries to cooperate and more importantly, to consider 
the full effects of their actions in their marine strategies. We conclude that 
MPAs may not be a panacea, but they will surely support safeguarding our 
marine environment. 
3.4.2. Limitations of the study 
Our analysis assumes symmetric players. In the issue linkage models of Folmer 
et al. (1993) and Cesar and de Zeeuw (1996) asymmetry is the key to break the 
prisoner’s dilemma. Their models consist of two prisoner’s dilemmas that have 
a reversed asymmetric payoff structure. The linkage of the two games removes 
the prisoner’s dilemma payoff structure. In our model asymmetry does not 
have a decisive role since our model considers only one strategic decision 
variable, in contrast to the models of Folmer et al. (1993) and Cesar and de 
Zeeuw (1996) who consider two strategic decisions, one for each game. Even if 
one country would have a higher advantage in fisheries and the other in 
species conservation we expect that the combined game would still give a 
result intermediate to the equilibria of the two separate games. Where that 
equilibrium would be, depends on parameter values.  
A further limitation of the assumed symmetry and uniform biological 
conditions in the model is that all spatial heterogeneity is ignored, whereas it is 
exactly this spatial heterogeneity both in fishermen behavior and in biological 
conditions that determine the effectiveness of MPAs. Regarding fishermen 
behavior, spatial heterogeneity in location choice and home ports decisions 
may largely negate any positive fisheries effects (Smith, 2004; Smith and Wilen, 
2004). The biological heterogeneity may have the same effect (Holland, 2000), 
although positive effects have also been found when a patchy environment is 
considered (Sanchirico and Wilen, 2002; Sanchirico, 2004). Effects very much 
depend on assumptions about migration and growth rates (Sanchirico and 
Wilen, 2002; Sanchirico, 2004; Ruijs and Janmaat, 2007). 
From the species conservation perspective biological heterogeneity translates 
into hotspots and species-poor areas, resulting in different SPARs. There is also 
the question whether species richness per se is desirable or that different 
species are valued differently, with different species located in different areas. 
Furthermore due to overlaps in protected species between MPAs and 
countries, questions arise whether species protected in one country should also 
be protected in the other. 
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 Although the fisheries model suggests a positive role for MPAs in fisheries 
management, this result may no longer hold if open access is present, as 
demonstrated in Hannesson (1998) and Anderson (2002). Even though agents 
may play non-cooperatively in our model, resulting in a sub-optimal solution, 
we do not allow for open access, because the sea is partitioned into EEZs in our 
model.  
3.4.3. Suggestions for further research 
In our model the fisheries game does not include monitoring and compliance 
costs. A more realistic setting would include a set-aside cost in the fisheries 
case, equal to the one in the conservation case. The most likely outcome of such 
a setting would be a smaller MPA in the separate fisheries game, because of 
extra costs. The MPA for conservation and combined game would not change, 
as costs already occur once in both games. Such a double dividend scenario 
would further demonstrate the need to consider all possible uses in MPA 
policies.  
As pointed out in the introduction, MPAs are a static tool in a dynamic 
environment. In further research it will be useful to explicitly include issues of 
time and space in addition to the steady state analysis of the current chapter. 
The importance of spatial dynamics has been demonstrated by e.g. Ruijs and 
Janmaat (2007), but just for the fisheries case and to our knowledge never for 
the combination of fisheries and conservation.  
The evolution of species richness over time and space, is very complex and a 
constant source of debate among ecologists (see Gray, 2001 for a critical review 
for the marine environment). The current approach is therefore a pragmatic 
compromise, but further empirical and theoretical work on this issue would 
greatly increase our understanding of the functioning of MPAs and facilitate 
inclusion of conservation issues in the MPA and fisheries modeling debate. 
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 3.A. Appendix: Derivatives with respect to parameters 
We use the implicit function theorem and relevant first order conditions to 
evaluate the effect of parameters on the equilibrium MPA. The equilibrium 
value of other variables enters the relevant FOC, before the derivative is 
determined.  
If we substitute E* calculated from (3.10) in first order condition (3.12) and 
rearrange we get: 
 
In the main text we pointed out that we are only interested in the solution 
stemming from the quadratic part, since the rest are corner solutions. For 
(3A.1) to be equal to zero, this is the part that equals zero, and only the effect of 
parameters on this part has an effect on the solution we are interested in. 
Therefore we can determine the effect of parameters on equilibrium MPA, by 
taking derivatives only on the part: 
 
This results in the following derivatives: 
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The procedure for the derivatives in Nash equilibrium is similar: calculate Ei* 
from equation (3.17), insert it into equation (3.19), both for Ei* and Ej*, replace 
Mj* with Mi*, and take derivatives with respect to the quadratic part of the 
resulting cubic equation: 
 
Hence derivatives are taken with respect to the implicit function that defines 
the interior solution in the main text: 
 This results in the following derivatives: 
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Chapter 4*: Marine Protected Areas for biodiversity 
conservation: cooperation, strategic behavior or 
conservation autarky? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) have received growing attention as a tool for 
marine management. In fact some authors claim that Marine Protected Areas 
are a panacea (Bohnsack, 1993). Others, such as Hannesson (1998) and 
Anderson (2002) are more critical of the role of MPAs, especially under 
conditions of open access or when they are compared to first-best solutions. 
Alisson et al. (1998) point out that due to the open nature of the marine 
environment MPAs do not grant protection from mobile threats such as 
pollution, oil spills and invasive species.  
Part of the debate is due to different meanings and purposes that people 
have in mind when using the term “MPA” (Jones, 2002). The term “protected” 
in “Marine Protected Area” begs the question: protected from what? In the case 
of fisheries management it would mean “protected from fishing”, which would 
refer to a no-take zone. If “protected” is meant in a stricter sense, such as 
protection from all human activities, the term “marine reserve” is more 
appropriate. Lastly, “protected” sometimes refers to limited human use, e.g. 
banning fishing but allowing other activities such as offshore wind parks. In 
this case MPAs are a zoning tool.  
We will interpret MPAs as fully protected zones, with biodiversity 
conservation as main goal, but with positive spill-over effects on direct uses of 
the ecosystem such as fisheries. The model developed thus reflects the 
multiple-use nature that exists in ocean space and that should be considered 
when making decisions about MPAs (Punt et al., 2010). 
The Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of countries are heterogeneous in 
terms of biodiversity, and therefore both location and size of an MPA are 
important. Location plays not only a role for biodiversity, but also has strategic 
implications: given that some biodiversity is protected elsewhere (e.g. in 
another country), can additional value be obtained by protecting biodiversity 
at a specific site? Essentially the question is whether biodiversity protected in 
other locations is a complement to, or substitute for biodiversity protected 
here. Moreover, different locations face different opportunity costs. Due to the 
*This chapter is based on the paper: Maarten J. Punt, Hans-Peter Weikard, Ekko C. van 
Ierland, Jan H. Stel. Marine Protected Areas for biodiversity conservation: cooperation, free-
riding or conservation autarky? Submitted. 
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 combination of complement-substitute issues and differing costs and benefits 
for protecting different locations, plenty of opportunities arise for countries to 
cooperate or defect on decisions on size and location of MPAs. 
MPAs have been modeled in several ways over the last decades; e.g. 
Sumaila (1998, 2002), Anderson (2002), Beattie et al. (2002), Boncoeur et al. 
(2002), Smith and Wilen (2003), Dalton (2004), Sanchirico (2004), Schnier 
(2005a,b), Armstrong (2007), Ruijs and Janmaat (2007), Kar and Matsuda 
(2008), Ngoc (2010) and Punt et al. (2010). Most models consider MPAs as a 
fisheries management tool and other uses are ignored (exceptions are Boncoeur 
et al., 2002, Dalton, 2004, Ngoc, 2010 and Punt et al., 2010). If multiple uses are 
accounted for, they focus on a single ecosystem and are generally non-spatial. 
Many countries however, have EEZs that comprise a number of ecosystems 
providing multiple direct and indirect services. Moreover, only a few papers, 
such as Sumaila (2002), Ruijs and Janmaat (2007) and Punt et al. (2010), 
consider strategic effects at country level. 
In this chapter we will formulate a spatial game theoretic model to analyze 
combined problems of complement-substitute issues, location differences in 
costs and multiple use benefits of MPAs. The setup of our model is similar to 
economic models on spatial configuration of terrestrial reserves. These models 
build to a large extent on traditional industrial organization literature. Goeschl 
and Igliori (2004) investigate competition between an extractive reserve and 
forest plantation in a linear spatial setting. They formulate conditions under 
which the reserve can co-exist with the plantation. Ando and Shah (2010) study 
where a single reserve should be located on a line if the valuation of a reserve 
decreases with distance. Albers et al. (2008) have shown how preferences for 
agglomeration influence the spatial configuration pattern when two agents 
consider strategic site purchases. 
Similar work on complement-substitute issues has been carried out by 
conservation biologists for terrestrial reserves (e.g. Rodrigues and Gaston, 
2002, Bladt et al., 2009, Kark et al., 2009, Jantke and Schneider, 2010 and Bode et 
al., 2011) but these papers compare full cooperation on conservation among a 
number of countries with a situation where countries designate reserves 
without considering conservation efforts by others. Following the trade 
literature we call this setting “conservation autarky”.  
What are plausible motives for conservation autarky? Several reasons may 
exist: countries may value protection in their own domain higher because they 
do not trust the protection in the other country, they may simply not know 
about species being protected in another country or they may feel it is their 
duty to protect species on moral grounds. Moreover, comparing full 
cooperation with conservation autarky is looking at the same problem at 
different scales, where full cooperation represents a regional scale, involving 
two or more countries. Conservation by independent countries however, may 
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 result in “location leakage”, i.e. countries do less because a species is protected 
by another country, even though from the global perspective they should do 
more. 
Our chapter is the first to describe strategic and economic considerations for 
biodiversity conservation with MPAs in a spatial context, with the 
complement-substitute problem explicitly incorporated. Furthermore, we are 
the first to explicitly compare a setting of strategic interaction with a setting of 
conservation autarky in a multiple-use environment. Bode et al. (2011) analyze 
two trusts buying land parcels under conservation autarky, strategic behavior 
and cooperation, but their agents have differing conservation objectives.  
We find that on the one hand conservation autarky implies an inefficiency 
from global perspective, because conservation efforts by others are ignored. On 
the other hand conservation autarky eliminates location leakage. Therefore for 
the global society conservation autarky is still preferred to the alternative 
scenario in which countries do not ignore others’ conservation efforts and 
exploit each other through leakage.  
4.2. Model characteristics 
4.2.1. Model background 
We formulate a spatial game theoretic model of MPAs for biodiversity 
conservation, where two countries decide on locations and sizes of MPAs. An 
MPA generates ecological benefits, but it also has opportunity costs and costs 
of implementation and enforcement. 
The value of biological benefits in an area can be disaggregated into direct 
use values and indirect use values that stem from different ecosystem services. 
These services for the marine environment have been classified by e.g. 
Beaumont et al. (2007). At ecosystem level direct values stem from production 
ecosystem services, such as provision of food and raw materials, local 
regulation services, such as bioremediation of waste, and over-arching support 
services, such as biologically mediated habitat. Indirect use values stem from 
cultural services, such as warm glow, and option-use services (Beaumont et al., 
2007).  
We would argue that there is another scaling issue here: direct use values 
are mainly benefiting local exploiters and are less dependent on biodiversity 
per se. Indirect use values, in contrast, are benefiting global society and are 
heavily dependent on biodiversity. 
If we focus on ecosystems and their services, dissimilarity between 
ecosystems seems a natural starting point for measuring biodiversity. Weikard 
(2002) suggests to take the number of species not in common between two 
ecosystems as a measure of this dissimilarity. Maximizing biodiversity then 
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 boils down to selecting the largest number of unique species by protecting 
relevant ecosystems as reserves.1 However, we can never be sure that a species 
can be fully save. Therefore we do not aim to maximize the total number of 
species, but the expected total number of species as in Polasky et al. (2000), 
Camm et al. (2002) and Arthur et al. (2004). 
If this ecosystem dissimilarity approach is used in combination with 
biodiversity maximization subject to a budget constraint, the full problem is 
equal to the Maximum Species Coverage Problem (Church et al., 1996; Ando et 
al., 1998; Polasky et al., 2000, 2001a,b; Camm et al., 2002; Arthur et al., 2004). If 
it is used in combination with a cost-effectiveness approach for site selection 
subject to a biodiversity constraint the full problem is equal to the Minimum 
Set Cover problem (Williams and Araéjo, 2000; Sala et al., 2002; Stewart et al., 
2003; Cabeza et al., 2004; Richardson et al., 2006). Both problems are the main 
building blocks of reserve site selection problems. In our framework however, 
we opt to use a benefit function approach, maximizing the net benefits of 
conservation, i.e. benefits from direct and indirect ecosystem services minus 
opportunity costs. Moreover, our model is generally applied to a larger scale. 
Reserve site selection problems mostly consider multiple sites within one 
ecosystem. In contrast, our “sites” are full ecosystems that can be partly 
protected. 
An important issue when maximizing the expected number of species is that 
the survival probability of one species may depend on the survival probability 
of other species (Mainwaring, 2001; van der Heide et al., 2005). However, 
Weikard (2002) argues that, because ecosystems are by definition stand-alone 
entities,  probabilities that ecosystems stay intact are independent.  
To be applicable in our framework we have to develop the ecosystem 
dissimilarity approach (Weikard, 2002) further as it lacks three essential 
features: 
(i) An explicit specification of probabilities of ecosystems to stay intact 
(henceforth: persistence probabilities) 
(ii) An explicit specification of direct use values 
(iii) An explicit specification how biodiversity behaves in space 
Therefore we introduce the following assumptions to amend it: 
(a1) Persistence probability of an ecosystem is directly related to the size 
of protected area in an ecosystem. 
(a2) Each additional unit of protected area in an ecosystem increases the 
direct use values of ecosystems services by improving their quality. 
1Biologists generally measure biodiversity with indices based on relative abundance and 
species richness (e.g. Hill, 1973). Others have proposed to measure biodiversity based on 
dissimilarity between species (Faith, 1992; Weitzman 1992, 1993, 1998; Solow et al., 1993). 
Indices that combine dissimilarity, abundance and species richness also exist (Ricotta, 2004; 
Weikard et al., 2006b). 
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 (a3) Dissimilarity between ecosystems increases with distance between 
those ecosystems. 
The relation between persistence probability of an ecosystem and size of 
protected area (assumption (a1)) stems from the fact that with increasing 
protected area an increasing number of keystone species, the building blocks of 
the ecosystem, are protected. Without protection of these keystone species the 
essential features of the ecosystem would be lost, leading to a regime shift in 
the ecosystem. The system would then be transformed into another ecosystem, 
that would still support some species, but often such a new ecosystem has less 
value than the original one. Once transformed, it is very hard to get the 
ecosystem back to its original state (Folke et al., 2004). An example is the 
Waddensea area along the Dutch, German and Danish coastline. If it would be 
impacted too much by human activities such as fishing, dredging and oil and 
gas exploration, its keystone habitats, sandy bottoms and mud flats, would be 
destroyed and most species would be lost. If a large MPA would be installed 
the ecosystem would be protected from damaging activities in this area and the 
probability of ecosystem destruction becomes smaller. In fact the area is 
currently protected by a tri-lateral agreement between the countries involved. 
The habitats sustained by keystone species are not just building blocks of the 
ecosystem, they are also the main contributors to direct use values and direct 
ecosystem services, either by providing a home to species that provide these 
services or by forming the basis for the service itself (assumption (a2)). An 
example of the former is fish habitat, whereas an example of the latter is sandy 
beaches providing tourism services. As the MPA gets bigger, more keystone 
species are protected and direct services have a higher quality. In the case of 
fishing, for example, protection of fish habitat could improve the growth rate 
and carrying capacity of the fish stocks. Of course, harvest would be restricted 
to a smaller area which is reflected in the cost function of MPAs. 
 The reasoning behind assumption (a3) is that many ecosystems are located 
along environmental gradients. Species that are very common occur in (nearly) 
all ecosystems. Other species occur only in specific habitats of ecosystems and, 
as we go on along the gradient, their specific habitats occur and disappear. 
4.2.2. A biodiversity conservation model 
In our MPA model we consider two countries that share a common sea. This 
common sea comprises the set of E ecosystems. Ecosystems are characterized 
by a number of keystone habitats and species, and their destruction would 
imply the destruction of the ecosystem. In all ecosystems together a set S of 
species exists, consisting of |S| species, denoted i. Each ecosystem is 
characterized by a subset of species, and consequently each of the i 
species occurs in a subset ecosystems. The intersection of two sets of 
∈e E
es S⊆
iN E⊆
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 species in ecosystems e and e', , decreases with distance. In this chapter 
we will use a simple exponential decay function to describe this relationship: 
 
with X describing the set intersection, Xo the set intersection between two 
neighboring areas, r the decay rate and δ the distance between the two 
ecosystems under consideration (Nekola and White, 1999). Implicitly this 
assumes a uniform decay gradient in all directions.  
We can think of this setting as a long coastline shared by two countries 
where a natural gradient such as temperature, benthos conditions or salinity, 
defines the ecosystems occurring along this coastline, such as the coastline of 
the US and Canada. Alternatively, we can think of a transect between the 
coasts of two countries where an increasing depth gradient defines the 
occurring ecosystems.  
As an example of a gradient consider the Dutch coast as starting point. The 
Waddensea area would then be the first ecosystem. The next ecosystem along 
the gradient would be the North Sea itself, and we would end up in the Arctic 
sea as the third ecosystem. The gradient is then defined by a combination of 
depth and temperature. This gradient is of course not as universal decaying as 
described in our stylized model, but it does capture the idea. 
The boundaries between ecosystems are in reality not rigid, and interaction 
will occur at the edges of ecosystems. Moreover, there may be highly 
migratory species that travel between ecosystems, such as tuna and whales. 
These species, however, although of great importance to certain ecosystems, 
are exceptions. We will assume throughout the chapter that ecosystems are 
independent units, large enough to contain the home ranges of most species 
occurring in those ecosystems, and ignore those species that traverse multiple 
ecosystems. Species can occur transboundary, but are assumed to be 
independent populations. 
The gradient defines the distribution of species over ecosystems and as such 
is the most important factor determining the spatial configuration of MPAs. 
Along a line, this uniformly decaying gradient will result in two ecosystems on 
the edges with a relatively large number of unique species. The ecosystems 
between those two edges all have a lower number of unique species, as a 
number of their species are shared with their neighbors.  
We consider two countries that wish to designate one or several protected 
areas, so as to maximize net benefits of conservation. The benefits stem from 
direct ecosystem services that have non-increasing marginal returns in area 
and only accrue to the assigning country, and from indirect ecosystem services 
that stem from biodiversity and accrue to both countries. Hence the game is in 
part a public goods game.2 
'e es s∩
 
r
oX X e
δ−
= (4.1) 
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Both countries own half of the sea. Each country k = 1,2 can decide to protect 
a share Me  of ecosystem e, i.e. Me is set apart as an MPA. See Figure 
4.1 for a schematic representation of this model.  
Political boundaries do not always coincide with ecosystem boundaries and 
consequently many countries share ecosystems as well as species. This gives 
rise to additional transboundary problems such as shared stock problems and 
MPA location and size problems. These problems have been considered in 
detail by e.g. Hannesson (1998), Ruijs and Janmaat (2007), Punt et al. (2010) and 
Pintasilgo et al. (2010). The focus of this chapter is more on shared species in 
different ecosystems and therefore we simplify the model by assuming 
ecosystem boundaries coincide with political boundaries.   
The MPA model with its ecosystems is in fact rather similar to Hotelling’s 
well-known firm location model, and the terrestrial conservation literature that 
builds on that specific model (e.g. Goeschl and Igliori, 2004, Albers et al., 2008 
and Ando and Shah, 2010). The important differences with Hotelling’s model 
are the number of firms (in our model the number of MPAs). In our model this 
number is endogenous, whereas in the Hotelling model and its extensions it is 
given. Similarly in our model the preferences for agglomeration follow from 
(0 1)eM≤ ≤
Figure 4.1: A schematic presentation of the nature protection model. Each of the two 
countries 1 and 2 own four ecosystems. In every ecosystem a discrete MPA of size
 can be designated. Ecosystem 1 and 3 in country 1 are partially protected, 
ecosystem 6 in country 2 is fully protected. 
e = 1
Country 1 Country 2
Border
M1 M3 M6
e = 2 e = 3 e = 4 e = 5 e = 6 e = 7 e = 8
≤ ≤0 1eM
2A public goods game is a game in which all players can contribute to a public good. In such a 
game it is in each player’s individual interest to contribute less than the social optimum to a 
public good. Examples include greenhouse gas mitigation (e.g. Finus, 2003 and Weikard et al.,  
2006a)  and catch restrictions on transboundary fish stocks (e.g. Pintassilgo 2003, Pintassilgo 
and Lindroos, 2008 and Pintassilgo et al., 2010). 
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 the (perceived) species distribution, whereas in the model of Albers et al. 
(2008) these are given. 
4.2.3. Full cooperation among countries 
Under full cooperation countries maximize the value V of their joint net 
benefits. Countries benefit directly from preserving ecosystems and indirectly 
through biodiversity. In effect they maximize: 
 
with De the direct benefits from protecting area Me in ecosystem , B are 
the indirect benefits from biodiversity, and  is cost of protection. 
is the total expected number of species. It is calculated in the following 
 way: persistence probability of a single ecosystem e is a function of the area 
protected in that ecosystem, Me. We assume this function follows a certain 
probability distribution that it is increasing in Me:  
If species i occurs in ecosystem e, then the probability that species i goes extinct 
in ecosystem e, because ecosystem e is replaced by another ecosystem, is one 
minus the probability that ecosystem e persists:  Species i is found in 
the subset of ecosystems Ni, hence the probability that species i goes extinct in 
all Ni ecosystems is equal to:   
The survival probability of a species is then equal to the probability that it 
does not go extinct in all its ecosystems:3 
 
The sum of all survival probabilities of species is the expected number of 
species. In our model, in contrast to the model approaches by Polasky at al. 
(2000), Camm et al. (2002) and Arthur et al. (2004) the survival probability of a 
species in a specific ecosystem is dependent on the persistence probability of 
that ecosystem, which is in turn determined by the MPA size.  
Substituting (4.4) in (4.2) the maximization problem is: 
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3The survival probability of a species is consequently a function of the persistence probabilities of 
the ecosystems it occurs in.  
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The first order condition (FOC) for an interior solution is: 
 
This problem can be solved analytically for small problems with only a few 
ecosystems and species, and simple specifications of benefit, cost and 
probability functions. It gets complicated rapidly when large numbers of 
variables and parameters are involved. 
As a simple illustrative example suppose we have three ecosystems, where 
each ecosystem has one species in common with its neighbor as in Table 4.1. As 
emphasized before, there is no migration between ecosystems and we are 
dealing with independent ecosystems. Furthermore assume linear benefits (de), 
quadratic costs with cost parameter ce, and persistence probabilities linear in 
protected area. The net benefit function is then: 
 
The relevant FOC are: 
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Table 4.1: Example of ecosystem configuration
 
Ecosystem Species 
e = 1 1,2 
e = 2 2,3 
e = 3 3,4 
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The first order conditions show the standard economic reasoning. On the 
left hand side of the equations we see marginal benefits of an additional unit of 
MPA: the marginal benefits of direct use (de) and the marginal change in the 
expected number of species. On the right hand side we see marginal costs of an 
additional unit of MPA, ceMe. 
We also see the effect of the distribution of species on the optimal location 
and size of MPAs. Both species 2 and 3 can be protected in multiple 
ecosystems, hence the negative effect of M2 in the FOC’s for M1 and M3 and 
vice-versa.  
In an interior solution countries will always assign at least a small MPA in 
all ecosystems. This can be seen from (4.8): an interior solution requires 
 consequently the  part is always positive and we get a 
positive MPA for each ecosystem. 
Solving for M1, M2 and M3 simultaneously we get: 
 
As can be seen from the solutions the effect of parameters is ambiguous and 
depends on the value of other parameters, in particular cost parameters. If the 
denominator is positive and the product of cost parameters is larger than 1, 
direct benefits of an ecosystem (the d’s) increase the MPA in that ecosystem. 
Interestingly, there is also a positive effect of direct benefits in ecosystem 1 on 
the MPA size chosen in ecosystem 3 and vice-versa, whereas the direct benefit 
parameter of ecosystem 2 affects MPA sizes in the other two ecosystems in a 
negative way. This occurs because ecosystem 2 is partly a substitute for the 
other two. If M1 increases, M2 decreases causing a protection loss to some of the 
species in ecosystem 3 where consequently M3 has to be raised to make up for 
this loss.  
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 The cost parameters determine the sign of the denominator; if the 
denominator is positive they decrease the MPA in their own ecosystem. 
Furthermore it can be seen that c2 has a positive effect on the numerators and 
denominators of M1 and M3. Whether an increase in c2 thus increases these two 
MPAs depends on relative parameter values. 
Because survival probabilities are linear in MPA size, the resulting survival 
probabilities of the different species are: 
with the respective Me given in equation (4.9).  Survival probabilities of species 
1 and 4 are equal to the MPA size in ecosystem 1 and 3, because they only 
occur in those ecosystems. Species 2 and 3 have a weighted sum of MPA sizes 
as survival probabilities.  
For comparison consider that each ecosystem contains all four species. This 
means in practice that we have three equal, independent ecosystems along a 
gradient. In this case the FOCs are: 
Because of symmetry the form of the solutions would be fully symmetric, as 
opposed to the gradient case as shown above. Moreover, if there was no 
overlap between the ecosystems, the FOC of each ecosystem would have been:
with  the number of species occurring in that ecosystem. In that case there 
is no interdependence of the solutions and hence no strategic interaction in 
location choice. Consequently MPA size is determined solely by the 
biodiversity and direct benefits on the spot. 
4.2.4. Strategic non-cooperation among countries 
To describe the strategic non-cooperative or Nash equilibrium we first have to 
specify how the set of ecosystems E is distributed between countries  
We divide the set of ecosystems into two subsets E1 and E2, one for each 
country. 
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 Each country takes the decision of the other country as given when it 
maximizes its own net benefit function. Countries reap the direct benefits of 
their ecosystems and bear the costs of MPAs in their own ecosystems. 
Additionally the value of the biodiversity services accrues to both countries in 
equal shares. Consequently, each country maximizes: 
 
First order conditions for an interior solution are then: 
 
These first order conditions also show the standard form. Private marginal 
benefits consist of the marginal benefits from direct services owned by the 
country and half of the total biodiversity services, private marginal costs are 
the marginal costs of MPAs that the country has to assign to get that additional 
benefits.  
If we take the example of the previous section and assign ecosystems 1 and 2 
to country 1 and ecosystem 3 to country 2, we get the following welfare 
functions: 
 
These two welfare functions result in the following first order conditions for 
an interior solution: 
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 It is informative before solving these three equations to look at the reaction 
curves for the three MPAs. These curves are described by the following 
equations: 
The sizes defined by (4.16) and (4.17) are affected in two ways that will induce 
smaller MPA choices: free-riding and location leakage. Free-riding occurs 
because countries do not account for generated benefits in other countries by 
biodiversity. This can be seen from the ½ factor in the FOC in (4.16).   
Location leakage can be seen from (4.17): if country 1 increases its MPA in 
ecosystem 2, country 2 will reduce  its MPA size in ecosystem 3, and vice-
versa. Another interesting effect of location leakage is that even though M3 did 
not play a role in the original FOC (4.16) with respect to M1, it has a positive 
influence on the equilibrium outcome of M1. The intuition is that if country 2 
invests in the species of ecosystem 3, location leakage applies in ecosystem  2. 
This in turn also decreases the protection of species shared between ecosystem 
1 and 2 and therefore the MPA in ecosystem 1 is increased. The effect also runs 
the other way, even though that cannot be seen directly from the reaction 
curves. 
Furthermore, we can see from the equations in (4.17) that the size of M1 and 
M2 is influenced positively by the direct benefits from the ecosystem itself and 
the cost in the other ecosystem, and negatively by the benefits of the other 
ecosystem. 
Solving the equations in (4.17) simultaneously we get: 
 
which have a similar structure as in the social optimum (cf. (4.9)) but differ in 
several products with factors of two and four. If benefits would only consist of 
the public good, and ecosystems and species numbers were evenly distributed 
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 among countries, the strategic non-cooperative equilibrium would exactly be 
half of the full cooperation case. However, private benefits are also involved 
and are fully accounted for. Furthermore the distribution of ecosystems and 
species is not fully symmetric. Therefore strategic non-cooperative equilibrium 
payoffs and MPA sizes are not necessarily a factor two smaller than full 
cooperation payoffs and MPA sizes.  
From the equations in (4.18) we can also see the positive influence of the 
direct benefits in ecosystem 1 on the MPA size in both ecosystem 1 and 3 and 
vice versa: an increase in d1 will increase M1 if and the 
denominator is positive. Similarly if the denominator is positive d1 will 
increase M3. This effect also holds in reverse. 
To show that MPAs are generally smaller than under full cooperation we 
further simplify the above sizes in equation (4.9) and (4.18) by assuming that 
no direct benefits exist (i.e. d1=d2=d3=0) and symmetric costs for all ecosystems 
(i.e. c1=c2=c3=c). This results in: 
Where is MPA size under full cooperation in ecosystem e and is 
MPA size under non-cooperative strategic equilibrium in ecosystem e. An 
interior solution for all Me requires that . In that case full cooperation 
MPAs in ecosystem 1 and 3 are always larger than those under the strategic 
equilibrium. The MPA in ecosystem 2 under full cooperation is smaller for 
 and larger for  
The associated equilibrium survival probabilities of species are again as in 
equation (4.10), but now the associated Me are those defined in equation (4.18). 
Because MPAs sizes are smaller under strategic non-cooperation, the survival 
probabilities are smaller as well.  
For comparison, consider the case with three independent but equal 
ecosystems as before. The FOCs of the countries are then: 
The solution would still be fully symmetric, as under full cooperation. 
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 Similarly, if there would have been no overlap the FOC would have been:
 
Qualitatively both the cases of no-overlap and three equal ecosystems give the 
same result: free-riding affects only size, but there is no location leakage. With 
three equal ecosystems as in (4.20) all species are affected in the same way, and 
hence there is no location choice. In the no-overlap case each species occurs in 
exactly one ecosystem and consequently it is impossible to exploit each other 
through location leakage. In both cases however, countries only account for the 
benefits of protection in their own country and consequently choose smaller 
MPAs than they would have done under full cooperation, so free-riding is not 
eliminated. 
4.2.5. Conservation autarky 
In the previous section we have implicitly assumed that from an individual 
country’s perspective it does not matter for the indirect services where a 
species is protected. This gives rise to location leakage, causing countries to 
free-ride on the protection of species by others. In a situation of conservation 
autarky it is assumed that protection of species in one country is not a 
substitute for protection in another country (as in Kark et al., 2009 and Jantke 
and Schneider, 2010). 
Conservation autarky eliminates a part of the public goods issue because 
location leakage no longer occurs. If the global society, however, considers 
protection of the same species in another country as a substitute, the most 
effective protection plan would not be implemented, because countries ignore 
protection in other countries. Moreover countries still account for biodiversity 
protected in their own country only, and therefore they still free-ride.  
Under conservation autarky each country maximizes its perceived benefits: 
 
where Sk denotes the set of species in country k, and Nik denotes the set of 
ecosystems where species i occurs in country k. The factor ½ applies because 
we are only considering a fraction of all countries. The associated first order 
conditions for a maximum are: 
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These first order conditions differ from the conditions derived for strategic  
non-cooperation in the second term. Marginal benefits of species protection are 
restricted to species protected domestically.  
Turning to our earlier example the private welfare functions of the countries 
are: 
with resulting first order conditions: 
 
As can be seen from (4.25) the substitution effect between countries and, 
hence,  location leakage is gone. There is no longer a negative effect of M2 on 
M3 and vice versa. The substitution effect within one country remains. Solving 
the system in (4.25) gives: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
{ }
1
2
1 1
0,
1,2 , .
k ik
k k
k
e
e
i S e Ne e e e
e E e Ee e e
V
M
B f M
D M C M
M M M
k e E
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
∂
=
∂
 
∂ − −  ∂ ∂ + − =
∂ ∂ ∂
∀ ∈ ∀ ∈
∑ ∏
∑ ∑
(4.23) 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 11
2 2
211
21 2
21
2 3 3 3 32
1 1
1 1
i
i
e e e e e e
e E i S e Ee N
e e
i S e N
V M d M M c M
V M d M M c M
∈ ∈ ∈∈
∈ ∈
 
= + − − −  
 
 
= + − − −  
 
∑ ∑ ∑∏
∑ ∏
(4.24) 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
21 2 1 1
1
1 1
22 1 2 2
2
2
3 3 3
3
2 0
2 0
1 0.
e
e
e
V M
d M c M
M
V M
d M c M
M
V M
d c M
M
∂
= + − − =
∂
∂
= + − − =
∂
∂
= + − =
∂
(4.25) 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 1 2
1
1 2
1 2 1
2
1 2
3
3
3
4 1 2 1
4 1
4 1 2 1
4 1
1
c d d
M
c c
c d d
M
c c
d
M
c
+ − +
=
−
+ − +
=
−
+
=
(4.26) 
 85 
 
 where the substitution effect within country 1 clearly remains, as the direct 
benefits of ecosystem 2 (d2) affect the size of MPA in ecosystem 1 (M1) 
negatively and vice versa. However, the effect between countries has 
disappeared: the negative effect of d3 on M2 and the positive effect on M1, and 
vice versa are both gone.  
Using the same simplification as in section 4.2.4. (d1=d2=d3=0 and c1=c2=c3=c) 
to compare full cooperation with conservation autarky, we find: 
 
where  denotes the MPA size in ecosystem e under conservation autarky. 
Again,  is required for an interior solution. These differences are 
generally positive, implying that full cooperation assigns larger MPAs than is 
done under conservation autarky, except in ecosystem 2 for  Here 
free-riding is outweighed by the fact that a country considers certain species as 
unique (whereas they are not) and therefore overprotects these species. 
Survival probabilities are again as in (4.10) with the relevant Me given by (4.26). 
Because Me is generally larger under full cooperation than under conservation 
autarky, the survival probabilities are generally larger under full cooperation 
as well. 
Compared to the free-riding solutions, we find: 
Here the area in the first ecosystem is larger under strategic non-cooperation, 
but the others are larger under conservation autarky. In general, because 
countries only consider protection in their own ecosystems, species that are 
transboundary receive more protection than under strategic non-cooperation 
 
( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )
2
1 1 2
2 2 2
2
3 3 2
2 1
2 1 2
2 3
2 1 2
2 2
,
2
FC CA
FC CA
FC CA
c c
M M
c c
c c
M M
c c
c c
M M
c c
− +
− =
+ −
−
− =
+ −
− +
− =
−
(4.27) 
CA
eM
2c >
2 3.c≤ ≤
 
( )( )
( )( )
( )
1 1 2
2 2 2
3 3 2
1
2 1 2 1
2
2 1 2 1
1
.
2 1
N CA
N CA
N CA
M M
c c
c
M M
c c
c
M M
c c
− =
+ −
−
− =
+ −
−
− =
−
(4.28) 
 86 
 
 but not as much as under full cooperation. Hence from the global perspective 
inefficiencies still occur, even though the situation is an improvement from 
strategic non-cooperation. Because M1 is larger under strategic non-
cooperation than under conservation autarky and M2 and M3 are smaller, the 
survival probability of species 1 is larger under strategic non-cooperation and 
that of species 3 is smaller. The effect on species 2 and 3 is ambiguous. 
For comparison consider again the three equal independent ecosystems 
case. Then the following FOC apply: 
 
Generally, since countries ignore contributions by others and have all 
species in their domain, they will assign larger MPAs than under the strategic 
non-cooperative equilibrium. These MPAs are not as large as under full 
cooperation because countries only account for the services in their own 
country.  
Similarly in the no-overlap case the FOCs are: 
Consequently in the no-overlap case conservation autarky is equal to strategic 
non-cooperation. 
4.3. Simulation model 
4.3.1. The ecosystem model 
We will now explore the effects of a more realistic probability function, as well 
as larger numbers of ecosystems and species. For the simulation we will 
consider a coastline of ecosystems with a universal decay rate and an equal 
maximum number of species in each ecosystem. A non-universal decay rate 
would result in more abrupt changes in species composition between 
ecosystems. An example would be that ecosystems that are not neighbors have 
no species in common.4 
From a matrix of distances between ecosystems and the maximum number 
of species, a distribution of species over ecosystems can be calculated. We will 
consider this distribution exogenous; its calculation is explained in Appendix 
4.A. 
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4A more detailed specification in two dimensions and non-universal decay rate would be a 
more realistic setting, but is more difficult to solve and adds little to the results found here 
except from a richer set of possible solutions and configurations. 
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The persistence probability function is assumed to be a cumulative normal 
distribution with a mean (µ) between zero and one and a small standard 
deviation (σ) to keep the relation between the minimum and maximum 
survival probabilities and MPA size between zero and one. Furthermore it is 
assumed that the persistence probability function is equal across ecosystems. 
Examples of persistence probability functions for several parameter 
combinations are shown in Figure 4.2. The fact that such functions do not 
always cross the origin or are equal to one even if an ecosystem is fully 
protected reflect that ecosystems may have some persistence probability even 
without protection, and that ecosystems may not be guaranteed to persist even 
if they are fully protected.  
4.3.2. The economic model 
For the economic side of the model we have to specify a benefit function and a 
cost function. The benefit function consists of direct benefits from ecosystem 
services of the separate ecosystems and indirect benefits from biodiversity. The 
direct benefits under full cooperation are specified as: 
Figure 4.2: Examples of possible persistence probability functions of the ecosystem (f(Me)) 
as a function of MPA size. The used parameters are for f1(Me): mean (µ) = 0.75, standard 
deviation (σ) = 0.3, for f2(Me): µ = 0.75, σ = 0.5, for f3(Me): µ= 0.5, σ= 0.2 and for f4(Me): µ = 0.5, σ 
= 0.1. 
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The equivalent formulation under the strategic non-cooperation and 
conservation autarky is: 
 
Similarly indirect benefits under full cooperation are specified as the 
benefits of biodiversity b, multiplied with the total expected biodiversity, 
measured as expected number of species: 
where erf is the error function used for calculations of the cumulative normal 
distribution used for the persistence probability, µ is the mean of the 
distribution and σ is its standard deviation. Its equivalent under the strategic 
non-cooperative specification is: 
In (4.34) some of the Me are exogenous to the decision maker as they are 
controlled by the other country. For conservation autarky the specification is:
 
In the simulations we will assume a cost function that is quadratic in MPA 
size:  
    
4.3.3. Simulations 
We will simulate a coastline with ten ecosystems and two countries; each 
country has the jurisdiction over five ecosystems. Parameter values for the 
simulations are given in Table 4.2. With these parameters we calculate a 
species distribution over the ten ecosystems that matches the patterns in 
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 Table 4.2: Arbitrary parameter and set values of the simulation in the base case 
 
 
Parameters Values 
SeMAX 50 
Xo 1 
r 0.9 
δ 1 (per ecosystem) 
µ 0.75 
σ 0.3 
de 2 (k€/ share protected) 
b 0.2 (k€/expected species) 
ce 10 (k€/share protected) 
Sets Range on elements 
E (1-10) 
E1 (1-5) 
E2 (6-10) 
S (1-255) 
S1 (1-149) 
S2 (33), (71), (78), (86), (97), (100-104), (118-255) 
Table 4.3: Initial distribution of species over ecosystems 
 
Ecosystem Species 
1 (1-50) 
2 (1-20), (51-80) 
3 (21-28), (51-70), (81-102) 
4 (29-31), (51-54), (71-74), (81-96), (103-125),  
5 (32), (75-77), (81-85), (97-99), (103-117), (126-148) 
6 (33), (78), (97), (100-101), (103), (118-124), (126-143), (149-167), 
 (91-110) 
7 (71), (86), (104), (126-131), (144), (149-162), (168-193)  
8 (102), (125), (145-147), (149-154), (163-164), (168-181), (194-216) 
9 (125), (145), (163), (165-166), (168), (182-188), (194-209), (217-237) 
10 (148), (167), (189-191), (194), (210-235), (238-255) 
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exponential decay as described in Appendix 4.A. The resulting pattern is 
shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.  
Next we solve the economic model given this species distribution and other 
parameters both for full cooperation, strategic non-cooperation and 
conservation autarky. To overcome the non-convexities of this problem we 
used a hybrid evolutionary algorithm to calculate the global maximum for full 
cooperation and conservation autarky and a hybrid coevolutionary algorithm 
for the strategic non-cooperative equilibrium as described in Son and Baldick 
(2004). We used an adapted version of the continuous genetic algorithm 
described by Haupt and Haupt (2004).   
 The results for full cooperation, strategic non-cooperation and conservation 
autarky are shown in Figure 4.3 and Table 4.5. In fact two non-cooperative 
equilibria exist: in the first equilibrium country 1 is slightly better off, in the 
second equilibrium country 2 is slightly better off (cf. Table 4.5). The two 
different equilibria differ in chosen main MPAs. The ecosystems with the 
highest number of unique species (ecosystems 1 and 10) get the highest 
priority in protection. However, under strategic non-cooperation a smaller area 
is protected than under full cooperation. The differences between the two are 
not too large because of the  S-shape of the persistence probability.  
There are two main reasons for assigning smaller MPAs under the strategic 
equilibria: free-riding and location leakage. Free-riding can be generally 
observed in Figure 4.3, i.e. all MPAs are smaller than under full cooperation 
because countries do not account for the benefits generated in the other 
country.  
Table 4.4: Overlap in number of species between ecosystems 
The matrix is symmetric and therefore only the lower halve is shown 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 50          
2 20 50         
3 8 20 50        
4 3 8 20 50       
5 1 3 8 20 50      
6 1 1 3 8 20 50     
7 1 1 1 3 8 20 50    
8 0 1 1 1 3 8 20 50   
9 0 0 1 1 1 3 8 20 50  
10 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 8 20 50 
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Figure 4.3: MPA sizes in ecosystems under full cooperation, strategic non-cooperative 
equilibrium (twice) and conservation autarky 
Table 4.5: Net benefits to the global society and to separate countries under full cooperation, 
strategic non-cooperative equilibria and conservation autarky (perceived and actual)  
 
 Full 
cooperation 
Strategic 
non-cooperative 
equilibrium 1 
Strategic 
non-cooperative 
equilibrium 2 
Conservation autarky 
from a global 
perspective 
Total net 
benefits 24.58 20.32 20.39 21.45 
Net benefits 
country 1 12.29 10.42 9.94 - 
Net benefits 
country 2 12.29 9.90 10.45 - 
Expected 
number of 
species 
200.38 132.36 132.97 145.97 
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 Location leakage is also visible in Figure 4.3, but it mainly occurs near the 
border. Moreover it runs in different directions depending on the non-
cooperative equilibrium. In equilibrium 1  country 1 is the country that exploits 
the leakage, in equilibrium 2 country 2 exploits the leakage, resulting in a 
much smaller MPA in the exploiting country and a larger MPA in the exploited 
country. 
In conservation autarky free-riding still exists, but location leakage is absent. 
In that case ecosystems at the borders are stronger protected. Because countries 
do not account for protection of species in other countries, some species are 
considered to be unique, whereas they actually also occur in other countries. 
From the global perspective some ecosystems are protected stronger than 
necessary, because protection in one country can be substituted by protection 
in another country. 
From Figure 4.3 we can clearly see these results: most MPA sizes under 
conservation autarky are comparable to those under strategic equilibria, except 
for border cases. The similarity to the strategic equilibria is caused by the 
remaining free-riding problem. Ecosystems 5 and 6 in contrast are heavily 
protected, even more than under full cooperation. This occurs because species 
in these ecosystems are considered to be unique by the separate countries. This 
eliminates location leakage, and because substitution of protection across 
 
Figure 4.4: Histogram of survival probabilities of species under full cooperation, strategic 
non-cooperative equilibrium 1 & 2, conservation autarky and when no protection is applied 
(i.e. no MPAs are assigned). The interval size is 0.1. 
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 countries is completely ignored, introduces an inefficiency from a global 
perspective. 
Table 4.5 clearly illustrates the occurring inefficiencies with the associated 
equilibria. Total net benefits to the global society are highest under full 
cooperation, and lower under both the strategic equilibria and conservation 
autarky. The inefficiency under conservation autarky is smaller, but this 
depends partly on parameter values. In general from these two inefficiencies 
conservation autarky is probably preferred over the strategic non-cooperative 
equilibrium.  
These distinct differences are also found in the survival probabilities of 
individual species. In Figure 4.4 we show histograms of survival probabilities 
of species under full cooperation, strategic non-cooperative equilibria, 
conservation autarky and when no protection is carried out. 
Figure 4.4 shows that under full cooperation, the survival probability of 
most species is between 0.7 and 0.9. In both strategic equilibria in contrast the 
survival probability of the majority of species is between 0.4 and 0.7. 
Compared with full cooperation species receive less protection, than would be 
optimal from the global perspective. Under conservation autarky most species 
have survival probabilities between 0.5 and 0.9. This is an improvement 
compared to both strategic equilibria, but still not as good as full cooperation. 
 
Figure 4.5: MPA sizes in ecosystems under full cooperation, strategic non-cooperative 
equilibrium and conservation autarky when the costs in ecosystem 6 are increased by 100%. 
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Figure 4.6: MPA size under full cooperation, strategic non-cooperative equilibrium and 
conservation autarky when µ=0.75 and σ=0.5 
 
 
Figure 4.7: MPA size under full cooperation, strategic non-cooperative equilibrium and 
conservation autarky when r = 0.65 and number of species=200 
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 If no MPAs are assigned, as in “no protection” in Figure 4.4, all species have a 
very low survival probability, all below 0.02.  
4.3.4. Sensitivity analysis 
The parameters describing locations in terms of costs and benefits have 
opposite effects. Raising direct benefits of MPAs in a certain ecosystem 
increases the MPA size in that ecosystem and decreases the MPA in adjoining 
ecosystems, for full cooperation, strategic non-cooperation and conservation 
autarky. In the case of conservation autarky however, the effect is limited to a 
country, as countries only consider their own species and ecosystems.  
Raising the costs in one location has the opposite effect. This can be seen 
from Figure 4.5 where we have increased the costs of MPAs in ecosystem 6 
with 100%. Compared with Figure 4.3 the MPA is lower in ecosystem 6 and 
MPAs in neighboring ecosystems are increased, except under conservation 
autarky where the effect stops at the border, and MPAs in country 1 are of the 
same size as in Figure 4.3. The effect of an increased price of conservation is 
most clear in the neighbor ecosystems and decreases with distance. Ecosystem 
1 and 10 for example are hardly affected (cf. Figure 4.3).  
Incidentally, the introduction of the sharp asymmetry in costs also removes 
one of the non-cooperative equilibria. Country 2 now always assigns a small 
MPA in ecosystem 6 because of the high costs. This decision in turn reduces 
the possibilities for location leakage. 
It is also clear from Figure 4.5 that on the one hand conservation autarky 
overvalues species from the global perspective: under this scenario ecosystem 
6 receives the highest level of protection compared to the other two scenarios. 
Strategic non-cooperation on the other hand undervalues species; it assigns the 
smallest MPAs and the compensation in other ecosystems is also the smallest.  
The ecological parameters describing the persistence probability mainly 
affect the conservation pattern in the ecosystems that contain common species. 
A low σ, indicating a very steep probability curve (cf. Figure 4.2), induces a 
conservation pattern where conservation is concentrated in a few ecosystems 
with large MPAs and small MPAs in the neighboring ecosystems. A higher σ 
induces a more even spread pattern with overall smaller MPAs. The MPAs in 
ecosystem 1 and 10 are always higher than MPAs in other ecosystems and in 
the conservation autarky case ecosystem 5 and 6 also have high MPAs. This is 
clearly shown in Figure 4.6, where we show full cooperation, strategic non-
cooperation and conservation autarky for and Increasing or 
decreasing µ does not alter the pattern of MPA designation but mainly the 
level, increasing µ raises MPA levels and decreasing µ decreases them.  
The decay rate r determines the overlap between ecosystems and hence the 
number of unique species in each ecosystem. An increase in r induces a smaller 
0.75µ = 0.5.σ =
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 overlap between ecosystems and hence more unique species. Incidentally, it 
also increases the total number of species needed to generate a species 
distribution over ecosystems, because each ecosystem now requires a higher 
number of unique species. 
 A decrease in r lowers the MPA size for two reasons: fewer species exist in 
the first place and fewer unique species exist. Figure 4.7 shows the MPA sizes 
under the three scenarios with and 200 species. The ecosystems with 
the (perceived) unique species are still almost fully protected, but other 
ecosystems have much smaller MPAs under these parameter values. Some 
ecosystems have become increasingly valuable, because the complete species 
distribution has changed and more unique species occur elsewhere, which 
results in a different conservation pattern as well.  
4.5. Discussion & conclusions 
In this chapter we have presented a modeling framework for the allocation of 
MPAs. We have investigated the full cooperation case and compared it with 
two cases of non-cooperation: strategic non-cooperation and conservation 
autarky. Strategic non-cooperation and conservation autarky both differ from 
full cooperation. In both cases ecosystems and species are under-protected due 
to free-riding. However, while under the strategic non-cooperation all 
ecosystems are generally under-protected, under conservation autarky species 
at the border receive a higher level of protection. The fundamental difference 
between these two scenarios is whether or not countries consider the same 
species protected in another country as a substitute to protection of that species 
in their own country.  
Conservation autarky is inefficient, because biodiversity conservation in one 
country can be a substitute for conservation in another country. However, it is 
less inefficient than the free-riding case. The case of having no knowledge of 
species existing elsewhere may actually be a bliss in a global perspective, 
because location leakage is eliminated and species are no longer under-
protected at the borders. On the contrary, species at the border are now over-
protected from a global perspective. Free-riding, however, remains. 
An important result from our simulations is that even when a country 
chooses to free-ride on the contribution of the other, most unique species are 
still decently protected, with the exception of those species occurring only in 
ecosystems next to heavily protected ecosystems. These species that become 
less protected, because neighboring ecosystems are heavily protected. They 
suffer from “local location leakage”. It can be observed from Figures 4.3 and 
4.5-4.7 that the largest differences in MPA sizes under strategic non-
cooperation compared to full cooperation are found in ecosystems where 
common transboundary species dwell. The exceptions where strategic 
0.65r =
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 non-cooperation chooses a larger MPA than full cooperation can be explained 
by differences in conservation patterns. 
This finding may seem counterintuitive at first, but makes sense from a 
valuation point of view: unique species are the most valuable and therefore 
most heavily protected. Location leakage cannot occur for these species 
precisely because they are unique. They cannot be protected elsewhere and 
consequently these species are better protected than more common 
transboundary species. Common species in contrast can be protected 
elsewhere and therefore countries choose to free-ride on the protection of these 
species and ecosystems.  
A well-known question in ecology related to the substitution effect is 
whether we should select a Single Large Or Several Small reserves (SLOSS 
problem). In our model the answer to this question is shown to be very much 
dependent on the distribution of species over ecosystems and the persistence 
probability of ecosystems. Assuming that the persistence probability curve is 
the same in all ecosystems the following holds. If the persistence probability 
curve of ecosystems is very steep and species are wide spread a single large 
reserve is better, because a large reserve is needed to reach a decent level of 
protection and a lot of species can be protected in that single area. If many rare 
species exist and the curve is very flat, several small reserves are better, 
because only small reserves are needed for a decent level of protection and 
each added reserve adds extra protected species. This whole assertion, 
however hinges on the persistence probability curve being similar in all 
ecosystems, which is not necessarily true. A general answer to the SLOSS 
problem cannot be given. 
In this chapter we have studied international cooperation on MPA allocation 
at the ecosystem level and assumed that all services and the distribution of the 
effects of the MPA were accounted for. As shown in Punt et al. (2010) 
accounting fully for all services is an important condition for the optimal 
allocation of MPAs because, if this is not the case, it may be better not to 
cooperate.  
We have shown how the distribution of species over ecosystems affects the 
assignment of MPAs in neighboring ecosystems through location leakage. 
Location leakage induces preferences to spread MPAs. This is similar to the 
analysis for terrestrial conservation in e.g. Albers et al. (2008).  
Although we have shown how the location of MPAs per ecosystem matters, 
the distribution of MPAs within an ecosystem is also very important, especially 
if an ecosystem crosses the border between countries. In that case the 
movement of species determines who bears the cost and reaps the benefits 
(Ruijs and Janmaat, 2007). We do not consider such movements in this chapter, 
but hypothesize that including movement would increase free-riding and 
location leakage.  
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 In our simulations most of the parameters are symmetric with exception of 
the distribution of species. This asymmetry is the reason that two strategic 
equilibria exist, in which the gains are distributed differently. Asymmetry in 
other aspects then distribution of species would alter the outcomes of our 
model but not to a large extent. We have shown some of the effects of 
asymmetry in the sensitivity analysis and we found that the exact patterns of 
MPA allocation changes but the general conclusions remain. 
This chapter is the first to investigate the effect of substitution of protection. 
We conclude that substitution is an important, but ignored effect in 
conservation planning and that the emphasis may have been too much on 
conservation autarky instead of on the dangers of free-riding and location 
leakage. As we have shown, conservation autarky may be not such a bad 
situation, if it is compared with strategic non-cooperation. 
In the light of our analysis international cooperation efforts on the 
protection of species should focus on three areas:  
• Transboundary species. Species that are known to occur in 
ecosystems on both sides of the borders, are the ones that will most 
likely  be under-protected through location leakage 
• Unique species. Some unique species may suffer from “local location 
leakage”, when neighboring ecosystems are well protected because 
of unique species there. 
• Species that occur in ecosystems that have low direct benefits of 
protection (or high costs). These are likely to be under-protected, if 
countries do not cooperate. Free-riding on indirect benefits will have 
a relatively large impact if direct benefits are small.  
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 4.A. Appendix: Calculation of the distribution of  species over 
ecosystems 
 
Given a set of species and ecosystems, a universal decay rate, a matrix of 
distances between ecosystems and the maximum number of species in each 
ecosystem a distribution of species over ecosystem, Distributioni,e, can be 
calculated with a relatively simple mathematical model. Starting from a 
dummy objective: 
 
where DUM is a variable used for the maximization, and Distribution is a 
binary matrix denoting species i’s presence (1) or absence (0) in ecosystem e, 
and is the actual variable of interest. 
Each ecosystem e has a number of species, and this number is 
exogenously given. In the distribution we want all ecosystems to contain that 
number of species, therefore: 
is a restriction on the distribution that has to hold. 
Consider the number of species common to two ecosystems. The similarity 
(in number of species) between two ecosystems e ∈ E and f ∈ E, Sime,f, is 
calculated with the distance decay function as follows: 
with X0 the maximum similarity (usually one), r the decay rate, and δ the 
distance between ecosystem e and f. The minimization term adjusts the 
similarity for the number of species present in each area.  
Given a distribution of species over ecosystems, Distribution, we can check 
whether this distribution matches the required similarity, Sime,f, by calculating 
the similarity implied by this distribution. This similarity Overlape,f is 
calculated as follows: 
 with DistributionT denoting the transpose of the distribution matrix. Thus the 
full model becomes: 
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Although the model sketched above is strictly speaking a Mixed Integer 
Non-Linear Problem, it can be approximated with a normal Non-Linear 
Problem (NLP) by letting Distribution be continuous over the interval [0,1]. 
Through rounding of Sime,f to the nearest integer, and equalizing it with 
Overlape,f we have only constraints consisting of integers, thus the solution of 
the NLP will coincide with the mixed integer variant. The solution to  is 
usually not unique as many configurations satisfy the constraints and the 
maximum value of the objective variable is the same for all those 
configurations. 
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Chapter 5*: Marine Protected Areas in the High Seas and 
their impacts on international fishing agreements 
5.1. Introduction 
Fisheries management is in a crisis. According to the FAO statistics in the last 
two decades 20 to 30 % of all fish stocks were either over-exploited or depleted 
(FAO, 2009). According to economic theory one of the main reasons for over-
exploitation is the lack of property rights, offering no incentives for fishing 
nations to conserve stocks. The lack of property rights was partly resolved in 
1982 with the introduction of Exclusive Economic Zones, with the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN, 1982). In these zones of 200 miles, 
fishing is the exclusive right of a country, although this may still cause 
problems for transboundary stocks, especially if the adjoining countries cannot 
agree upon a cooperative management scheme. 
However, beyond the exclusive economic zones exist the High Seas, where 
no country can claim exclusive fishing rights. These High Seas comprise a 
considerable part of the world oceans as shown in Figure 5.1. Although no 
country can claim property rights to fish, this does not mean that there are no 
rules governing fishing in the High Seas. The UN Fish stock agreement on 
straddling fish stocks states that countries should “adopt measures to ensure 
long-term sustainability of straddling fish stocks” (UN, 1995). Moreover 
international law rules that countries wishing to participate in fishing the High 
Seas should join a regional fishing management organization (RFMO) and that 
within an RFMO a management scheme has to be set up (UN, 1995). 
In practice, however, the management through RFMOs has proven to be 
difficult. Large problems exist of unreported and unregulated fishing. Because 
enforcement is difficult or even impossible and the chance of detection is 
small, countries have incentives to free-ride on the agreed quota, by 
underreporting the amounts caught (unreported fishing). Furthermore 
countries that do fish in parts of High Seas, without joining the appropriate 
RFMO are said to be involved in unregulated fishing (FAO, 2001). Thus free-
riding makes agreeing on quota within RFMOs very difficult, and persuading 
fishing nations to join even harder. Another problem associated with the 
formation of RFMOs is the new member problem. If a new country enters the 
fishery, this may decrease the payoffs of the current members, even to such an 
extent that cooperation is no longer feasible. 
*This Chapter is based on the article: Maarten J. Punt, Hans-Peter Weikard and Ekko C. van 
Ierland. Marine Protected Areas in the High Seas and their impacts on international fishing 
agreements. Submitted. 
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In part because of these failings some fisheries managers and scientists have 
now turned their attention to other management tools. One of these tools is the 
designation of Marine Protected Areas in the High Seas. Marine Protected 
Areas mean different things to different people and accordingly can have 
different goals, such as nature conservation or fisheries management (Punt et 
al., 2010). Several proposals and proponents for MPAs in the High Seas exist 
(Sumaila et al., 2007; Ardron et al., 2008; IUCN, 2010; WWF, 2010). Proposals 
for the size of MPAs range from 20%-30% of all seas (Sumaila et al., 2007). The 
current size of MPAs is 1.17% of all seas (Spalding et al., 2010), while the 
parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity have agreed in 2006 to 
conserve at least 10% of the seas. They have reaffirmed this decision in the 2010 
convention (CBD, 2010). 
In this chapter we will interpret MPAs as no-take zones for fisheries 
management. We will ignore other uses, although these are as important in 
considerations of MPAs if they are intended for multiple goals (Punt et al., 
2010).  
Several authors have looked into the strategic aspects of MPA designation 
for fisheries, but most have investigated the performance of MPAs in the 
presence of open access (e.g. Hannesson, 1998) or looked at MPAs within 
EEZs, i.e. shared or transboundary fish stocks (Sumaila, 2002; Ruijs and 
Janmaat, 2007). The possibilities for cooperation on management agreements 
on fish stocks has also been investigated, both with cooperative games (Kaitala 
and Lindroos, 1998; Li, 1998; Kronbak and Lindroos, 2007) and non-
cooperative games (Pintassilgo, 2003; Kwon, 2006; Pham Do and Folmer, 2006; 
Pintassilgo and Lindroos, 2008; Pintassilgo et al., 2010). The possibilities and 
 
Figure 5.1: Countries of the world and their claimed EEZs (shown in white). The gray shaded 
areas comprise High Seas. Source: VLIZ 2011. 
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 strategic aspects of MPAs in the High Seas, however, have not been examined 
so far.  
In this chapter we will expand the modeling of RFMO fisheries agreements 
on highly migratory and straddling stocks with MPAs. In their RFMO model 
Pintassilgo et al. (2010) formulate a partition function based on the 
Gordon-Schaefer model and introduce asymmetric countries. Such a partition 
function approach is especially suited to analyze such problems. We will 
therefore use their model and adapt it, so that it facilitates the introduction of 
an MPA. 
Our main contribution to the literature is to investigate the influence of 
MPAs on the formation and stability of RFMOs. We find that MPAs can 
improve fisheries in terms of profits and stock if MPAs increase growth rates, 
even in the absence of further cooperation in an RFMO. Furthermore we find 
that within our simulations, MPAs generally improve the stability of coalitions 
when countries differ in fishing costs, but not when fishing costs are the same. 
5.2. The model 
5.2.1. Background 
Coalition models 
Coalition formation models used in fisheries follow two approaches: the 
cooperative game theory approach or the non-cooperative approach. There are 
clear links with the literature on international climate agreements (e.g. 
Nagashima et al., 2009).  
In the cooperative approach it is assumed that an agreement is formed, and 
the analysis mainly focuses on how to distribute the benefits between countries 
such that all countries perceive the agreement as beneficial. Important 
contributions within the fisheries literature are Kaitala and Lindroos (1998), Li 
(1998), Pintassilgo and Duarte (2000) and Kronbak and Lindroos (2007).  
In the non-cooperative approach the analysis focuses on which agreements 
can be formed in the first place, mainly using the internal and external stability 
concept due to d'Aspremont et al. (1983). Pintassilgo (2003) introduced the 
coalition stability approach with externalities into the fisheries, and has 
analyzed free-riding and the associated problems to reach an agreement with 
an application to tuna fisheries. Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008) apply the 
coalition approach using the standard Gordon-Schaefer model and assuming 
symmetric players. They found that under these circumstances free-riding 
always prevails, i.e. no coalition can be formed, except in the case of two 
players, where the grand coalition is stable. Pham Do and Folmer (2006) study 
partial cooperation and derive some general results such as an increased effort 
level by the coalition if marginal cost decrease. Lindroos (2008) and Pintassilgo 
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 et al. (2010) relax the assumption of symmetric players and find that generally 
small coalitions can be formed, but that larger coalitions of players are still 
unstable. Long (2009), following Barrett (2003) and Carraro et al. (2009), adds a 
minimum participation level to the agreement. Such a participation rate 
generally increases stability and allows for higher degrees of cooperation. Long 
(2009) also includes monitoring cost, in the manner of McEvoy and Stranlund 
(2009) and shows that this may raise the minimum participation rate and thus 
cooperation even further. 
MPA models 
MPAs as a fisheries management tool have been modeled in a number of ways. 
A number of choices and modeling assumptions have to be made a priori 
which may have major impacts on the model results. Models can be non-
spatial (Hannesson, 1998; Anderson, 2002), continuous in space (White et al., 
2008) or discrete (Sanchirico and Wilen, 2001; Sanchirico, 2004; Ruijs and 
Janmaat, 2007). The first two model types usually split the stock in an inside 
and outside MPA part. The last model type usually uses metapopulation 
models in discrete patches. Another important assumption is the regime 
outside the MPA: does open access prevail outside the MPA (Hannesson, 1998; 
Sanchirico and Wilen, 2001), or does some kind of limited entry system exist 
(Sanchirico, 2004; Costello and Kaffine, 2010). Finally the scale is important, 
although it is mainly defined by the problem at hand: some papers analyze 
MPAs at the country scale as a game between fishermen and regulator (Beattie 
et al., 2002; Sanchirico, 2004; Ngoc, 2010), others analyze international settings 
involving several countries’ EEZs (Sumaila, 2002; Ruijs and Janmaat, 2007; 
Punt et al., 2010). MPAs at the High Sea scale, however, have not yet been 
considered.  
The High Sea scale brings about several interesting aspects that need to be 
considered when modeling MPAs: first of all the number of players is 
potentially large and not necessarily constant over time. Two-player games are 
therefore inherently limited and, as we will be confronted with the new 
member problem, n-player games are more appropriate. Second because an 
MPA is not a real no-take zone if it is not acknowledged and respected by all 
(or a very large) number of countries, we need an MPA that everyone can 
agree upon, i.e. its size must be acceptable to all. 
5.2.2. Model setup 
Consider the High Seas where a number countries fish. In order to coordinate 
their fishing efforts and to prevent overfishing countries can form an RFMO. 
We will refer to this RFMO as the effort coalition. Given some RFMO all 
countries may wish to negotiate an MPA in the High Sea. We study the impact 
of the designation of an MPA on the incentives to join an RFMO. 
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 We assume that the countries will target nursery areas such that the MPA 
does not only protect part of the fish stock, but it also increases the internal 
growth rate of the stock in the MPA. The reason for this increase is called 
habitat or hot-spot effect: limiting the fishing activities improves the habitat 
quality and this increases the growth rate. Establishing an MPA would 
generate this effect (Sanchirico, 2004; Schnier, 2005a,b; Armstrong, 2007; 
Armstrong and Falk-Petersen, 2008). 
An interesting feature of MPAs is that they must be acknowledged and 
respected by (almost) everyone to be successful. If someone fishes in an MPA 
the habitat remediation effect would be lost. We will assume that if a single 
country does not support the MPA, the agreement breaks down. Hence single 
deviations result in a full breakdown of the agreement and the habitat effect. 
As a consequence the MPA must be acceptable to and respected by all players. 
The formation of an MPA agreement is, therefore, a weakest link game as 
described by Hirshleifer (1983) and Sandler (1998). 
We model the full game as a three stage game: at the first stage countries 
decide whether or not they sign-up to the RFMO, at the second stage they 
decide on an MPA size that is agreed upon by all, and the final stage effort 
levels are determined based on RFMO membership and the given MPA size. If 
countries cannot agree upon an MPA, its size is zero. We normalize the size of 
the fishing grounds to one, and assume that the exact spatial distribution – 
whether several small or a single large reserve is agreed upon – does not 
matter.  
 The equilibrium effort, profit and coalition outcomes for such a game 
(without MPAs) have been described by Pintassilgo et al. (2010). We construct 
a modified model to accommodate MPAs. The full game is solved by 
backward induction, to find equilibrium efforts, the equilibrium MPA size, and 
the stable effort coalitions. We now proceed to the formal analysis of this game. 
5.2.3. Formal description 
A set of N countries are fishing in the High Seas. They can coordinate their 
fishing effort in a coalition or decide to fish alone. The coalition is used for 
effort decisions only, because in the decisions on MPAs only the grand 
coalition is effective. We will assume that only a single coalition can form and 
that other players act as singletons, i.e. only one RFMO exists. Effort coalition
is then a subset of countries that form a coalition. A coalition structure 
can be described by a vector  with  where 0 denotes non-
signatories and 1 denotes signatories to effort coalition S.  
We use a static Gordon-Schaefer model to describe fishing activities. The 
model is a combination of the coalition model used by Pintassilgo et al. (2010) 
and the fisheries MPA model of Punt et al. (2010) but in contrast to the last 
S N⊆
( )i i Nσ ∈ { }0,1iσ ∈
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 model we now explore a High Seas setting and asymmetric players as opposed 
to Exclusive Economic Zones and symmetric players1. 
 The growth of the fish stock is logistic, carrying capacity is normalized to 
one, and the stock X is divided proportionally over the MPA and the 
remaining seas into inside (XM) and outside the MPA (Xo). The carrying 
capacity in each area is assumed to be proportional to area. The internal 
growth rate is ro outside the MPA, and due to nursery and habitat effects ro + 
rM inside the MPA. Consequently, if an MPA of size M is present, the stock 
growth is: 
 
Thus the internal growth rate of the stock can be described by the function 
The growth function collapses to the standard logistic growth 
function if no MPA is assigned. 
In the Gordon-Schaefer model catch is proportional to stock (X) and effort 
(E) and some catchability parameter q. In our model we go beyond the 
capturing the concept of catchability by a single parameter, but rather describe 
it as a function of fishable area.  Therefore catchability Q is a decreasing 
function in  the size of the MPA, M. This is to reflect that catching fish gets 
harder if just a smaller area can be fished. If no MPA is assigned Q(M) 
collapses to the baseline catchability parameter (q), i.e.  In the simplest 
specification  which is what we will analyze here. We then 
have as harvest of player i : 
 
If the stock is uniformly distributed, all growth can be caught in equilibrium 
and the total harvest, i.e. the sum of harvests of all players, should equal the 
growth: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1 1
1
1 .
M o
o M o
o M
dX dXdX
dt dt dt
M XMX
r r MX r M X
M M
r r M X X
= + =
 − 
+ − + − − =    
−   
+ −
(5.1) 
( ) = + .o MR M r r M
( )0 .Q q=
( ) ( )1Q M q M= −
 
( ) ( ) .i i iH E Q M E X= (5.2) 
1In order to keep the model analytically tractable we use a very simple modification of the 
static Gordon-Schaefer model that allows for the introduction of MPAs. More elaborate 
specifications may offer additional insights but do not alter the basic line of reasoning.  
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Non-signatory countries wish to maximize their individual profits ̟j. 
Players differ in harvesting costs but are identical in all other aspects. They 
value their harvest at price p and incur a cost ci for every unit of effort used. 
Payoff ̟j of a non-signatory country j is: 
 
 As stated earlier countries can form a coalition to coordinate their fishing 
effort. Because costs are linear in effort, the coalition will let the fishing be 
carried out by its most efficient member. Let  denote the cost parameter of 
the country with the lowest effort cost in coalition S. The coalition 
consequently maximizes: 
 
5.2.4. Analysis 
The game is solved by backward induction. We start the analysis at the last 
stage. 
Third stage 
At the third stage the RFMO has formed, and countries have decided on the 
MPA size, consequently S and M are given. An effort coalition S is a partial 
agreement Nash equilibrium (Chander et al., 2006) if coalition S plays a best 
reply against all other singletons, and all singletons play a best reply coalition 
S and all other singletons. Assuming that both the coalition and the other 
players optimize their profits taking the effort decisions by others as given we 
can derive equilibrium efforts and payoffs for every coalition structure. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
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∈
− = ⇔ = −
∑
∑1 1 .
i
i N
i
i
Q M E
R M X X Q M EX X
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min
Sc
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )pi
∈
  
+   
  
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 
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Q M E E
pQ M E X c E pQ M E c E
R M
(5.5) 
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 Let n denote |N| and s denote |S|. Taking first order conditions of (5.4) and 
(5.5) with respect to Ei and ES, respectively, and solving gives the following 
equilibrium effort and payoffs (see also Pintassilgo et al., 2010): 
 
Where asterisks denote equilibrium strategies, –S denotes  and –j 
denotes  An interior solution of course requires all effort 
levels to be strictly positive. This requirement translates into two equations: 
 
Without loss of generality assume that we order the countries such that 
 It can then be shown that (5.7) and (5.8) are met if 
(Pintassilgo et al., 2010): 
 
which gives us a restriction on the parameter space. 
Second stage: 
In the second stage countries either decide on the size of an MPA or, if they do 
not reach a unanimous agreement, no MPA is formed. This is a feature of the 
weakest link game. If the countries wish to design an MPA that is acceptable to 
all, such that full cooperation is reached, the MPA must increase profits for all 
countries relative to the no MPA case.  
We will assume that the decision process on the size is as follows: an 
arbitrary country i ∈Ν is selected to make a proposal on the size M of the 
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 MPA2. If the size is unanimously agreed upon, the MPA is installed. If not, 
negotiations fail and the MPA size is zero. The size of the MPA is now 
determined by a weakest link game (Hirshleifer, 1983; Sandler, 1998).  
To see this, note that countries are asymmetric and consequently receive 
different net benefits due to the MPA. Consider the payoff of country i, 
selected to announce the MPA size M: if an MPA increases the payoff of 
everyone, clearly country i picks a size M > 0. However, consider country j that 
gains if instead of M a smaller size M’ is selected. Then country j can create its 
desired M’ by first signing up to the agreement, creating an MPA of size M, 
and then starting to fish in a part of the MPA such that M is reduced to M’. The 
other countries could then of course declare the MPA agreement null and void, 
but this threat is not credible as long as M’ still offers net benefits to all other 
countries compared to the no MPA case. Consequently, in equilibrium player i 
will pick M* such that it is equal to the smallest optimum size M, of all 
countries i ∈Ν.  
Taking the first order conditions of ̟S* and ̟j* with respect to M yields: 
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2This procedure is similar to the formulation of a minimum participation rule for an 
international environmental agreement in Weikard et al. (2009).  
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 The optimal M from the perspective of the effort coalition is then3: 
 
and from the perspective of an individual that is not in the coalition: 
 
The equilibrium proposal M* is: 
 
Which M* is the smallest hinges upon the distribution of the cost parameters 
and the effort coalition formed. This effort coalition itself is also determined by 
the distribution of the cost, price and the baseline catchability (Pintassilgo et 
al., 2010). It can be shown that an interior solution for M requires (see 
Appendix 5.A1.): 
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pqr
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3Both (5.11) and (5.12) produce in fact three solutions, but two of those are corner solutions if 
we assume that all parameters are > 0 and effort > 0. The proof is in Appendix 5.A1.  
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Turning to the effect of parameters: A necessary but not sufficient condition 
for (5.12) and (5.13) is and   
(Appendix 5.A1.). The effect of rM and ro can then readily be seen from the 
solutions: rM increases M and ro decreases M. This is in line with expectation, 
because rM makes an MPA more worthwhile, whereas an increase in ro makes it 
relatively less attractive. 
 The effect of other parameters can be determined with the help of the 
implicit function theorem as explained in Appendix 5.A2. The full list of effects 
is shown in Table 5.1. The signs are as expected: an increase in the price of fish 
(p) increases the desired MPA size because the extra growth from the MPA is 
valued higher. Similarly an increase in own effort cost decreases the desired 
MPA size, because MPAs make fishing more expensive in the first place. An 
increase in costs of other countries increases the desired MPA size because 
opponents will fish less, and this means that the country (or coalition) under 
consideration can catch a larger share of the growth bonus. Consequently a 
larger MPA with more growth is then desired.   
Under full symmetry cj = cSmin = c. The optimal M* is the same for everyone 
and the game is a degenerated weakest link game. The optimal M* in (5.12) and 
(5.13) simplifies in both cases to: 
 
Since everyone is symmetric and (5.17) is the result of an optimization, as 
long as M* exists it is better than the no-cooperation case, where M* = 0. Hence 
in the symmetric case an MPA will always be designated. The full benefits of 
 =
− >∑1
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Table 5.1: Comparative statics of parameters with respect to optimal MPA size 
 
Assumptions: All parameters >0, 0 ≤ M ≤ 1, j ∈ (-S) and k ∈ (− j). A + denotes that MPA size 
and the parameter move in the same direction, a – denotes the opposite direction, and n.a. 
denotes not applicable. Note that the sign of the derivative with respect to cj and ck only 
hold for marginal changes, i.e. as long as they do not affect the formed coalition.  
 rM ro p cSmin cj ck 
Effect on 
MS 
+ - + - + n.a. 
Effect on 
Mj 
+ - + + - + 
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 this MPA may not be captured because there is a non-cooperative equilibrium 
in terms of effort. 
First stage 
In the first stage countries decide upon their membership of the RFMO. Their 
membership decision is driven by their payoff in the last stage. We use the 
concept of internal and external stability due to d’Aspremont (1983), combined 
with the optimal sharing rule as defined in Weikard (2009). 
Using the equilibrium payoffs in (5.6) an effort coalition S is internally stable 
if and only if: 
 
That is coalition S is internally stable if and only if every country in S gets a 
payoff that is larger than or equal to the payoff it gets if it free-rides. Similarly a 
coalition S is said to be externally stable if and only if: 
 
That is coalition S is externally stable if and only if the payoff of every country 
outside the coalition is larger than or equal to the payoff when joining the 
coalition.  
Clearly, to check whether (5.18) holds, we need to specify how the profits 
within the coalition are shared. We introduce the Claim Rights Condition 
(Weikard, 2009) which states that every country in a coalition S should at least 
get its outside option payoff (its claim), provided the coalition payoff is large 
enough to satisfy all claims. The remaining surplus can then be shared among 
coalition members. Hence if: 
 
is satisfied and the Claim Rights Condition is used for sharing, then (5.18) 
holds for every i ∈ S and coalition S is internally stable. Consequently to check 
internal stability of coalition S it is enough to check whether (5.20) holds. 
Moreover, using the Claim Rights Condition it can be shown that every 
coalition S ⊂Ν is externally unstable if there exists an enlargement
  such that  is internally stable (Weikard, 2009). 
Hence to check whether a coalition is both internally and externally stable, it is 
sufficient to check for which coalitions (5.20) holds and within that subset find 
the coalitions that cannot be enlarged to another coalition in that subset. 
Using the payoffs specified in (5.6) in condition (5.20) we find that internal 
stability can be satisfied if: 
 
( ) { }( )* * .i iS S i i Spi pi≥ − ∀ ∈ (5.18) 
 
( ) { }( )pi pi≥ ∪ ∀ ∉* * .j jS S j j S (5.19) 
 
( ) { }( )pi pi
∈
≥ −∑* *S i
i S
S S i (5.20) 
{ } \S j N S∪ ∈ { }S j∪
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where M*(S) denotes the equilibrium MPA size under coalition S and M*(S – 
{i}) denotes the equilibrium MPA size when coalition S – {i} is formed. 
Condition (5.21) shows that MPAs have a direct effect on stability but only 
through their effect on the catchability and not through the extra growth in the 
MPA. Indirectly, though the extra growth does play a role since it determines 
the equilibrium size of M. From (5.21) we see that an MPA does not  
necessarily improve stability in each particular case, as can be seen for full 
symmetry below.  
If we assume full symmetry (5.21) simplifies to: 
 
which shows that MPAs do not have an effect on stability under full 
symmetry. Equation (5.22) is consistent with the result of Pintassilgo and 
Lindroos (2008) that under full symmetry no coalition is stable except in the 
case of n = 2 when full cooperation is stable. This result reflects the full leakage 
in this game, i.e. coalition members’ reductions in effort are fully offset by non-
signatories. Under asymmetry coalitions have two effects: they reduce over-
fishing and they reduce costs of fishing. In symmetry the latter does not apply 
and because of is full leakage no coalition is stable. The exception is the two-
player game where leakage cannot occur, once a coalition is established. 
As a special case let us consider what happens if all countries are identical, 
and there is no RFMO, when a new entrant arrives with a different cost 
structure as in Lindroos (2008). Hence we assume all countries but one are 
identical, and that the non-identical country has higher costs, i.e. 
and  Then (5.21) simplifies to: 
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 In (5.23) MN refers to the MPA size under full cooperation, and Mn is the MPA 
size demanded by the nth player, the high cost country. If one of the low cost 
countries defects, inspection of (5.12) and (5.13) shows that the MPA size 
demanded is not affected, but if the high cost country defects it demands a 
smaller MPA, as higher costs induce smaller MPAs (see Table 5.1). If MPAs 
would not exists (5.23) simplifies further to: 
 
If we subtract (5.23) from (5.24) we get the reduction on both sides that is due 
to the MPA. The reduction on the left hand side is: 
 
and on the right hand side: 
For large values of n, the reduction on the left hand side (5.25) is less than the 
reduction on the right hand side (5.26). This shows the potential stabilizing 
effect of MPAs. However, the effect in general, for arbitrary S the stability 
cannot be seen from these equations. Therefore we investigate the effects with 
simulations. 
5.2.5. Simulations 
Here we illustrate the model with a number of simulations. The (arbitrary) 
parameter values are shown in Table 5.2. They have been selected according to 
the restrictions for an interior solution in (5.9), (5.15) and (5.16). To get more 
general conclusions their effects are later tested in a sensitivity analysis. We 
calculate the profits of each effort coalition using the solutions in (5.6), (5.12) 
and (5.13). We assume that the MPA assigned is the smallest MPA among the 
solutions to (5.12) and (5.13). To investigate the influence of MPAs on stability, 
we do the calculations twice: once with the MPA sizes as determined by (5.12) 
and (5.13) and once assuming that no MPA is formed. In a four player game 
there are 12 possible coalition structures. The results are shown in Table 5.3 
and 5.4. 
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From these tables it can be seen that the presence of an MPA increases the 
benefits to all players, and has a positive influence on stock size. However as 
can be seen in Table 5.4 the more free-riders are present the smaller the MPAs 
formed.  
Using the Claim Rights Condition we can determine which coalitions are 
internally and externally stable. In principle coalitions are internally stable if 
the sum of the outside option payoffs is smaller than or equal to the payoff of 
the coalition, and a coalition is externally stable if no enlargement of that 
Table 5.2: Arbitrary parameter values for the example 
 
Parameter Value 
Number of countries (n) 4 
Number of coalition structures 12 
Price of fish (p) 20 
Cost per unit of effort (ci) [5, 5.5, 6, 7] 
Growth rate outside MPA (ro) 0.2 
Extra growth rate inside MPA (rM) 0.8 
Original catchability (qo) 1 
Table 5.3: Stock size, profits of the coalition and free-riders, and global profits for each 
coalition structure in absence of an MPA 
 
Coalition members share the coalition profit. Because we do not specify a sharing rule, we 
do not provide profit for individual coalition members. Stable coalitions have been marked 
with an asterisk. 
Coalition 
structure 
Stock  
size 
Profit 
 coalition 
Profit 
country 
1 
Profit 
country 2 
Profit 
country 
3 
Profit 
country 
4 
Global 
profits 
(1),(2),(3),(4) 0.44 - 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.34 
(1,2),(3),(4) 0.48 0.20 - - 0.12 0.06 0.39 
(1,3),(2),(4) 0.47 0.19 - 0.15 - 0.06 0.40 
(1,4),(2),(3)* 0.46 0.17 - 0.13 0.10 - 0.40 
(1),(2,3),(4) 0.47 0.15 0.19 - - 0.06 0.40 
(2,4),(1),(3)* 0.46 0.13 0.17 - 0.10 - 0.40 
(3,4),(1),(2) 0.46 0.10 0.17 0.13 - - 0.40 
(2,3,4),(1) 0.51 0.22 0.27 - - - 0.48 
(1,3,4),(2) 0.51 0.27 - 0.22 - - 0.48 
(1,2,4),(3) 0.52 0.28 - - 0.19 - 0.47 
(1,2,3),(4) 0.53 0.32 - - - 0.13 0.46 
(1,2,3,4) 0.63 0.56 - - - - 0.56 
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 Table 5.4: Stock size, profits of the coalition and free-riders, global profits and equilibrium 
MPA for each coalition structure 
 
Coalition members share the coalition profit. Because we do not specify a sharing rule we 
do not provide profit for individual coalition members. Stable coalitions are marked with 
an asterisk. 
Coalition 
structure 
Stock 
size 
Profit 
coalition 
Profit 
countr
y 1 
Profit 
country 
2 
Profit 
countr
y 3 
Profit 
countr
y 4 
Global 
profits 
MPA 
size 
(1),(2),(3),(4) 0.45 - 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.40 0.05 
(1,2),(3),(4) 0.50 0.28 - - 0.16 0.07 0.51 0.10 
(1,3),(2),(4)* 0.49 0.25 - 0.19 - 0.06 0.50 0.09 
(1,4),(2),(3)* 0.51 0.28 - 0.19 0.13 - 0.60 0.20 
(1),(2,3),(4) 0.49 0.19 0.25 - - 0.06 0.50 0.09 
(2,4),(1),(3)* 0.51 0.19 0.28 - 0.13 - 0.60 0.20 
(3,4),(1),(2)* 0.51 0.13 0.28 0.19 - - 0.60 0.20 
(2,3,4),(1) 0.57 0.32 0.44 - - - 0.76 0.27 
(1,3,4),(2) 0.57 0.44 - 0.32 - - 0.76 0.27 
(1,2,4),(3) 0.57 0.46 - - 0.25 - 0.72 0.22 
(1,2,3),(4) 0.57 0.47 - - - 0.16 0.63 0.14 
(1,2,3,4) 0.69 0.91 - - - - 0.91 0.32 
Table 5.5: Desired MPA sizes from the coalition and individual countries 
 
 Countries is in the effort coalition desire the coalition MPA size, therefore we do not 
provide an individual MPA size for countries in the coalition. 
Coalition structure Ms M1 M2 M3 M4 
(1),(2),(3),(4) - 0.6029 0.3859 0.2466 0.0546 
(1,2),(3),(4) 0.5475 - - 0.2711 0.1044 
(1,3),(2),(4) 0.5000 - 0.3541 - 0.0872 
(1,4),(2),(3) 0.4203 - 0.2970 0.2013 - 
(1),(2,3),(4) 0.3541 0.5000 - - 0.0872 
(2,4),(1),(3) 0.2970 0.4203 - 0.2013 - 
(3,4),(1),(2) 0.2013 0.4203 0.2970 - - 
(2,3,4),(1) 0.2711 0.3541 - - - 
(1,3,4),(2) 0.3541 - 0.2711 - - 
(1,2,4),(3) 0.3859 - - 0.2234 - 
(1,2,3),(4) 0.4581 - - - 0.1407 
(1,2,3,4) 0.3246 - - - - 
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 coalition exist that is internally stable. Stable coalitions in Table 5.3 and 5.4 
have been marked with an asterisk. 
Looking at stability we see that the introduction of MPAs increases stability, 
such that two additional coalitions are stable, although the two extra coalitions 
do not perform better than the coalitions that were also stable in absence of the 
MPA. Full cooperation is still not reached though.  
The desired MPA sizes are shown in Table 5.5. It can be seen from Table 5.5 
that countries with higher costs generally desire lower MPAs, but that the size 
is also influenced by the number of active fishing countries, i.e. the size of the 
coalition. Consider countries 3 and 4: they have the highest effort costs, and 
therefore when they free-ride they effectively determine the MPA size. The 
MPA size they desire increases with coalition size, but by how much depends 
on the composition of the coalition. The opposite holds for the countries with 
the lowest effort costs, countries 1 and 2. 
 To investigate the effect of MPAs on stability in general we have run 
simulations for the above four player game while varying some parameters, 
and keeping other parameters constant, such that interior solutions are still 
possible in all coalitions. We have also investigated the effect of larger MPAs 
Table 5.6: Stability of coalitions under differing parameter values 
 
With MPA  Without MPA  
No. stable 
coalitions 
Maximum 
size 
No. stable 
coalitions 
Maximum 
size 
20; 5; 5.5; 6; 7; 0.2; 0.8 4 2 2 2 
25; 5; 5.5; 6; 7; 0.2; 0.8 3 2 1 1 
40; 5; 5.5; 6; 7; 0.2; 0.8 2 2 1 1 
75; 5; 5.5; 6; 7; 0.2; 0.8 1 1 1 1 
200; 50; 55; 60; 70; 0.2; 0.8 4 2 2 2 
200; 50; 52; 53; 80; 0.2; 0.8 3 2 3 2 
200; 50; 52; 70; 75; 0.2; 0.8 3 3 4 2 
200; 50; 60; 70; 75; 0.2; 0.8 4 2 1 2 
200; 50; 52; 53; 54; 0.2; 0.8 1 1 1 1 
200; 50; 55; 60; 70; 0.1; 0.8 5 2 2 2 
200; 50; 55; 60; 70; 0.05; 0.8 3 3 2 2 
200; 50; 55; 60; 70; 0.2; 1.5 5 2 2 2 
p; c1; c2; c3; c4; r0; rM  
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 by decreasing r0, keeping other parameters fixed. In Table 5.6 we list the 
parameter values and the size and number of stable coalitions with and 
without MPAs.  
From Table 5.6 we see that MPAs increase stability, either by increasing the 
number of stable coalitions or by increasing the maximum size of the coalition. 
MPAs do not increase stability if the parameter setting is almost full symmetry, 
i.e. when the cost parameters are all almost equal but one (line 6 of the results 
in Table 5.6) or when the cost parameters are all almost equal (line 9 of the 
results in Table 5.6) 
   The latter occurs if countries are (nearly) identical or when the price of fish 
(p) is large compared to the costs of effort. In all other cases MPAs improve 
stability suggesting a positive role for MPAs in coalition formation. We have 
not analyzed the effect of baseline catchability (q). This parameter, however, 
always appears in combination with the price of fish, both in the determination 
of the size of the MPA, and in the stability condition. Therefore its effects are 
the same as those of p. 
From Table 5.6 it can also be inferred that the potential gains of an MPA are 
reaped better by larger coalitions. We know from Table 5.1 that a decrease in 
the growth rate of the fish stock outside the MPA (ro) or an increase inside the 
MPA (rM) increases the MPA size. The stability of effort coalitions in Table 5.6 
also increases when ro goes down when an MPA is present, i.e. larger coalitions 
are better equipped to capture the additional benefits of an MPA and 
consequently are stabilized by the presence of an MPA. The growth bonus in 
the MPA (rM) has a similar but opposite effect: an increase in rM increases 
stability in the MPA case.  
5.3. Discussion & conclusions 
In this chapter we investigate the influence of MPAs on the formation of 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). We have extend the 
classic Gordon-Schaefer model to accommodate MPAs, and we link this 
adjusted model to a coalition formation model, generally used in the literature 
of international environmental agreements. Our results are in agreement with 
the results of Pintassilgo et al. (2010): under full symmetry no coalition is 
stable, but the introduction of asymmetry in cost parameters does stabilize a 
number of coalitions. The inclusion of MPAs, however, offers additional 
insights.  
Given that MPAs increase the internal growth rate of the stock, they tend to 
have a positive influence on both stock and profits. MPAs basically make the 
stock more resilient against large harvest. This increased resilience comes at a 
price: reduced catchability; but in an interior solution this is a price that 
countries are willing to pay. 
Another observation is that MPAs in the High Seas constitute a weakest link 
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 public good. The observation that MPAs are a weakest link public good in the 
absence of enforcement carries over to terrestrial parks when enforcement is 
lacking and hard to establish. In the model we have taken this observation to 
extremes, i.e. an MPA loses its extra growth bonus if any country fishes in the 
MPA. Nevertheless even if the weakest link property would hold in a less strict 
form, the property still implies that MPA agreements form as if under a 
minimum participation constraint, albeit not requiring full cooperation. Barrett 
(2003) has shown that such participation constraints stabilize larger 
agreements. In this chapter we show that such an agreement may make it 
easier to agree on other issues.  
The results of the simulations in this chapter show that MPAs tend to 
increase stability of RFMOs, for most of the analyzed parameter values, and 
that larger MPAs do a better job at this than smaller MPAs. The reason is that 
the benefits of an MPA can be reaped better by a coalition than by free-riders, 
because coalitions generally have a cost advantage. As we have seen, free-
riding remains a problem, but it is reduced by the presence of MPAs. This 
result hinges on three important assumptions: MPAs increase growth, the 
stock is uniformly distributed and decisions on MPA size are made in the 
setting of a weakest link public good. If these conditions do not exactly hold in 
reality, all seem to be reasonable to approximations. MPAs have been found to 
increase growth rates inside the MPA (Lester et al., 2009; Stewart et al., 2009) 
and the fact that a number of High Sea MPAs have been installed, albeit only 
for trawling (North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, 2009), suggests that 
decisions on MPAs can be taken even in the absence of enforcement. Even if 
the stock is not uniformly distributing, it is likely that some spill-over will take 
place. In practice our model can be adjusted for this by decreasing the growth 
bonus parameter.  
In this chapter we take an important first step in the analysis of how MPAs 
influence the formation of coalitions for fishing effort. We have shown, for the 
first time, that the introduction of MPAs in the High Seas have the potential to 
increase the stability of RFMOs, although not in all cases. In future research it 
will be useful to address how MPAs function in a dynamic setting and whether 
this modifies the result. The actual effects of MPAs and whether or not they 
increase growth, as well as the migration patterns are other important features 
that need to be addressed.  
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 5.A1. Appendix I: Necessary and sufficient conditions for an 
optimal M 
First we will show that only one solution of equation 5.11 is admissible, if we 
assume positive parameters and a positive effort level. Then we will show the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal Mj* for this specific solution. 
The conditions for MS* follow the same line of reasoning.  
The three solutions to Mj* are: 
 
Substituting the first solution for Mj* in equation (5.A1) into the solution for 
effort level Ej* in equation (5.6) gives an effort level of 0. Therefore this solution 
is a corner solution and not admissible. 
A necessary condition for an interior solution for Mj* requires that the 
discriminant of (5.A1) ≥ 0 , i.e.:  
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which can be satisfied under two cases. Either: 
 
 
 or 
In (5A.3), if the first inequality holds then, by the assumption of positive 
parameters the second condition of the pair also holds.  
The second pair can never occur in an interior solution. The proof is by 
contradiction: 
If  then the root in the solutions in equation 
(5A.1)  is smaller than  and therefore 
an interior solution for Mi* also requires  to 
hold. This implies that  Inserting this as a 
minimum value for 2pq in (5A.4) we get: 
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From the first inequality in (5A.4) we know that part I in equation (5A.5) is 
negative, but because part II in (5A.5) is also negative, the final result is 
positive, hence (5A.5) cannot be true, hence (5A.5) can never hold in an interior 
solution. We have established that in an interior solution 
 which in turn rules out the second solution for 
 Mj* in (5.A1), because, by the assumption of positive parameters, solution 2 in 
(5A.1) can only produce interior solutions for   
Furthermore this fact is used in the determination of the effects of ro and rM, 
and the sign of the derivatives with respect to parameters in appendix 5.A2.  
The sufficient conditions for an interior solution for Mj* require: 
 
Let . Taking the left part of (5A.6) we get: 
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The maximum value of a is . Thus we arrive at (5.15). Similarly 
taking the right part of (5A.6) we get: 
 
For (5A.7) to hold a > 0. The minimum value of a is . Thus we arrive 
at (5.16). 
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 5.A2. Appendix II: Derivatives with respect to parameters 
The solution to (5.10) and (5.11) consist of two polynomials of power three that 
can both be factorized in quadratic and linear parts. This function is for (5.10): 
 
and for (5.11): 
 
The interior solutions considered in the chapter are the solutions in which the 
quadratic function in the numerator is equal to zero. Consequently the implicit 
functions determining the optimal M for a coalition player and a free-rider are 
respectively: 
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Function (5A.10) has the following derivatives with respect to individual 
parameters: 
 
 
 
Function (5A.12) has the following derivatives with respect to individual 
parameters: 
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Chapter 6: Discussion & conclusions 
 
6.1. Summary of results 
This thesis focused on several problems of resource allocation in ocean space. I 
analyzed these problems on a variety of policy scales going from the local 
scale, involving a single country, to the regional scale, involving a few 
countries to the international scale, involving a large number of countries. 
Chapter 2 dealt with the spatial planning of offshore wind farms. I 
presented an optimization model that allocates offshore wind farms in order to 
maximize profits under ecological constraints. The model results show that 
spatial planning is an essential instrument to derive an optimal management 
plan of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), because the allocation of offshore 
wind farms is highly dependent on both spatial economic factors such as 
location costs and ecological restrictions. Only by considering the full 
ecological effects, and specifying clear policy targets for both offshore wind 
energy and nature conservation can an optimal spatial plan of the EEZ be 
formulated. 
In Chapter 3 I studied the multiple use nature of assigning Marine Protected 
Areas (MPAs) in EEZs and the associated incentives. I developed a game 
theoretic model in which MPAs are considered both as an instrument for 
fisheries management and as an instrument for nature conservation. The 
model shows that the multiple use nature of MPAs does not affect the general 
incentive of countries not to cooperate. It also shows that when the multiple 
use nature of MPAs is disregarded, i.e.  regarding only a single use of MPAs, 
cooperating on such a single use may produce worse outcomes than not 
cooperating at all when all uses are accounted for. 
Chapter 4 dealt with the question how the distribution of species over 
ecosystems in ocean space and how different ways of accounting for the 
contributions of others affects the MPA assignment in ecosystems. I developed 
a game theoretic model that incorporates the distribution of species over 
ecosystems into the decisions on MPA size in different ecosystems. Three 
different regimes were considered: full cooperation, strategic non-cooperation 
and ignoring the contribution of others. The model shows that unique species 
occurring in a single ecosystem are better protected than species that occur in 
multiple ecosystems, even when countries are behaving strategically. 
Furthermore ignoring contributions by others generally gives higher 
protection levels than strategic behavior, although MPA size is not as high and 
the full plan is not as efficient as the fully cooperative solution. 
Chapter 5 dealt with the effect of MPAs in the High Seas on the formation of 
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 Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMO). Note that “regional” 
in this case refers to a region of the High Seas, and that it is not a membership 
restriction. I adapted the fisheries model from Chapter 3 to a High Sea setting 
and combined it with a game theoretic model to investigate the stability of 
RFMO coalitions. I found that in the symmetric case MPAs are implemented 
but have no effect on stability. In the asymmetric case MPAs stabilize a number 
of extra coalitions such that more and larger coalitions are stable when an MPA 
is present compared to the no MPA case. Full cooperation, however, is not 
reached. 
6.2. Brief answers to the research questions 
In this section I will briefly discuss the results in light of the research questions. 
 
Question 1: How can spatial planning of new uses of ocean space improve the 
ecosystem management in the marine environment? 
 
Chapter 2 develops and applies a constrained spatial optimization model as a 
basic first step in spatial planning. In the model profits from the economic 
activity under consideration (i.e. offshore wind farms) are maximized, subject 
to spatial and non-spatial constraints. The spatial constraints are other 
activities, such as shipping or nature conservation. The non-spatial constraints 
are minimum or maximum targets, such as a total capacity target for offshore 
wind farms or a minimum number of birds that survive. 
The model results show that spatial considerations are very important 
factors when considering multiple activities, because one activity does not 
necessarily exclude another activity. In our model for example it is shown that, 
given the assumptions on the effects of offshore wind farms on bird and fish 
populations, it is possible to plan offshore wind farms such that bird 
populations are not harmed seriously and fish stocks increase. This suggest 
that synergy between marine nature conservation and offshore wind farms is 
possible. This has also been pointed out by Petersen and Malm (2006) who 
argue that careful siting of offshore wind farms may benefit the marine 
environment. Other possible synergies that have been suggested are offshore 
wind and aquaculture (Buck et al., 2004; Michler-Cieluch et al., 2009), nature 
conservation through MPAs and tourism (Brown et al., 2000; de Groot and 
Bush, 2010; Thur, 2010) nature conservation through MPAs and fisheries 
management (Tundi Agardy, 1994; Gell and Roberts, 2003; Meester et al., 2004) 
and nature conservation and scientific research (Lindeboom, 1995). These 
possible synergies can only be realized however, through marine spatial 
planning. 
Spatial optimization models such as the one described in Chapter 2 are 
useful tools to identify the areas where synergy possibilities exist and where 
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 trade-offs between activities have to be made. Furthermore the maps 
generated by such a model can then form the basis for discussions with and 
consultation of stakeholders. The views and opinions expressed in such 
meetings as well as new insights from ecological and economic science can 
then be incorporated in the model to generate new maps which can then be 
used as a basis for further discussions, resulting in an iterative process to 
derive a spatial master plan for an EEZ. Such an approach was used in e.g. 
California, resulting in a master plan for MPAs (Scholz et al., 2004; Gleason et 
al., 2010). Marine Spatial Planning does not stop there however. The ocean as 
well as the economy are dynamic systems, changing constantly. Therefore 
marine spatial planning has to be adaptive and flexible (Douvere et al., 2007; 
Douvere, 2008). 
In conclusion: Marine Spatial Planning is an instrument that, with the help 
of spatial optimization models and stakeholder involvement, can identify 
locations to maximize the effect of synergies and can show locations where 
trade-offs  between activities  must  be  considered.  Within  Marine  Spatial 
Planning, spatial optimization models can play a positive role in identifying 
these locations. Consequently Marine Spatial Planning is an instrument that 
can be used to improve the marine environment, while planning new activities 
on the seas. For its implementation, however, there is an urgent need for 
spatial models that combine ecological knowledge with economic information, 
such as this one. These models require further research into the ecological 
spatial  effects  of  activities  in  ocean  space,  as  well  as  detailed  spatial 
information on costs and benefits. 
 
Question 2: How does the multiple use nature of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) 
affect the incentives of countries to assign such areas? 
 
As demonstrated in the answer to the previous question there is a large 
scope for synergies between nature conservation and other economic activities 
in the seas through the use of MPAs. Consequently when an MPA is assigned 
it is expected to fulfil multiple goals. In Chapter 3 we look at one of the 
proposed synergies: fisheries and nature conservation through MPAs. 
On the local scale it is relatively easy to account for all benefits that an MPA 
creates, but at a regional sea scale this is much harder, because multiple 
countries are involved that both derive benefits from an MPA designated in a 
single country’s EEZ. When dealing with a single use countries may choose to 
free-ride: a single country bears the costs of the MPA, whereas all countries 
benefit. In equilibrium countries will only assign an MPA of the size that is 
beneficial to each of them separately.  
Chapter 3 investigates how these incentives change once the multiple use 
nature  of  MPAs is  accounted  for.  The  full  game theoretic  model  is  a 
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 combination of two sub-models:  a fisheries model where symmetric countries 
decide simultaneously on their MPA size in their EEZ and their level of fishing 
effort and a nature conservation model where countries decide simultaneously 
on their MPA size in their EEZ. In the fisheries model the MPA generates 
benefits for all countries by increasing the internal growth rate of the shared 
fish stock, but reducing the catchability of the stock in a single country. In the 
conservation model the number of protected species within all MPAs generate 
benefits to all countries but the cost of an MPA in a country’s EEZ are borne by 
that country alone. Both sub-models offer scope for free-riding. 
If a single use is considered for an MPA the equilibrium of both sub-models 
is a non-cooperative outcome, i.e. the MPA size assigned is smaller than under 
full cooperation. When countries consider both uses of the MPA the final 
outcome is qualitatively the same, i.e. non-cooperative and smaller than under 
full cooperation. MPA sizes assigned are a compromise between the non-
cooperative outcomes of the different single uses. Because accounting for all 
uses does not change the game structure per se, it does not induce cooperation.  
This outcome does not imply that nothing is gained from accounting for all 
uses, or that we should focus on a single use and try to reach cooperation on 
that  single  use.  On the contrary,  the outcome of  the game shows that 
accounting for a single activity and cooperating accounting only for that 
activity may be worse than not cooperating at all, if the benefits from both uses 
are accounted for. This particular outcome occurs because cooperating on a 
single issue may induce an MPA size that is so large that its negative effects on 
one use cancel out all gains from the other use. In our example this holds for 
the conservation case, but depending on parameter values it could also occur 
for fisheries, although this seems less probable. Consequently, cooperating on a 
single use can be worse than not cooperating at all.  
In conclusion: the multiple use nature of MPAs does not change the 
structure of the incentives but does change the outcomes. Accounting for all 
possible uses when assigning an MPA is important because ignoring one use 
can undo all positive gains from another. Therefore it is very important that 
activities in the marine domain such as fisheries and nature conservation are 
considered simultaneously. This implies that the sectoral approach in policy 
making should be replaced with a more holistic and integral approach, such as 
Marine Spatial Planning. 
 
Question 3: How does perceived uniqueness of species and their distribution over 
ecosystems owned by different countries affect the MPA assignment of countries? 
 
The answer to the previous question addressed how incentives to assign 
MPAs change as a result of their multiple use nature. In Chapter 4 I assumed 
that all uses have been accounted for and I studied how the distribution of 
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 species over ecosystems and the attitudes towards conservation by other 
countries affect the MPA assignment in a country. 
The model devised in this chapter represents a two player game. The game 
comprises a number of ecosystems, and each country has authority over a 
number of these ecosystems. Each ecosystem is a stand-alone unit but there is 
overlap in species between ecosystems. In each ecosystem an MPA can be 
assigned, protecting the ecosystem and consequently protecting the direct and 
indirect services the ecosystem provides. The direct services accrue only to the 
country that owns the ecosystem and are a function of the level of protection of 
that ecosystem, the indirect services depend on the total number of species 
protected in all ecosystems and accrue to countries in equal shares. The level of 
protection, i.e. the size of the MPA, in each ecosystem is investigated under full 
cooperation,  strategic  non-cooperation  and  conservation  autarky.  Under 
strategic non-cooperation countries take contributions by others as given, 
under conservation autarky countries ignore contributions by others. 
In general ecosystems that contain many unique species are better protected 
than ecosystems that contain species occurring in many ecosystems. This holds 
for all scenarios, although the level of protection is lower under strategic non-
cooperation  and  conservation  autarky  than  under  the  fully  cooperative 
solution. An interesting feature of conservation autarky is that individual 
countries  consider  some  ecosystems  to  contain  unique  species,  and 
consequently  assign  larger  MPAs  there  than  would  have  been  strictly 
necessary, because there is overlap with the other country. 
How the species distribution over ecosystems affects MPA assignment 
depends critically on the perceived uniqueness of the species by countries. 
Taking full cooperation as a benchmark, countries assign too small MPAs if 
they account for protection of species in other countries, but only value the 
protection in their own country. In contrast if countries ignore the protection of 
species by other countries some ecosystems are better protected than under 
strategic non-cooperation.  
In conclusion: Unique species are generally better protected than general 
species,  especially  if  these  species  occur  transboundary.  Although 
“conservation autarky” is not as good as a fully cooperative solution when 
trying to maximize global welfare, it is generally better than strategic non-
cooperative behavior, especially for species that occur only near the boundary. 
Also our cooperative protection effort should focus on species that occur 
transboundary in a broad range as these are the ones that are under the most 
severe threat.  
 
Question 4: How does the assignment of MPAs in the  High Seas influence the 
formation of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs)? 
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 The previous questions all focused on local or regional scale where property 
rights have been clearly delineated. This question in contrast is focused on the 
High Sea level, where property rights have not been explicitly defined and that 
are governed by international law, treaties and custom. 
In Chapter 3 we have seen how MPAs can change incentives. The setting of 
the High Sea is different from the one in this chapter however, because there 
are no EEZs, and effort restrictions cannot be enforced, i.e. they have to be 
voluntary. 
In Chapter 5 I investigated how MPAs can be assigned on the High Seas, 
and how they make a difference in the formation of international fishing 
agreements on the High Seas, i.e. RFMOs. Using the MPA fisheries model from 
Chapter 3 and combining it with a coalition formation model for RFMOs 
designed by Pintassilgo et al. (2010) I investigated the coalitions formed with 
and without MPAs, in otherwise similar circumstances. 
The first important finding is that for MPAs to work in the High Seas they 
have to be acknowledged and respected by all. They are in effect a public good 
of the weakest-link type. Therefore the size of the MPA will be equal to the 
smallest optimal size proposed by a country or a coalition of countries. If a 
larger MPA would be declared, the country that wishes a smaller size can 
simply create an MPA of the desired size by fishing in parts of the MPA until it 
reaches the desired size. 
Another important finding is the large difference in outcome between fully 
identical countries and countries that have differing fishing costs. In the model 
of Pintassilgo et al. (2010) no coalition is stable in the case of identical countries 
and only small coalitions are stable when countries differ in fishing costs. I 
found that with MPAs in the symmetric case still no coalition is stable, and the 
MPA size is also always the same; the globally optimal size. In the asymmetric 
case with MPAs, more and larger coalitions are stable, although full 
cooperation is not necessarily reached. Furthermore the MPA size is smaller 
than the globally optimal, unless full cooperation is reached. 
In asymmetric settings coalitions have a cost advantage over free riders and 
this advantage is increased by MPAs. This cost advantage is the driving force 
behind the stability, and hence MPAs generally increase stability, if countries 
are not too symmetric. In the symmetric case no cost advantage exists and 
consequently MPAs have no influence, but because everyone gains and suffers 
from the MPA in equal shares the optimal MPA size is still reached, even 
though the potential full benefits are not reaped. 
In conclusion: the assignment of MPAs in the High Seas generally improves 
the stability of RFMOs, if countries are asymmetric. They have no effect on the 
incentives if countries are symmetric but they do increase profits and stock in 
that case. 
Three important conclusions can be drawn from this thesis as a whole. First 
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 Marine Spatial Planning and Marine Protected Areas can contribute in a 
positive way to the management of human activities in ocean space. Second, 
neither of them is a silver bullet. Both need careful implementation, where all 
uses are accounted for, and especially the public good aspects of MPAs needs 
to be addressed. Third the success of MPAs (and as such of Marine Spatial 
Planning)  is not only highly dependent on the incentives and social norms but 
also on the implementation scale. As shown in the introductory chapter there 
are a number of governance levels in ocean space and I have shown in the 
subsequent chapters how these scale levels result in different incentives for 
MPA assignment. 
 
6.3. Conclusions on methodology 
In this section I will address the appropriateness of the methodology in the 
different chapters and outline their strengths and weaknesses. 
In Chapter 2 a spatial optimization model was formulated. The strength of 
the model lies in the fact that through the spatial explicitness possible synergies 
and trade-offs can be examined that could not have been identified otherwise. 
The spatial specification of revenues and costs of offshore wind farms, as well 
as the combination with some of the potential spatial ecological effects allows 
explorations of effects and possibilities that are otherwise ignored. Even 
though some of the ecological effects are severely simplified, the potential of 
the model is clearly illustrated. The weaker points of the model are the linear 
parameterization of the ecological model and the fact that the model is not 
dynamic, whereas the ocean system is inherently dynamic. In order to be of 
good use in practical policy making and to form a basis for ecosystem based 
management, it would be useful to be able to quantify the effect of offshore 
wind farms on the environment more precisely. An ecological model is needed, 
that takes into account the major effects of offshore wind farms, and includes a 
time dependent specification. 
Another important point, as has been pointed out under the research 
questions, is that such a model can only be one of the first steps in a Marine 
Spatial Planning process. Although a number of other economic uses have been 
included in the model some of the possible uses may only be identified after 
discussions with stakeholders. Furthermore some of the effects of offshore 
wind farms that are not taken into account in the model may only become clear 
after discussions, such as effort displacement of fishermen. The maps resulting 
from different scenarios should therefore not be taken as an endpoint but as the 
starting point for a discussion.  
In the other chapters I analyzed strategic aspects of the assignment of MPAs, 
sometimes spatial, sometimes non-spatial. The economist’s tool of choice to 
analyze strategic situations is game theory. Game theory is a mathematical 
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 method to analyze strategic interactions among agents.  Agents choose a 
strategy from their possible set of strategies, such that they maximize their 
payoffs given the behavior of other agents. Because MPAs constitute at least 
partly public  goods and fish stocks constitute a common pool resource 
strategic interaction between countries is likely to occur. Therefore game 
theory is an appropriate method to analyze such situations. 
In Chapter 3 I formulated a model where MPAs are an instrument for 
fisheries management as well as a model where MPAs are an instrument for 
nature conservation. Although both the strategic effects of MPAs have been 
studied (e.g. Sumaila, 2002 and Ruijs and Janmaat, 2007) as well as the 
economic consequences of their multiple uses (e.g. Brown et al., 2000 and 
Boncoeur et al., 2002) their combination has not been considered so far.  
The fisheries MPA model of Chapter 3 (and Chapter 5) is highly stylized, 
and relies on simplifying assumptions such as a single stock that is uniformly 
distributed, and no interaction effects between the fish stock and other stocks. 
The assumption of uniform distribution is unusual in MPA models, because in 
the absence of other effects an MPA would just make fishing more inefficient. 
However, as we have argued in Chapters 3 and 5, following Armstrong (2007), 
Armstrong and Falk-Petersen (2008), Sanchirico (2004) and Schnier (2005a,b), 
MPAs may have a habitat effect, increasing the growth rate of the fish stock, 
and this can be captured by increasing the growth rate in the MPA. The spill-
over between MPA and fishable area depends on movement parameters. In 
our model movement is not explicitly modeled, but low movement out of the 
MPA could be captured by adjusting the growth rate bonus downward. The 
exact ecological and spill-over effects of MPAs urgently need further research, 
especially in the temperate regions, because the justification for MPAs for 
fisheries management lies in these effects. 
The MPA as a nature conservation tool in Chapter 3 shows the importance 
of considering the transboundary aspects of the species in MPAs. Busch (2008) 
has shown that the gains of transboundary parks depend upon the exact goals 
and how they are measured. In the model in Chapter 3 there are diminishing 
returns in number of protected species per extra unit of area, and protection in 
one country is a substitute for protection in another country. Therefore 
countries have an incentive to free-ride on the contribution of others, but this is 
not necessarily true in absence of these assumptions. I explored this subject 
further in Chapter 4. 
Symmetry is an important assumption in Chapter 3 as well. Chapters 4 and 
5 clearly show the important differences that occur through the introduction of 
asymmetry. In general the introduction of asymmetry mitigates the effects of 
non-cooperation to some extent, because it introduces greater cooperation and 
better protection, although not up to the fully cooperative level. We can 
therefore think of symmetry as a worst case scenario. 
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 The multiple use nature of MPAs applies equally to transboundary parks 
and ecosystems in a terrestrial setting; they provide multiple services (e.g. 
Munthali, 2007 and López-Hoffman et al., 2010). Accounting for all these 
services is important and transboundary cooperation on just one service may 
be detrimental to another. 
Chapter 4 can be thought of as an extension of the conservation model in 
Chapter  3.  In  this  chapter  I  explored  the  subject  of  substitution  and 
transboundary species further and on a higher ecological scale. The fact that 
species do not occur in all places necessitates a spatial model, and this is 
exactly what is formulated in Chapter 4. To reduce the complexity the model in 
Chapter 4 is one dimensional; it can be interpreted as a coast line or transect. 
The extension to a two dimensional model is straightforward, but adds little 
value to the basic analysis.   
The analysis of transboundary protection and especially the issue of 
substitution between protected areas or, more generally, nature conservation 
by different countries is still in its infancy. A number of authors explore the 
current efficiency of transboundary protection in a terrestrial context (e.g. Kark 
et al., 2009 and Jantke and Schneider, 2010) but to my knowledge no such 
attempt has been made in the marine domain. Moreover these authors 
consider efficiency, i.e. they compare a situation of full cooperation with what I 
have termed “conservation autarky”, but strategic non-cooperation is not 
explored. This is where Chapter 4 contributes: it formulates a framework in 
which both strategic non-cooperation and conservation autarky can be 
explored, in a spatially explicit model. 
Game theory requires an approach where benefits and costs are explicitly 
accounted for, because of the difference between the shared benefits and the 
individual costs. The usual approach for these kind of protected area selection 
problems is a cost minimization approach, or a maximization under a budget 
constraint (Williams et al., 2005). This is the very first paper applying game 
theory to this subject, and therefore our benefits approach is necessarily very 
stylized. In later papers the description of the benefits and costs as well as the 
exact calibration of the ecological model can be more precise, but for now the 
model gives at least some intuition of the problems at hand in transboundary 
conservation. 
In Chapter 5 I used game theoretic concepts from the literature on 
international environmental agreements and the fisheries MPA model from 
Chapter 3 to provide insights in how MPAs affect the formation and stability 
of RFMOs. The decision on the size of the MPA is modeled as a weakest link 
game as described by Hirshleifer (1983) and Sandler (1998). The assumption 
that a country can destroy the habitat effect in a part of the MPA by starting to 
fish in that area, may seem a rather extreme, but is justified if the fisheries 
activity comprises e.g. frequent trawling in vulnerable benthos. 
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 The game is in essence a broadening of the model formulated by Pintassilgo 
et al. (2010) and looks at the formation of RFMOs in a broader context, 
accounting for more management tools, i.e. MPAs, in High Sea fisheries. These 
tools generally broaden the scope for cooperation.   
6.4. Policy recommendations 
Looking at the previous conclusions we get the following recommendations for 
policy makers in order to manage our marine resources optimally: 
Marine Spatial Planning is a step forward, that needs to be implemented. To be 
successful,  however,  it  needs to be holistic,  and run across sectors and 
stakeholders. Modeling tools such as the one described in Chapter 2 form an 
important basis, but are just the beginning, not the end point. Also, we need to 
be clear on objectives and (expected) effects, and involve stakeholders from the 
beginning of the process. Only in this way can we achieve an ecosystem-based 
management plan for our EEZ. 
As part of the Marine Spatial Planning process, and in the European context 
within the Marine Strategies that countries are in the process of formulating, 
MPAs should be included. MPAs offer a broad range of possible advantages, 
but their potential can only be fully realized if all uses of the MPA are 
accounted for. At the local level again, the involvement of stakeholders is 
crucial to identify the possible costs and benefits of MPAs. As shown in 
Chapter 3, at the more regional level the economic incentives for under-
provision of MPAs are strong because most of their beneficial effects are public 
goods.  Although  the  Marine  Strategy  Directive  encourages  countries  to 
cooperate it cannot enforce cooperation. Therefore in the EU the Maritime 
Policy  should  be  strengthened  to  enforce  these  MPA  assignments. 
Alternatively, it can be structured such that the incentives associated with the 
assignment of MPAs are realigned. Possible examples include increasing the 
fishing quota of countries that assign shared MPAs for fisheries, or the 
possibility to account for shared MPAs for countries that have to meet 
conservation objectives. 
When MPAs have conservation as a main goal, the location and size of 
MPAs is strongly influenced by the distribution of species or other ecological 
features,  as  shown  in  Chapter  4.  In  the  absence  of  enforcement  or  a 
realignment  of  incentives  countries  will  generally  free-ride  on  the 
transboundary species. Therefore, exactly these kind of species that should 
receive the most attention when bargaining about conservation efforts among 
countries. Species that are unique to a country will generally receive more 
protection, and are therefore less prone to international bargaining efforts on 
conservation, given of course that countries have enough funds to protect the 
species in the first place. 
Chapter 5 shows the importance of  MPA presence in the High Seas. Their 
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 presence may make bargaining over effort and reaching stable effort coalitions 
easier. Because MPAs  have to be agreed upon unanimously they are a weakest 
link good. The scope for reaching agreements on large MPAs in the High Seas 
is therefore small, and international efforts should focus on protecting the most 
vulnerable areas first, especially the areas that are nursery areas. By protecting 
these, their habitat function is restored and this may in turn improve the fish 
stock, which in turn may give scope for larger agreements. 
6.5. Recommendations for further research 
Marine Spatial Planning can make a positive contribution to protection of the 
marine environment. Our model in Chapter 2 shows the potential of models as 
a tool for scenario analysis and as a basis for discussions with stakeholders. To 
really use such a model in practice however, the ecological relationships 
between offshore wind farms and the environment need to be further clarified. 
A lot of the research done here has implications for terrestrial research, 
especially  the  research  on  transboundary  parks  and ecosystem services. 
Including ecosystem services and environmental effects of economic activities 
in terrestrial and marine spatial planning is a step forward that has been 
implemented by some but not by all. 
The use of game theory in (terrestrial) allocation of reserves is a relative new 
and unexplored area of research. Most of the research done on transboundary 
parks is terrestrial and uses reserve site selection methods. Incorporation of 
game theory directly in these methods is difficult because these methods 
generally use cost effectiveness or optimization under a budget constraint. For 
game theory to be used in these areas we need to reformulate these problems 
to benefits approaches or devise a way of incorporating game theory in these 
algorithms.  
The conservation models in both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are symmetric in 
their benefits function, i.e. in both cases the benefits of conservation accrue to 
all countries in equal shares. An interesting case to further explore is to relax 
this assumption, as well as a more unequal endowment of biodiversity. Similar 
work but on a higher scale level has been done by Barrett (1994) who explores 
the incentives for biodiversity conservation in the poor regions of the world 
paid for by the rich part and the associated incentives in a supergame. He finds 
that the developed countries of the world have an incentive to contribute too 
little to conservation of this kind, and that a fully cooperative solution that is 
renegotiation proof offers little extra benefits. 
The notion that MPAs are a weakest link good in absence of enforcement is 
also  interesting  from  a  terrestrial  perspective,  especially  in  developing 
countries where enforcement of conservation areas is often difficult. Applying 
a similar framework on a lower level, i.e. that of stakeholders may be an 
interesting extension. In that case it would also be important to account for all 
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 the costs and benefits from protected areas, especially to the stakeholders. By 
accounting for all possible opportunity costs and benefits of the stakeholders 
one can try to find the protected area size that is  acceptable to all.  If 
opportunity costs are very high or benefits do not accrue to stakeholders this 
minimum size may be absent. 
Finally the ecological effects of human activities on ocean space and their 
interactions are an area of urgent research need. With offshore wind farms we 
generally know their direct impacts, but their long term effects and spatial spill
-over effects are generally unknown. The same holds for MPAs; we generally 
know what happens inside, but their effects on the surrounding areas and the 
human response are less well known, whereas my work and that of others has 
shown the importance of human behaviour on (spatial) spill-over effects, 
especially since the spill-over effects are generally public goods.  
6.6. (Sea)Food for thought 
Ocean space is still as limitless as in the days of Hugo de Groot, considering 
how little we know about the ocean floor and the full ocean system. Even with 
our limited knowledge however, it is clear that we are rapidly approaching 
some of its boundaries.  Rockström et al. (2009) have identified the “Planetary 
Boundaries”, nine interrelated boundaries on important geo-physical processes 
and current trends, that keep our planet stable and habitable. Ocean space is an 
integral and important part of these boundaries. For some of these boundaries 
it functions as a supplier (e.g. the fresh water cycle and biodiversity), for some 
it functions as a sink (e.g. ocean acidification and chemical pollution) and for 
some it functions as a stabilizing element (e.g. climatic change). As we are 
finding out more about these boundaries, we are also discovering the vital role 
the ocean system plays in these processes. 
To make sure that we do not cross these boundaries and to make sure that 
both the current and future generation can continue to enjoy the goods and 
services provided by the ocean we have to manage our activities on land as 
well as on ocean space. Management is needed on all scale levels and needs to 
be integrated across sectors and space, incorporating both ecology and socio-
economic aspects. This thesis has shown how Marine Spatial Planning and its 
tools can play a positive role in achieving such management. 
At the European level the first steps towards such an integrated approach 
have  been  taken  with  the  formulation  of  the  Maritime  Policy,  and  its 
subsidiaries the Marine Strategy Directive and the Common Fisheries Policy. If 
we can manage to implement this policy, whilst avoiding the pitfalls of free-
riding, as well as involve the stakeholders to design Marine Strategies at the 
country level, the foundations for good management for now and the future 
have been laid. 
In this way, with well-coordinated management of our human activities in 
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 ocean space, we may be able to turn the negative trends into positive ones such 
that we and future generations can continue to benefit from our planet that we 
inappropriately called Earth, when it is quite clearly “Ocean” (Arthur C. 
Clarke). 
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Summary 
 
Ocean space is in a crisis. Globally, many fish stocks are over-exploited or in 
decline, pollution increases, and there is an increasing competition among the 
growing number of users and activities in ocean space. 
Yet, ocean space forms the basis for a large number of ecosystem goods 
such as food and provides essential ecosystem services such as climate 
regulation, that form the foundation for our human economy. If we want to be 
able to sustainably harvest the goods from the system and keep the 
foundations of our economy stable we will have to manage our activities in 
ocean space in a radically different way. 
A new way of management that offers a new holistic perspective for 
ecosystem based management of our ocean space is Marine Spatial Planning 
(MSP). Although far from a panacea, Marine Spatial Planning, with Marine 
Protected Areas as one of its tools is a dynamic approach that can identify 
possible synergies and plan economic activities in ocean space in such a way 
that they do not cause irreversible damage to the system. 
Many open questions remain in the area of optimal management of marine 
resources through Marine Spatial Planning and Marine Protected Areas 
(MPAs). First of all the suitability of MSP and MPAs depends on the activity 
being managed and the state of the ocean system. Second the suitability of the 
instruments is scale dependent, because different sets of rules and regulations 
apply on different scale levels of ocean space management. 
This thesis focuses on three scale levels, based on the regulatory framework. 
These levels are: a single country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a 
territorial sea fully claimed by Exclusive Economic Zones and the High Seas. 
At the first level activities are governed by the laws of a single country. At the 
second level the activities within the EEZ are governed by the local laws, but 
countries cannot force each other to cooperate or exhibit certain activities. At 
the third level activities of countries are governed by international law only. 
In this thesis I investigate the use of Marine Spatial Planning of offshore 
wind farms on the level of a single country’s Exclusive Economic Zone, and I 
investigate the suitability of MPAs as instruments for both fisheries 
management and conservation on the scale level involving several Exclusive 
Economic Zones as well as the High Sea level. 
At the first level I study the spatial planning of offshore wind farms with an 
optimization model that allocates offshore wind farms under ecological 
constraints. The model results show that space is an essential element to 
derive an optimal management plan of the EEZ, because the allocation of 
offshore wind farms is highly dependent on both spatial economic factors such 
 142 
 
 as location costs and ecological restrictions. The results show that Marine 
Spatial Planning is necessary, because only in this way can possible synergies 
between e.g. offshore wind farms and environmental protection be identified 
and eventually realized. The model can assist with the first steps in Marine 
Spatial Planning of offshore wind farms; its results  can be used as a basis for 
conversation and consultation with stakeholders. 
I then move on to the second level to study MPAs as a tool for conservation 
and fisheries management. In a game theoretic model I investigate the multiple 
use nature of assigning MPAs in EEZs. MPAs are considered as an instrument 
for both fisheries management and nature conservation. The model results 
shows that the multiple use nature of MPAs does not alter the general 
free-riding incentives that are also present when it is used as solely as a 
fisheries management or nature conservation tool. The magnitude of the 
incentives and the general equilibrium MPA size do change. The free-riding 
MPA size becomes a compromise between the fisheries free-riding solution 
and the conservation free-riding solution. An interesting side effect of the 
multiple use nature of MPAs is, that if only a single use of MPAs is considered, 
cooperating on that single use may produce worse outcomes than not 
cooperating when accounting for all uses. Thus the importance of considering 
all possible uses and stakeholders of an MPA, and the need to realign 
incentives in MPA assignment on the regional scale is shown. 
At the same scale level I study how species distributions and different ways 
of accounting for the contributions of others affects MPA assignment as a tool 
for biodiversity conservation. With a spatial game theoretic model I investigate 
three different conservation regimes: full cooperation, strategic non-
cooperation, and conservation autarky. Under strategic non-cooperation 
countries anticipate protection by the other, under conservation autarky they 
ignore these contributions. The main results show that unique species 
occurring in a single ecosystem are relatively well protected, even when 
countries are free-riding. Species that occur in multiple ecosystems on both 
sides of the border in contrast are under non-cooperation under-protected, 
compared to full cooperation. This is in part caused by location leakage, i.e. 
protecting a number of species less because they are protected by others. On 
the one hand conservation autarky eliminates location leakage and generates 
larger MPAs at the border. On the other hand these MPA sizes are often too 
high from a global perspective. From this we can conclude that international 
conservation efforts should mainly focus on transboundary occurring species. 
Also, although conservation autarky is not a first-best solution, if it occurs, e.g. 
through social norms, it is certainly better than strategic non-cooperation.  
I then move on to the third level: international waters or the High Seas. I 
study the effect of the assignment of internationally recognized MPAs in the 
High Seas on the formation of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
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 (RFMO) with a game theoretic model.  
MPAs are assigned through a weakest-link game: because everyone has to 
agree on an MPA before it actually can be protected, it can only be as large as 
the strongest opposing player wants it to be. The full coalition formation of the 
RFMO follows a three stage game: in the first stage countries sign up to the 
RFMO, in the second stage both RFMO members and non-members agree on 
an MPA size through a weakest-link game and in the last stage RFMO 
members and non-members choose their fishing effort. The game is solved 
with backward induction. 
 I find that if countries have equal costs and benefits MPAs of optimal size 
are implemented but these have no effect on stability of RFMOs; the only stable 
coalition is the coalition where everyone acts alone. In the case where countries 
face different fishing costs, MPAs stabilize a number of extra coalitions such 
that more and larger coalitions are stable when an MPA is present compared to 
the no MPA case. Full cooperation, however, is not necessarily reached. A 
general conclusion is therefore that the assignment of MPAs in the High Seas 
can not only improve the fisheries through direct effects such as insurance and 
possible increases in catches, but also indirect by contributing in a positive way 
to the formation of RFMOs. 
Three important conclusions can be drawn from this thesis as a whole. First 
Marine Spatial Planning and Marine Protected Areas can contribute in a 
positive way to the management of human activities in ocean space. Second, 
neither of them is a silver bullet. Both need careful implementation, where all 
uses are accounted for, and especially the public good aspects of MPAs needs 
to be addressed. Third the success of MPAs (and as such of Marine Spatial 
Planning)  is not only highly dependent on the incentives and social norms but 
also on the implementation scale. As shown in the introductory chapter there 
are a number of governance levels in ocean space and I have shown in the 
subsequent chapters how these scale levels result in different incentives for 
both MPA assignment and Marine Spatial Planning.   
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Samenvatting 
 
De oceanische ruimte verkeert in een crisis. Wereldwijd is sprake van 
overbevissing, vele visbestanden nemen af, vervuiling neemt toe, en er is 
steeds meer concurrentie tussen het groeiende aantal gebruikers en activiteiten 
in de oceanische ruimte. 
Dat terwijl de oceanische ruimte de basis vormt voor een groot aantal 
ecosysteemgoederen en ecosysteemdiensten zoals voedsel en de regulering 
van het klimaat, die de basis vormen voor onze economie. Als we de goederen 
uit de oceanische ruimte duurzaam willen kunnen blijven oogsten en de 
fundering van onze economie stabiel willen houden zullen we onze 
activiteiten in de oceanische ruimte op een radicaal andere manier moeten 
beheren. Het roer moet om. 
Ruimtelijke planning op zee is een nieuwe manier van management met 
een holistische kijk waarbij het ecosysteem de basis vormt voor het beheer. 
Hoewel zeker geen wondermiddel, is ruimtelijke planning op zee, met 
zeereservaten als een van de gereedschappen, een dynamische benadering 
waarmee synergieën gecreëerd kunnen worden en waarmee economische 
activiteiten zodanig gepland kunnen worden dat ze geen onomkeerbare 
schade aan het systeem toebrengen.  
Er zijn nog veel openstaande vragen op het gebied van optimaal beheer van 
hulpbronnen op zee, door middel van ruimtelijke planning op zee en 
zeereservaten. Allereerst hangt de geschiktheid van ruimtelijke planning op 
zee en zeereservaten als beleidsinstrument af van de activiteit die we willen 
beheren en van de status van het oceanisch systeem. Ten tweede hangt de 
geschiktheid van deze instrumenten af van het schaalniveau, omdat 
verschillende sets van regels en wetten van toepassing zijn op verschillende 
schaalniveaus in de oceanische ruimte. 
Dit proefschrift concentreert zich op drie schaalniveaus, die gebaseerd zijn 
op het kader van wetten en regels. Deze drie niveaus zijn: de Exclusieve 
Economische Zone (EEZ) van één land, een territoriale zee die volledig 
geclaimd wordt door meerdere Exclusieve Economische Zones en de 
internationale wateren. Op het eerste niveau worden activiteiten gestuurd 
door de wetten van één land. Op het tweede niveau worden de activiteiten 
binnen de EEZ gestuurd door lokale wetten van verschillende landen, maar 
landen kunnen elkaar niet dwingen om samen te werken of bepaalde 
activiteiten op zee uit te voeren. Op het derde niveau worden de activiteiten 
van landen uitsluitend gestuurd door het internationaal recht. 
In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik het gebruik van ruimtelijke planning voor 
het plannen van windmolenparken op zee binnen de EEZ van één land (eerste 
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 niveau). Verder onderzoek ik de geschiktheid van zeereservaten als 
beleidsinstrumenten voor zowel de visserij als natuurbehoud. Dit laatste 
onderzoek vindt plaats op het schaalniveau waarbij verschillende EEZs 
betrokken zijn (tweede niveau) en op het schaalniveau van de internationale 
wateren (derde niveau). 
Op het eerste niveau onderzoek ik de ruimtelijke planning van windmolens 
op zee met een optimaliseringsmodel dat windparken op zee toewijst, 
rekening houdend met ecologische beperkingen. Uit de resultaten blijkt dat 
ruimte een essentieel onderdeel is voor een optimaal beheerplan van de EEZ, 
omdat de toewijzing van windparken erg afhankelijk is van ruimtelijke 
economische factoren zoals de kosten op locatie en ecologische beperkingen. 
De resultaten laten ook zien dat ruimtelijke planning op zee noodzakelijk is, 
omdat alleen op deze manier mogelijke win-win situaties tussen bijvoorbeeld 
windparken op zee en milieubescherming geïdentificeerd en gerealiseerd 
kunnen worden. Het model kan een hulpmiddel zijn voor de eerste stappen bij 
ruimtelijke planning op zee; de resultaten kunnen als basis dienen voor 
verdere consultatie en communicatie met belanghebbenden. 
Op het volgende niveau onderzoek ik het gebruik van zeereservaten als 
beleidsinstrument voor natuurbehoud en visserijbeleid. Met een 
speltheoretisch model onderzoek ik het effect van het multifunctionele 
karakter van zeereservaten op het aanwijzen van deze reservaten in EEZs. 
Reservaten worden in het model beschouwd als een instrument voor zowel 
visserijbeleid als natuurbehoud.  
De modelresultaten laten zien dat het multifunctionele karakter van 
zeereservaten geen invloed heeft op de algemene neiging van landen om mee 
te liften op elkaars bijdrage, die ook aanwezig is als zeereservaten worden 
ingezet als beleidsinstrument voor uitsluitend de visserij of natuurbehoud.  In 
het evenwicht van ieder afzonderlijk spel, en van het gecombineerde spel 
wordt dus niet samengewerkt. De sterkte van deze neiging en de grootte van 
het zeereservaat in het evenwicht veranderen wel. De grootte van het 
zeereservaat in het evenwicht wordt een compromis tussen het meelift 
evenwicht van de visserij en het meelift evenwicht van natuurbehoud.  
Een interessante bijwerking van het multifunctionele karakter van 
zeereservaten is dat, als landen samenwerken bij het aanleggen van het 
zeereservaat, maar daarbij slechts op één gebruiksvorm van het zeereservaat 
letten, deze samenwerking in totaal een slechtere uitkomst kan geven dan 
wanneer ze niet samenwerken en wel op alle gebruiksvormen letten bij hun 
individuele keuzes.  
Hiermee is aangetoond hoe belangrijk het is om alle mogelijke 
gebruiksvormen van, en belanghebbenden bij, zeereservaten in acht te nemen. 
Verder heb ik laten zien hoe belangrijk het is dat de economische prikkels bij 
het aanwijzen van zeereservaten herschikt worden. 
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 Op hetzelfde schaalniveau onderzoek ik hoe het aanwijzen van 
zeereservaten voor biodiversiteitsbescherming afhangt van de manieren 
waarop landen rekening houden met elkaars besluiten en van de verdeling van 
plant- en diersoorten. Met een ruimtelijk speltheoretisch model onderzoek ik 
drie verschillende beschermingsregimes: volledig samenwerken, strategisch 
gedrag en beschermingsautarkie. Bij strategisch gedrag anticiperen landen op 
bescherming door de ander, bij beschermingsautarkie negeren ze bescherming 
door de ander.  
De resultaten laten zien dat unieke soorten die in één ecosysteem 
voorkomen relatief goed beschermd worden, zelfs als landen meeliften op de 
inspanningen van de anderen. Soorten die in meerdere ecosystemen aan beide 
kanten van de grens voorkomen worden, in vergelijking met volledige 
samenwerking, daarentegen te weinig beschermd als landen op elkaars 
inspanningen meeliften. Dit wordt gedeeltelijk veroorzaakt door 
locatielekkage: dat wil zeggen dat het ene land soorten minder beschermt, 
omdat andere landen ze al beschermen.  
Aan de ene kant zorgt beschermingsautarkie ervoor dat locatielekkage 
vervalt en reservaten aan de grens groter zijn. Aan de andere kant zijn deze 
reservaten uit mondiaal perspectief vaak groter dan nodig.  
Hieruit kunnen we concluderen dat de inspanningen voor internationale 
bescherming zich vooral zouden moeten richten op soorten die 
grensoverschrijdend voorkomen. Verder kunnen we concluderen dat, hoewel 
beschermingsautarkie niet de allerbeste oplossing is, indien het voorkomt, 
bijvoorbeeld als gevolg van morele verplichtingen, het in ieder geval beter is 
dan strategisch gedrag. 
Vervolgens ga ik door met het derde schaalniveau namelijk dat van de 
internationale wateren. Ik onderzoek het effect van internationaal erkende 
zeereservaten in internationale wateren op de formering van regionale 
visserijbeheer organisaties (RVOs) met een speltheoretisch model. 
Zeereservaten worden aangewezen door een spel met de zwakste schakel: 
omdat iedereen het eens moet zijn over een zeereservaat voordat het 
beschermd kan worden, kan het slechts zo groot zijn als de sterkste 
tegenstander van het reservaat wil dat het is. De volledige formering van een 
coalitie die een RVO vormt verloopt via een spel in drie stadia: in het eerste 
stadium worden landen lid van de RVO, in het tweede stadium onderhandelen 
de RVO leden en niet-leden over de grootte van het zeereservaat door middel 
van een spel met de zwakste schakel en in het derde en laatste stadium kiezen 
leden en niet-leden hoeveel ze willen vissen.  
Ik ontdek dat als landen gelijke kosten en baten hebben voor wat betreft 
visserij, ze een zeereservaat van optimale grootte aanwijzen, maar dat dit 
zeereservaat geen invloed heeft op de stabiliteit van de RVO; de enige stabiele 
coalitie is die waar ieder voor zichzelf gaat, dat wil zeggen er is geen coalitie. 
Als landen verschillende kosten hebben voor visserij en we vergelijken een 
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 situatie waarin landen niet onderhandelen over een zeereservaat met een 
situatie waarin ze dat wel doen, dan zien we dat zeereservaten ervoor zorgen 
dat een aantal extra coalities stabiel zijn. Het is echter niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
zo, dat volledige samenwerking bereikt wordt. Een algemene conclusie is dus 
dat het aanwijzen van zeereservaten in internationale wateren niet alleen de 
visserij kunnen verbeteren door directe effecten zoals een verzekeringsfunctie 
en het verbeteren van de vangsten, maar ook indirect door bij te dragen aan de 
formering van RVOs. 
Drie belangrijke conclusies kunnen getrokken worden als we dit hele 
proefschrift in ogenschouw nemen.  Allereerst dat zowel ruimtelijke planning 
op zee als zeereservaten op een positieve manier kunnen bijdragen aan het 
sturen van de menselijke activiteit in de oceanische ruimte. Ten tweede dat 
geen van beide een wondermiddel is. Allebei moeten ze zorgvuldig toegepast 
worden, rekening houdend met alle gebruiksvormen. Hierbij moet vooral gelet 
worden op de aspecten van zeereservaten die publieke goederen 
vertegenwoordigen. Ten derde hangt het succes van zeereservaten (en dus ook 
van ruimtelijke planning op zee) niet alleen sterk af van de prikkels en sociale 
normen maar ook van de schaal waarop ze worden toegepast. Zoals ik laat 
zien in de inleiding zijn er een aantal sturingsniveaus in de oceanische ruimte 
en in de daaropvolgende hoofdstukken toon ik aan dat deze schaalniveaus 
resulteren in verschillende prikkels voor zowel zeereservaten als ruimtelijke 
planning op zee. 
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